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
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
IN THE EVOLUTION AND EXECUTION OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY RELATIVE
TO JAPAN, 1936-1941

JAMES HENRY HERZOG

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By

James Henry Herzog

A.B., University of North Carolina, 1946 M.P.A., Harvard University, 1961

## Thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science at Brown University

June, 1963

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This thesis by James Henry Hersog is accepted in its present form by the Department of Political Science as satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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#### PREFACE

The role of the United States Navy in Japanese-American relations is an excellent example of a military branch of one country significantly influencing foreign relations with another country. In choosing a dissertation topic involving the United States Navy in international relations I gravitated to relations in the Pacific area, eventually narrowing the subject to a study of the role of the Navy in relations with Japan in the decade before Pearl Harbor. Once I had begun work at my first course of original material in the Naval Mistory Division, Navy Department, Washington, it was apparent that the early 1930's offered very little material, while the period beginning with 1936 was decidedly richer. Consequently, I further limited my field of study to the 1936-1941 period.

I consider myself most fortunate in the quality and quantity of original documents made available to me. Within the Naval History Division I was allowed access to the complete files of the War Plans Division (Op 16), the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Files, the unpublished work of Captain Tracy Kittredge which purportedly was to have been a history of the Navy in World War II, the unpublished narrative of Admiral Thomas C. Hart and naval orders and documents which were promulgated only within the structure of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The filing system of the Navy in the prewar period left much to be desired and cross-referencing was very limited, necessitating a page by page check in some folders to insure complete coverage.

Of equal importance to me, and most enjoyable from the view point of exact indexing and cross-referencing, were the State Department records in the National Archives. I visually sighted each State Department entry to

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and from the Navy Department for the period of study. Records and documents in the Naval War College and the Roosevelt Papers at Hyde Park were used to complement the Washington sources.

The interesting and varied facets of American relations with Japan involving the Navy made a topical rather than a purely chronological presentation seem best. There was a certain sacrifice involved in choosing the former approach because interesting material which did not "fit in" to any chapter and was too limited to warrant a separate chapter was left out of the paper. In this category I would place the personal relationships between Admiral Nomura and other senior Japanese naval officers with Admirals Ctark and Turner, the work of Naval Intelligence against the Japanese espionage network and the use of the Good Offices of the Navy by the Japanese to get restricted material released from other departmental control.

I am very grateful to a large number of persons without whose help I could never have finished in the time allowed me. I am particularly grateful to; Septain James C. Longino, USN, for his friendship and guidance as my naval adviser; Captain F. Kent Loomis, USN, Director of Naval History, for his assistance in granting clearance to classified Navy reconstruction for his assistance in granting clearance to classified Navy reconstruction. Commander Burton Robert Trexler, USN, for his prompt work in declassifying desired selections; Mr. Dean Allard, Custodian of Naval History Division files for his very cooperative assistance; Mr. William M. Franklin, Director Historical Office of the State Department for his advice and permission to review State Department classified documents, Mr. E. Taylor Parks for his assistance, advice and excellent cooperation in expediting the return of research materials to me; Mrs. Fatricia Dowling for cheerfully and efficiently supplying the voluminous files in the diplomatic records

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section of the National Archives; Mr. Herman Kahn, head of the Civil
Records Branch of the National Archives for his advice, Miss Elizabeth
Drewry, Director, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, for her assistance and
cooperation; Mr. John F. DiNapoli, Director of Libraries, Naval Mar College
for his assistance in promptly getting requested materials to me, Mrs.
Winifred R. Barton for the clerical assistance in preparing the thesis, and
finally and most importantly, my very able and patient adviser, Doctor
Whitney Trow Perkins, who generously gave his time, suggestions and guidance.

Any mistakes or shortcoming are solely mine and should not reflect upon any of my cherished acquaintances who have helped me along the way.

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## CHAPTER ONE

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

## Introduction.

In the Fall of 1936 a newly re-elected President Franklin Roosevelt relaxed in South American waters on the cruiser, U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS. While on the cruise the President learned of the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25 tying Japan to Germany and Italy in agreements directed at communism and the Third International. Germany the previous Spring had violated the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties by reoccupying the demilitarised Rhineland and the Italians had taken Addis Ababa in July to end their Ethiopian war. The actions of the two European militants seemed to be part of the pattern begun by the Japanese in their seizure of Manchuria in 1931. The news that the three leading aggressors of the time were united was certainly reason enough for the President to inquire of his naval aide the status of the nation's war plans. The answer to the President received by the naval aide from the Chief of Naval Operations covered the general status of the war plans and emphasized that the war planners in the Navy considered Japan the most probable enemy with which the United States might wage war.

The war between Japan and the United States which finally broke out on December 7, 1941 has been called "the logical results of the events which began in Manchuria." If the Manchurian Incident were considered the start of a trend of events, the tempo of sequence of those events increased noticeably in 1936 and accelerated until the crippling naval defeat at Pearl

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 220.

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# Introduction.

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Harbor brought the United States into war. In 1936 actions by Germany and Italy and the outbreek of the Spanish Civil War filled the headlines of American newspapers, but the attention of the United States Navy was focused in the Pacific and future relations with Japan. The frame of reference through which the naval strategists viewed their problems was drawn from the traditional roles of the Navy in the Pacific, the theories of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the history of Japanese actions in the Pacific, the experience of the recent naval treaties and the attitudes of the statesmen of the nation toward problems in the Orient.

The assessment by the Navy of Japan as the most likely enemy of the United States had obvious historical roots. Before developing the role of the Navy in the relations between Japan and the United States from 1936 to Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to examine briefly the influences and background which conditioned the thinking of the naval leaders in 1936.

## Traditional roles of the Navy in the Far East.

East. One, almost as old as American trade with China, was the group of naval vessels stationed in the Orient since 1835 to protect American nationals and their commerce. It was from the American forces in the Far East that Commodore Ferry drew support in the "opening" of Japan in 1853 and from which Admiral Dewey formed his force to attack the Spanish at Manila in 1898. In the twentieth century the collective vessels in the Orient were called the Asiatic Fleet.

A second and more modern relationship of the Navy to the Far East came with the rapid acquisition of islamis in the Pacific in 1898-1899. Possession of Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines raised the American flag over

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potential naval bases strategically located between the west coast and the Far East. A line of communications seemed in place ready to be developed to promote increased commerce with the Orient, and, concomitantly, there arose the responsibility for the Navy to defend the line across the Pacific. The lack of existing bases and the absence of a fleet capable of defending the new territories or future bases were major problems to be solved if possession of the islands were to be an asset instead of a liability. The solution of the two basically naval problems; i.e., secure bases and a strong fleet, would become the most important strategical consideration in the Pacific in the twentieth century.

## The Influence of Mahan in the Pacific.

The recognised authoritative figure on naval affairs and international relations in the late mineteenth century was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. First as a lecturer and then as second President of the newly established Naval War College, Mahan developed his knowledge of naval history and in 1890 published his first lectures under the title: "The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783." The book, an excellent history of British naval development, a clear explanation of the art of naval warfare and a strong endorsement of a large navy, was well known and well received in Europe before it attracted attention in the United States. The admiration of Mahan for the British naval and mercantile growth and power ensured favorable reception in Britain. In Germany, Wilhelm II was so impressed with the book that he ordered a copy placed in the wardroom of each ship in the new German Navy, and more of Mahan's works were translated into Japanese

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than into any other language. In the United States his reputation was primarily among scholars and naval officers, although his prolific pen accounted for numerous articles in the periodicals. The two most ardent exponents of Mahan's ideas, who through personal friendship had direct access to his views on international and naval affairs, were Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, later President, Theodore Roosevelt.

Mahan's theory may be summarized as follows: In order for a nation to be truly great it must have see power. See power encompassed a merchant marine, markets, bases, and a strong capital ship navy to guarantee the use of lines of communications. The six natural factors in a country upon which see power depended were: (1) geographic position, (2) physical conformation, (3) extent of territory, (4) number of population, (5) character of the people, and (6) character of the government. The United States possessed the potential to develop see power to rival and surpass Britain, contended Mahan, if the people and the government were convinced of the advantages to be gained and were shown how to manipulate their resources to accomplish their goal. One of the prerequisites for success was a system of bases similar to those possessed by Mahan's model, Britain.

Though Mahan envisaged the Caribbean Sea, after completion of an Isthmian canal, as a great artery of maritime activity and an area in which the United States should have bases, his interest was directed to the Pacific in terms of strategy and commerce. His first focal point of

Alfred T. Mahan, From Steam to Sail (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1907), p. 303.

Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Fower upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), pp. 28-89.

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interest in that area was Hawaii. In 1890 Mahan wrote that Hawaii was politically unstable and that it was to American military and commercial interests "to allow no foreign influence to equal our own" there. In 1893 in a letter to the Editor of the New York Times Mahan used the "yellow horde" threat of possible invasion of the islands by Chinese as justification for a civilized maritime power to have a firm hold on the islands. "Our own country, with its Pacific coast, is naturally indicated a proper guardian for this most important position. To hold it, however, whether in the supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great extention of our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?" Mahan well knew that the United States Navy was not then prepared to wage war to hold Hawaii, but his blueprint for future action was being clearly drawn. He continued his literary campaign for annexing Namaii in an essay: "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Fower" in Forum magazine in March 1893. His approach this time was one of strategic position. "It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast-line -- of a sea frontier -- is concentrated in a single position; and the circumstances renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it, if we righteously can." Senator Lodge and like-minded cohorts used Mahan's statements in their arguments for annexation, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt wrote: "As regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do in foreign policy generally. If I had my way we

Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1898), p. 7.

Letter: Mahan to New York Times, January 31, 1893, reprinted in Interest of America in Sea Fower, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," reprinted in The Interest of America in Sea Power, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

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would annex those islands tomorrow."

Roosevelt may have been ready to annex the islands, but he was not the President. After the attempt at annexation failed in 1893, Mahan continued to write articles and letters favoring annexation. It was not until after Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila that the Hawaiian Islands were finally annexed by joint resolution. Mahan's "first fruit" in the Pacific had become American.

The naval strategist who valued Hawaii as vital to the defense of the west coast and as an asset to the commercial interests of America in the Pacific did not look upon the acquisition of the Philippines with equal enthusiasm. He wrote to Lodge:

I myself, though rather an expansionist, have not fully adjusted myself to the idea of taking them, from our own standpoint of advantage. It does seem to me, however, that the heavy force, army and navy, we have put in Luzon, has encouraged the revolutionists to an extent for which we are responsible. Can we ignore the responsibility and give them back to Spain? I think not ...Might it not be a wise compromise to take only the /Marianas/ and Luzon; yielding to the "honor" and exigencies of Spain the Carolines and the rest of the Philippines.

If Mahan were unsure of the wisdom of annexing the Philippines, he was part of a host of Americans. The scales upon which with complex pros and cons of annexation were being weighed were tipped in favor of annexation by at least three factors: the feeling of moral obligation to the Philippine people, the desire for a Far Past naval base and, especially pertinent, ignorance of any other suitable solution.

Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3, 1897; Roosevelt Papers, quoted in William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), p. 168.

Mahan to Lodge, July 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, quoted in Livezey, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

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Fossession for possession's sake was not part of Mahan's concept of bases and commercial markets. After the annexation of the Philippines and Guam, he considered naval bases at Manila and Guam sufficient to protect American commerce into the rich Yangtze valley and to uphold John Hay's Open Door policy. Nevertheless, though the two potential bases were thought sufficient, Mahan appreciated that American naval power alone would never be strong enough in the Orient to force acceptance of the Open Door policy. Moral influence by the United States and mutual cooperation by the other commercial powers were sine qua non to the success of the policy.

The influence of Mahan on Pacific policy had passed its zenith by the time of the announcement of the Open Boor policy, but in another very important area bearing on Pacific balance of power it was yet to be fulfilled. That area concerned the composition and employment of the United States Navy. The late mineteenth century function of the Navy was coast defense and battleships were thought of as floating forts to be stationed around ports to augment shore batteries. The suggestions of Mahan for a fleet as a collective force of capital ships capable of cruising long distances, seeking out and destroying or containing the enemy went unheeded by the Secretaries of the Navy. Two events pushed the ideas of Mahan to fruition. They were the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam and the succession to the Presidency on the assassination of McKinley of Theodore Roosevelt. As the acquisition of the islands had made the inited States a Far Eastern power, it likewise made necessary ships designed to cruise long distances in order properly to defend the islands. From Mawaii to Guam was 3300 miles and to

Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1900), pp. 172-179 and The Interest of America in International Conditions (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1910), pp. 147-149, 182-185.

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<sup>(1900),</sup> to many (1900), to the property of the

the Philippines from Hawaii was 4800 miles. Few ships in the Navy could steam the 4800 miles without refueling and many could not make the leg from Hawaii to Guam. So in a matter of simple logistics, future ships would have to be something more than the "coast-line" battleships authorized as late as 1899. The shackles tying the Navy to coast defense were broken with the annexation of Hawaii; the shackles were thrown away by the naval-oriented President Roosevelt who was determined that, not only would the Navy have long range ships, but that they would meet the specifications of capital ships advocated by Mahan.

The results of the drive by the energetic President were spectacular. From 1901-1905 Congress authorized at his insistence ten first-class battle-ships, four armored cruisers and seventeen other ships. In 1905 Roosevelt called for a breathing spell and advocated a program of replacement at the rate of one-a-year. At this juncture, counting ships under construction, the Navy had twenty-eight battleships and twelve armored cruisers -- strength exceeded only by France and Britain.

Two situations caused Roosevelt to renege on his one-a-year replacement program. The first situation was successfully hamiled by Roosevelt personally; the second, required Congressional action and involved a defeat for Roosevelt and the Navy. Public sentiment in Japan, which became anti-American over the absence of a cash indemnity from Russia in the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, flared to a war fever pitch over the segregation of Oriental school children in San Francisco in 1906. Roosevelt finally managed to placate both the Californians and the Japanese and to reach a "Gentleman's Agreement" on future Japanese immigration, but he also exploited the ensuing crisis to request more battleships. His subsequent dispatch of sixteen battleships on a world cruise was to impress the

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Japanese and to win support for his last drive for additional ships.

The second event occurred in late 1906 when the British launched the revolutionary new battleship, the DREADNOUGHT, with a main battery of ten twelve-inch gams, greater speed and heavier armor. Its marked superiority in fire power, speed and protection made all other battleships obsolete. In January 1907 Roosevelt asked for four new battleships comparable to the DREADNOUGHT to keep the United States as a leading naval power and to be ready for any action by the Japanese. Congress for many reasons fought the second drive for modernization of the Navy, quoting often Roosevelt's one-a-year plan. Reductantly, two new ships were authorized and two more the following year, but four ships were still four short of that which was requested. Roosevelt and the Navy were blocked from keeping up a modern capital ship force. At the rate of two or less battleships a year under the following administrations, the Navy deteriorated in capital ship and balanced force strength to a nadir from which President Wilson lifted it in 1916.

# The role of naval bases in American-Japanese relations.

No deficiency in naval strategy in the twentieth century caused more frustration to American naval leaders than the lack of bases in the western Pacific. From the acquisition of the Philippines to the eve of Pearl Harbor the question of a secure base in the Philippines and whether the Navy would be able to defend the islands was interwoven in American-Japanese relations. With a secure base and a superior capital ship force the United States not only could defend the Philippines, but also go a long way toward backing up the principles of the Open Door policy in China. But as far back as Mahan in 1900 the problem appeared insurmountable. A fleet capable of

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defending the Philippines and backing the Open Door policy could crush Japan. Neither the American people nor any administration was ready to risk war with Japan to assert such superiority in the Orient. Yet conversely, if Japan were strong enough to defend herself against American naval action, it could also defeat the American naval units in the Far Fast and/or take the Philippines. Theodore Roosevelt's calling the Philippines, America's "Achilles heel" was quite appropriate. In the face of determined Japanese aggression, the United States had the choices of getting out of China and the Philippines; risking defeat, at least temporarily; or resorting to other means to thwart the Japanese. The history of the United States shows that the combination of the latter two was used, with the "other means" being treaties, nonrecognition and moral influence.

The question of potential bases came up before the treaty with Spain was signed in Paris in 1898. A United States Navy spokesman urged the commissioners to ask Spain not only for the Philippines and Guam but also the Carolines, the Pelews and the remainder of the Marianas. These islands contained many sheltered anchorages suitable for possible naval stations and possession of the continuous chain of islands through the western Pacific would guarantee the United States a secure line between the Pacific coast and the Philippines. In the hands of an enemy they would offer a serious menace to the route to the Philippines. The general feeling was that Guam and the Philippines were all the fueling stations the United States needed and in the face of Spanish resistance over giving up the other

<sup>10</sup>Harold and Hargaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 31.

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islands, the commissioners demanded and received only Guam and the Philippines. When Spain disposed of her remaining Pacific islands by ceding them to Germany, there was still little opposition, since German occupation with European entanglements seemingly precluded her becoming a threatening Pacific naval power.

From 1900 to 1907 the Army and Navy in the Philippines worked on their respective plans for a fortified naval base. The Navy favored Olongapo on Subig Bay, about sixty miles from Manila, since it was easily defended by sea, while the Army's plan involving defense against land attack called Manila Bay the easiest to defend. Impetus to develop a base came with increased tensions with Japan in 1907. Within the Navy the General Board reminded Secretary Metcalf that without an impregnable base in the Philippines, the islands would be at the mercy of the enemy during the three months required to move the battleships from the Atlantic to the Far East. Since Congress had already appropriated \$500,000 for Philippine defense, the Navy wanted the entire sum spent on fortifications of a naval base. The resulting arguments between the War and Navy Departments resulted finally in the Joint Board in 1909 "recommenting that the government abandon the idea of developing a first-class base in the Philippines, locate its principal insular base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, and maintain only a small, unfortified station at Olangapo." Congress had already appropriated \$900,000 to begin work on a base in Hawaii and with the Joint Board's recommendation for development there, an additional \$900,000 was

William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin: University of Texas Fress, 1958), pp. 201-202.

Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Sea Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 301.

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voted. The development of Pearl Harbor was undoubtedly a wise step; the wisdom of the abandomment of plans for a fortified base in the Philippines was questionable. The United States was still committed to defend the islands and Japan still remained a potential threat.

Five years later the Japanese naval forces occupied the German owned Marshall, Caroline and Marianas Islands as World War I came to the Pacific. At the time of occupation it was still pretended both in London and in Tokyo that this move was temporary, and that Japan entertained no intention of holding these islands beyond the duration of the war. A Treaty of Alliance in 1902 had united Japan and Britain for mutual advantages against Russia, but in 1914 the mutual advantages to be gained from the treaty were at Germany's expense. Japan's quid pro que for ridding the Pacific of German cruisers, aiding British anti-submarine work in the Mediterranean, and supporting British claims to German islands south of the equator was British support for Japanese claims to German islands north of the equator.

assurances from both Britain and France, demanded outright transfer of the three island groups which they had seized. Only the United States offered opposition. The American delegation realized that the Japanese were not going to give up their strategically located possessions readily, as estally to any control involving the United States. An American proposal was under to return the islands to Germany with the reasoning that in German hands there would be no threat to the United States and possibly in the future the

<sup>13</sup> Braisted, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>14</sup> Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>15</sup> Toid., p. 89.

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United States might be able to acquire part, if not all, the islands from 16 Germany.

President Wilson was aware of the strategic position of the islands on the route between Hawaii and the Philippines, but since he favored early withdrawal from the Philippines, he was more concerned with Japanese actions in China and Siberia. The final disposition of the islands appeared to safeguard American interests and temper the Japanese demands. Japan was given a mandate from the Allied and Associated Powers to administer the islands. The mandate forbade the construction of fortifications anywhere in the islands and expressly ordered an annual report containing full information as to conditions in the islands.

The effect of Japan's receiving the marriate was observed by one naval. writer as being to:

... surround Guam with a cordon of potential Japanese strongholds and maval bases. Japan, as mandatory of the islands, is not entitled to fortify them, but that she would forego the use of such invaluable bases in case of emergency is not to be believed. Hostile submarines, working from a base at Saipan Island, in the Marianne (Sic) group, would be within a few hours' sail of Guam. A few hundred miles to the south-west lies Yap, the administrative centre of the Archipelago ... The Island is admirably adapted for the use as a base for submarines or other vessels operating against the Guam-Manila line of communications, and so long as it remained in enemy occupation this route would never be safe ... Some 14:00 miles east of Guam lie the Marshall Islands ... used by the German Cruiser Squadron... When the Marshall Islands were in German ownership the beginnings of a naval base is said to have been further developed, and there is now a depot for the storage of coal and oil. Similar reports have been heard in connection with Yap ... and Ponage, in the Carolines. Notwithstanding that the military government installed upon the first Japanese seizure of these islands has since been replaced by a civil administration, they are regarded primarily as military ports, and

<sup>16</sup> Tbid., p. 91.

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very little information concerning the work in progress there is allowed to leak out...Without in any way impugning the good faith of Japan, it may be accepted as certain that these newly-acquired territories will henceforth occupy a most important place in her scheme of naval strategy. 17

Japanese possession of the former German islands was but one of many political and military moves by the Japanese between 1914 and 1920 which bore on the important postwar naval decision to develop American Pacific bases. Japan's occupation of German holdings in Shantung; her "twenty-one demands" on China in 1915; the movement of troops into Siberia in 1917 during the Bolshevik Revolution; the demands for a statement of racial equality at Versailles; the demands for ownership of the German possessions in the Pacific; the belligerency over control of the important transpacific cable connecting center at Yap; and the accelerated naval program of constructing capital ships all contributed to an ever-tightening vortex whose final stage of maturity meant war with the United States.

Against this background the Secretary of the Navy in 1917 and, in more urgent pleas, in 1920 asked Congress for additional naval stations on the west coast since there was "no more pressing problem in connection with the national defense than the provision of the Pacific of ample bases...for the maintenance and operation of the fleet..." The Secretary also averred that the day would never come when a powerful American fleet would not be in the Pacific. Funds were requested to develop Hawaii, but it was the Navy's plans for the large-scale development of Guam as a "strongly fortified naval base" and of an improved secondary base in the Philippines that were "loaded with international dynamite." Enough of the congressional hearings on the naval

<sup>17</sup> Hector C. Bywater, Sea-Power in the Vacific (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), pp. 266-268.

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proposals leaked out to show the trend of official opinion. Two assumptions upon which the opinion rested were that the United States still had a "moral responsibility" for defense of the Philippines, even if they were to be granted independence, and secondly, that the American people were headed toward armed conflict with Japan. "On the basis of these assumptions, American naval authorities could see no justification for congressional delay in voting the appropriations necessary to retrieve past blumbers and to push our military read into the far western Pacific."

The American naval planners were to be thwarted again in their quest for bases. The deliberate plans for development of the bases were inevitably bound to trigger Japanese reaction and further accelerate the existing naval construction race. Many complex factors combined at this station to prompt the Harding administration to seek an easier way out of the costly and explosive predicament. Many congressmen balked at the expense of further naval base development and ship construction; pacifists despaired of more war; Anglophiles objected to spending money to surpass British naval supremacy; strategists hoped to find a way to prevent the scheduled renewal in 1921 of the Treaty of Alliance between Japan and Britain; and the politicians hoped to win public support by keeping campaign promises to limit armaments expenditures. In this climate of thought the Washington Naval Conference was called in 1921. Pra-conference approval of the idea by the British and opposition by the Japanese fortold the international attitudes at the Conference.

<sup>18</sup> Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Fower, op. cit., pp. 100-102.

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### The Maval Treaties; Four Power and Mine lower Treaties.

The Washington Naval Conference met in November 1921. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, who presided over the Conference, presented the American position on the first day in a highly unorthodox approach. Moving right to the crux of the unprecedented American proposal, Hughes offered to scrap all American battleships being built and, in addition, fifteen old pre-dreadnought battleships, and to abstain from further building for ten years. He followed his offer with a presentation of a list of specific secrifices on the part of Japan and Britain which the United States would consider "fairly commensurate." The final level of capital ships to which the navies of the leading powers would be cut was approximately 500,000 tons for the United States and Britain; 300,000 tons for Japan and 175,000 tons for France and Italy.

In the ensuing diplomatic maneuverings Japan attempted to get a higher ratio than the sixty per cent proposed by the United States. The significance of the discussions in Congress during the previous winter on the United States Navy's proposed bases in Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines was not lost on the Japanese. Approval of the plans would mean a definite shift in American favor in the balance of naval power in the Far Fast, and under such conditions Japan would not accept less than seventy per cent ratio. However, if the status que of fortifications in the Pacific could be maintained, then the lower ratio might be acceptable. Hughes knew well the views of the naval authorities on the subject. "The General Board repeatedly advised against permitting any considerations of Vacific naval bases in the approaching conference. And American naval authorities apparently understood that their Government's proposal at the opening session was framed on the assumption that the United States was to make no commitments limiting their

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plans as to Guam and the Philippines." The American delegation chose to put political strategy over naval strategy and without consulting the naval representatives agreed to a modified non-fortification clause in order to get Japan to accept the sixty per cent ratio. The limitation on fortifications did not apply to Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand or the Japanese home islands. It did apply to the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Bonin and Kurile Islands and other smaller groups. The Mandated Islands were not included since their fortification was forbidden in the mandate.

A second objective of the Washington Conference, and one which was mandatory if the United States were to give up its easily attainable supremacy in capital ships, was the liquidation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance of 1902. Britain, pressured by the United States and Canada, was quite willing to abrogate the treaty. The trick was to do so without the Japanese losing prestige or becoming politically isolated. The answer was the Four Power Treaty between Britain, Japan, the United States and France. Various theories have been advanced on the selection of France as the fourth member. France did consider herself a Far Eastern Power and having a fourth member created the picture that the United States was not joining the old alliance only to be outvoted by Britain and Japan.

In the Four Power Treaty the contracting parties agreed to respect the rights of others in "relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." If "controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights" could not be settled by diplomacy, the four powers should meet in a joint conference "to which the

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>20</sup> Toid., p. 176.

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whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." There were no proposed military actions or provisions for enforcement other than conferring. On December 12, 1921 the treaty was accepted by the delegations of the four powers and the way was clear for Japan to accept the sixty per cent ratio.

Another independent treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, was the reaffirmation of the American principles of the Open Door policy. Like the Four Power Treaty it was a statement of intent to recognize rights and principles rather than to take enforcement action. The agreement in this case was to "respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," to maintain the principle of equal opportunity, and to assist China "to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." Signatories to this treaty were: Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and China.

Collectively the three interdependent treaties at the time were considered a success by the diplomats. The United States at the conference table had received British agreement to naval parity and Japanese agreement to statistical inferiority. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 was replaced by a limited agreement which did not prevent Anglo-American cooperation against the Japanese in other areas of diplomacy, Japan and other world powers subscribed to the "Open Door" policy and the costly arms race was prevented. On the question of the non-fortification clause opposed by American naval officers, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. had this private comment:

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[The clause in the treaty] leaves us, in my opinion, in a slightly better position than Japan. We trade certain fortifications which we would never have completed, for fortifications which they (the Japanese) would unquestionably have completed. We retain one outpost of great importance (Hawaii) and they give up all but their mainland.<sup>21</sup>

Since the naval ratios set by the Washington agreements applied only to battleships, the resulting building race in cruiser strength necessitated conferences to settle that question. A meeting in Geneva ended without agreement, but the London Conference of 1930 set the cruiser ratio at 10:10:7 for the United States. Britain and Japan respectively, and submarine strength for the three set at parity. Before the Second London Naval Disarmament Conference in 1935-1936, aimed at perpetuating the naval agreements, Britain had conceded submarine parity to Germany and allowed her thirty-five per cent total tonnage in their bilateral naval agreement. France and Italy had stepped up their building programs. Italy refused to come to the London meeting, and Japan, who was refused the parity which she demanded in all categories, withdrew. The diluted provisions with "escalator clauses" rendered the treaty virtually worthless. In December 1934 Japan gave the two years advanced notice that she intended to terminate her adherence to the Washington Naval Treaty, thus causing it to expire on the same date as the expiration of the London Treaty of 1930. On January 1, 1937 the provisions of the naval treaties no longer applied to the most probable opponent of the United States Navy.

<sup>21</sup> Colonel Roosevelt's Diary, January 29, 30 quoted in Sprout, Toid., p. 251.

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### The effect of political attitudes on naval thinking.

The reaction of Secretary of State Stimson to the Japanese aggressions in 1931 and his subsequent diplomatic maneuvers attempting to salvage the principles of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty have been thoroughly described by participants and able scholars. How did the attitudes of the political leaders toward American problems in the Orient affect naval thinking in the 1930's?

The resort to non-recognition of Japanese gains in the conquest of
Manchuria had historical precedent in similar action by Bryan and Lansing in
1915 when the United States did not recognize the Twenty-one Demands of Japan
on China. In both situations there was no appropriate military force or
willingness to risk the use of such force, if it were available.

Outraged as [President Hoover] was by Japanese aggression, he was opposed, in every fiber of his being, to any action which might lead to American participation in the struggles of the Far East...since he believed that any policy of embargo or sanctions might lead to war, his position effectively blocked any governmental support for economic sanctions.... In taking this position Mr. Hoover was squarely in line with the whole tradition of American foreign policy in the Far East. Even Theodore Roosevelt had always insisted that American interests in the Orient were not worth a war....Mr. Hoover...was so much a man of peace that he did not like the notion of even unspoken threats of war.23

Mr. Hoover with his deep pacifist character was certainly not prone to overthrow the traditions dating to Theodore Roosevelt of not wanting to wage war in the Orient. He was safe from having to make a decision on use of the fleet in the Orient since there was no base from which such a concentration

<sup>22</sup> Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., Ch. IX, (2) A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Bastern Policy of the United States, Ch. X. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company Inc., 1938).

<sup>23</sup> Stimson and Burdy, op. cit., pp. 233, 244-245.

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Company Inc., 1933).

<sup>23</sup>stimeon and Burdy, op. cit., op. 233, 24-215.

of ships could operate. That too had been a political decision. The collection of ships honored with the term "Asiatic Fleet" was sent to Shanghai in 1932 on Secretary Stimson's suggestion to protect American lives and property in conjunction with a similar move by the British, but again, it was problematical that action would have been taken against the Japanese except in self-defense. In "deference to his Secretary of State's urgent pleading" Hoover accepted "Stimson's suggestion that the American Fleet be left at Hawaii, where it arrived in mid-February [1932] by pure coincidence, in maneuvers planned and publicly announced the previous summer. The fleet duly remained in Hawaii instead of returning to its usual west coast bases, and it was probably useful in restraining the more flagrantly headlong Japanese militarists."

The Fleet was withdrawn the following year to the Atlantic by the new administration as an act of good will.

In 1932 the Asiatic Fleet had been used in Shanghai to protect American nationals and property. Would the physical presence of the fleet interposed between the Japanese military and American interests be sufficient to deter the Japanese in the future from aggressive acts? What order would be given to the naval commanders if the Japanese did attack American vessels and property? Was there a limit of acceptable aggression before war was inevitable? Under which conditions would the United States demand restitution or begin war using the Far Eastern forces? Would naval forces be withdrawn in a deepening crisis before Japanese actions would make the withdrawal appear to be out of fear or would the forces be left to protect American interests and symbolize American prestige "to the bitter end?"

President Hoover had reluctantly allowed the United States Fleet to

<sup>2</sup>h Ibid., p. 2h5.

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remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive moves in other parts of Asia. With the limited facilities at Pearl Harbor in the 1930's and the almost complete lack of a supporting train, did the politicians realize that the fleet was incapable of deploying further west without risking heavy losses and possible defeat? Did the Japanese consider the presence of the fleet in Hawaii was a bluff? If the use of the fleet at Hawaii was to show the intent of the United States not to ignore Japanese actions in the Pacific, and that there was a possibility of the use of the fleet in conditions which the United States considered serious, did the Japanese understand the conditions under which the fleet would be used? Would the United States "draw the line" clearly and fight if its position were challenged?

These are but a sampling of the questions asked within the United States Navy in the early 1930's. Some questions were answered in the final phase of war preparation in 1941. Many were never answered, since the trend in international developments, the national apathy to American involvment and the political decisions facing the nation's leaders did not permit clear cut decisions or firm positions relative to Japan. The questions which perplexed and influenced naval planners in the pre-war period were passe after the sinking of American ships on December 7, 1941 fused an undecided people into a fighting nation.

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#### CHAPTER TWO

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND EXTRA-SERVICE COOPERATION

Introduction.

The Constitution of the United States bestowed upon the individual elected as President the dual responsibility of being at once the Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. President Franklin D. Roosevelt brought to that highest office unusual past experience as a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy. As one very close observer noted, "he probably knew more about the Navy than any of his predecessors. Throughout his Administration [he gave] preferential attention to every question arising in regard to the Navy. He himself made most of the more important decisions with respect to naval affairs."

The naval organisation from which the President received advice and through which his policies were implemented was headed by a civilian Secretary appointed by him. The highest military position in the Navy, the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, likewise, was filled with the choice of the President. Through these two personally selected individuals, the President had civilian and military control of the naval forces. By an Executive Order on 5 July 1939 the President directed that the Joint Board (made up of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Anny Chief of Staff and their top assistants) and other service elements report directly to him on certain matters rather than through the civilian Secretaries. The significance of

Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 451.

Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, a volume in the series: United States Army in World War II (Washington: Department of the Army, 1950), p. 6.

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Control bull, Header (New Yorks The Meastline Sensor, 1963), p. 151.

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the Executive Order was apparent, for it eliminated one civilian echelon in the decision-making process on certain matters. On those matters the President chose to use the military channels only. Military advice, decisions and, possibly, influence would flow directly between the Commander in Chief and his military leaders.

The Chief of Naval Operations was not created as a billet until 1915 and the authority of the officer holding the position was not completely accepted until World War II. Despite intra-service friction between the World Wars, the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations increased so that a sizable staff consisting of functional divisions came into being to assist him in the administration of the office. The two key divisions which figured in the external policies of the Navy were the War Plans Division and the Central Division. The Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants also worked with joint organizations and other governmental agencies between the World Wars. The major joint military organization was the Joint Board, or Joint Army and Navy Board, with its subordinate working committee, the Joint Planning Committee. Another important committee in this period was the Standing Maison Committee, organized in 1938 at Secretary of State Hull's suggestion. Since the problems which prompted the State, War and Navy Departments to work together in this committee primarily pertained to Latin America, that Committee will not be discussed.

The purpose of this Chapter will be to describe the parts of the naval organization which contributed to influencing the decision makers in American relations with Japan from 1936 to 1941. Specifically, the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans and Central Division Officers and the Joint Board will be discussed. In

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addition to the review of the structural side of the naval organization, short biographical sketches of selected individuals will be given.

### The Changing Naval Organization, 1789-1919.

When the Federal Government under the Constitution of 1789 came into being there was no Navy Department nor necessity for one. The last of the Navy had been sold three years earlier, and naval affairs were assigned to the War Department. As a result of naval unreadiness in a quasi-war with France, a separate Navy Department was established on April 30, 1789.

Almost from its very beginning the Navy Department has been in a state of change as the various Secretaries, Congress and naval officers sought to improve the structure within which the naval forces were administered. In the first of a sequence of five phases, the Secretary and half a dozen employees were capable of managing the few ships and small Naval Establishment. Military assistants to the Secretary appeared in the second phase, when in 1815 a Board of Commissioners consisting of three Captains was appointed. A dispute within the first month between the Secretary and the Captains was finally resolved by President Madison. The responsibility of naval command was retained by the Secretary and the field of logistics, i.e., the building, equipping and repairing of ships, was assigned to the Board. In 1842 a major change occurred as the work load of the Navy Department was divided functionally between a number of Bureaus, each of which was headed by a senior officer specialist in the respective field. Under this principle, the Mexican, Civil and Spanish-American Wars were fought.

Rear Admiral Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1959), p. 5.

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In 1900 the General Board, the most important of many boards appointed by the Secretaries, was established. Originally headed by Admiral George Dewey, its first members were: the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the Chief Intelligence Officer and his principal assistant, the President of the Naval War College and his principal assistant, and three other line officers. The assigned mission was "to insure efficient preparation of the Fleet in case of war and for naval defense of the coast." After 1915 and the establishment of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board became purely a consulting body for the considerations of matters of general policy referred to it by the Secretary.

...Its members have no administrative duties and only act in an advisory capacity. It recommends to the Secretary the number and types of ships and aircraft to properly constitute the fleet and such building program as may be submitted annually to the Congress. It also advises with respect to the general policy toward the number of naval districts, navy yards, operating bases, and other shore activities...The membership of the General Board is designated by the Secretary and usually consists of the highest ranking officers. The Secretary may, if he chooses, select retired naval officers, ...The Board usually consists of from five to seven members, although no specific number is designated in the Navy regulations. Its members are senetimes referred to as the "Elder Statesmen" of the Navy."

In 1909 the fourth phase of changes in the organization found a Naval Aide system attempted, due to the shortcomings of the Bureau system in the expansion program after the Spanish-American War. The primary deficiencies were in the provisions for making war plans, for planning and directing the operations of the Fleet and for coordinating the work of the various Bureaus. Four senior line officers were assigned to advise and assist the Secretary

United States Navy, Senate Document 35, Seventy-fifth Congress, First Session (Washington: G.P.O., 1937), pp. 5-6.

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in the fields of fleet operations, personnel, material and inspection, respectively. Congress did not give statutory approval to the idea and Secretary Josephus Daniels let three of the Aides be detached without relief. Upon the advice of Admiral Dewey, Chairman of the General Board, the Aide for Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, was retained.

Admiral Fiske enlisted the aid of a Navy veteran of the Spanish-American War, Congressman Richmond P. Hobson, who believed as Fiske did that the office of Aide for Naval Operations should be guaranteed by statutory authorization. Hobson, with the full consent of the House Naval Affairs Committee, incorporated in the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1915: ".... there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy not below the grade of Rear Admiral, appointed for a term of four years by the President by and with the advice of the Senate, who under the Secretary of the Navy shall be responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and to be charged with its general direction."

The Hobson rider was stricken on a point of order. Secretary Daniels did not approve the scope of responsibility proposed for the Aide for Naval Operations because he feared too much military power within the Navy Department. In order to placate Secretary Daniels and to get his approval for enactment, the provisions of the rider were rewritten.

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of

Furer, op. cit., p. 109.

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the Navy, be charged with the operations of the Fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.

The bill, with the revised rider incorporated, passed both Houses on March

3, 1915 but the Hobson-Fiske group was not satisfied. The responsibility of
the Chief of Naval Operations as first written was "for the readiness of
the Navy for war and its general direction" and as finally passed, the
responsibility authorization had been pared down to being "charged with the
operations of the Fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for
its use in war." (Emphasis mine.) The difference between responsibility
for the Navy and responsibility for the Fleet meant that the Chief of Naval
Operations had no specific authority over the Eureaus and the shore establishment.

In August 1916 Congress further strengthened the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations by authorizing the rank and title of Admiral for the position and giving legislative recognition to the force of his orders:

...All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned to him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such. 7

While the legislative maneuverings were taking place the Office of Ghief of Naval Operations was quietly getting organized. On May 11, 1915

Admiral William S. Benson was appointed as the first Chief of Naval Operations and immediately thereafter he assumed the duties which were then being performed by the last of the Naval Aides, Admiral Fiske. The psychological

Thid., quote from 5 U.S. Code 422; (2) Navy Regulations, 1920, Article 392 (1) and Article 433 (1).

<sup>7</sup> Thid., p. 110, quote from 5 U.S. Code 427; (2) Navy Regulations Article 392 (2).

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pressures of possible entry into the European war, the huge ship building program advocated by President Wilson and authorized by Congress and the favorable attitude of Secretary Daniels, whose fears of loss of civilian control were assuaged, all enhanced the spirit of cooperation with the new CNO. When war did come in 1917, for the first time in the history of the nation, one officer was responsible for the operations of the Fleet and war plans readiness.

The Bureau chiefs, who jealously guarded their areas of responsibility as their predecessors had since 1842, cooperated with Admiral Benson in the winning of the war; however, the wartime professional esprit de corps soon faded into peacetime bickerings. The crux of the arguments turned on the authority of the CNO to control the Chiefs of the Bureaus.

### The Chief of Naval Operations.

In 1921 a Board of naval officers was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy "to consider and recommend such changes in the interest of efficiency and economy as may be deemed necessary in the organization of the Navy Department." The recommendation that the CND have authority over the entire Naval Establishment was evaded by the Secretary who told the Board to limit its study to eliminating duplication of effort among the Bureaus and not to concern itself with departmental organization.

A change in 1924 in Navy Regulations, Article 433, gave to CNO some of the authority recommended by the 1921 Board. The change read: "He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel therefor as to insure maximum readiness of the fleet for war." The ensuing

<sup>8</sup> Furer, op. cit., p. 111.

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dispute over the power of CNO over the Bureaus on the strength of the article finally reached President Roosevelt in 193h. To get to that highest level, the question had been examined by Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson and by a special board headed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Henry L. Roosevelt. President Roosevelt ruled that the article 133 should remain in effect but that;

In my judgment he (the President) would too greatly delegate this power if he delegated to the Chief of Naval Operations the duty of issuing direct orders to the bureaus and offices...the orders to the Bureaus and offices should come from the Secretary of the Navy.

In March 1942 the President reversed his position stated, supra, and in Executive Order 9096 of 12 March, 1942 which bombined the CNO and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet into one billet, the following words appear:

...as Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding the combined offices as herein provided shall be charged under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy with the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt...<sup>10</sup>

The Executive Order made legal what had been practiced in fact, because, through necessity, the Chief of Naval Operations had to coordinate the efforts of the Bureaus in preparing the Navy for war.

The duties which had accrued to the Chief of Naval Operations by 1942 encompassed the responsibility for the operation of the Fleet, the preparation and readiness of plans for fleet use, coordination of the Bureaus to insure

<sup>9</sup> Toid., p. 112.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 113-114.

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fleet readiness for war and advice to the Secretary of the Navy on the status of forces and prospective requirements. In addition the Chief of Naval Operations was directed by various orders to "advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments and foreign relations..." to act as the Secretary of the Navy "during the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under-Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy"; and to serve as a member of the Joint Army and Navy Board in accordance with General Order No. 7.

The officers appointed as Chief of Naval Operations in the period under study were:

Admiral William H. Standley Admiral William D. Leahy Admiral Harold R. Stark July 1933-January 1937 January 1937-August 1939 August 1939-March 1942

Each of the three CNO's in this period had broad experience prior to their appointment. All had had duty in the Asiatic Fleet and in various shipboard and Navy Department assignments. Additionally, Admiral Standley had been Director of War Plans Division from 1923-1926; Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, 1928-1930; and Commander Battle Force, U.S. Fleet before becoming CNO. During his period in office, Secretary of the Navy Swanson was frequently absent, due to illness, and Admiral Standley performed the duties of Acting Secretary of the Navy. He was a United States Delegate to the London Naval Conference, held in London, England, during the period

<sup>11</sup> Navy Regulations, 1920, Article 433, para. 7.

<sup>125</sup> U.S. Code 423.

Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with Duties Assigned the Divisions thereunder, a manual dated October 23, 1910 issued within the Navy Department by the CNO, Admiral H.R. Stark (hereafter cited as CNO Manual), p. 2; NHD Files.

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<sup>12</sup> core vareabetteme, 1980, Artisla hill, pare. 7.

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December 7, 1935 to March 25, 1936, and signed the London Naval Treaty on behalf of the United States. He also initiated the Vinson-Transel Bill which provided for establishing, building and maintaining the U.S. Navy at lk

Admiral Leahy had a very colorful career prior to becoming CNO. He served in the Asiatic Fleet during the Philippine Insurrection and Boxer Rebellion, and later was Commander Maval Forces in Nicaragua in 1912. He commanded a troop transport in World War I and a Maval Detachment for the protection of Americans in the war between Turkey and Greece in 1921. He was also Chief of two Bureaus, Navigation and Ordinance and supported the Bureau Chiefs in their fight against increased CND authority. Under his leadership discussions began with the British over possible cooperation against the Japanese and a review of Joint War Plans was started.

Admiral Stark was Aide to Admiral Sims in London in World War I when he met the young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The ensuing friendship lasted through their respective careers. In 1930 Stark was Aide to Secretary of the Navy Glaude F. Adams and later to Secretary Swanson. His influence upon the President during his tenure of office is discussed in Chapter Nine, infra.

Within his own ismediate office the CND on October 23, 1940 promulgated a manual on the organization of his office in which the duties of his various assistants were clearly stated. The most important of his assistants was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (OP 11) whose duties were:

Biographical information on the officers discussed in this chapter was furnished by Biographies Branch, OI-430, Office of Information, Navy Department.

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- ll-1. Next in authority to the Chief of Naval Operations, and holding the same relation to Directors of Divisions as the Chief of Staff of a Commander-in-Chief holds to the flag officers under that commander-in-chief, shall be an officer who will be known as the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations.
- 11-2. The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations shall relieve the Chief of Naval Operations of all administrative details possible. He shall sign such of the mail and attend to such routine matters as the Chief of Naval Operations may designate.
- 11-3. Considers all questions of either administration or policy proposed by Directors of Divisions, before such matters are referred to the Chief of Naval Operations.
- 11-h. The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations is a member of the Joint Army and Navy Board (General Order No. 7).15

Officers who held the position of Assistant CNO during the period under study were:

Rear Admiral William S. Pye
Rear Admiral James O. Richardson
Rear Admiral Arthur P. Fairfield
Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley
Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll
June 1936-June 1938
June 1938-July 1939
June 1938-July 1939
June 1938-June 1938
June 1938-June 193

Rear Admirals Chormley and Ingersoll will be discussed infra in their role as Director of War Plans Division. Rear Admiral Richardson preceded Admiral Kimmel as Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet and will be discussed in Chapter Nine, infra. Rear Admirals Pye and Fairfield had no particular connection with American-Japanese relations in the period under consideration.

### War Plans Division (OP 12)

The duties of the War Plans Division, listed below, show two sections into which the division was separated in 1940. Prior to that time the duties were basically the same without the section organization.

<sup>15</sup> CNO Manual, op. cit., p. 5.

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<sup>\*\* + 3 × 1 × 1 × 1810 × 0 = 1/2</sup> 

#### 12-1. DUTIES:

#### (a) Folicy and Projects Section:

(1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.

(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.

(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects affecting national defense.

(h) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(5) Action in advisory capacity in current administrative matters referred to the War Plans Division.

### (b) Plans Section:

(1) Direction of war planning.

(2) Preparation of designated war plans.

(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.

(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.

(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting national defense.

- 12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).
- 12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees:

Joint Board
Joint Planning Committee
Joint Aeronautical Board
Joint Air Advisory Committee
Shore Station Development Board.

12-4. The War Plans Division is non-administrative. 16

Officers who held the position of Director of War Plans Division were:

Captain (later Admiral) Royal E. Ingersoll

Captain (later Vice Admiral) Robert L. Chormley

Captain Russell S. Crenshaw

Captain (later Admiral) Richmond K. Turner

June 1936-July 1938

July 1938-July 1939

July 1939-October 1940

October 1940-February

1942

The officers who served as War Plans Director had several qualifications

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

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in common. All were graduates of the Maval Academy and courses at the Maval War College, and all had had several tours of duty in the Mavy Department in Washington prior to the War Plans assignment.

Undoubtedly Captain Ingersoll had the widest experience in foreign 17 relations prior to becoming War Plans Chief. As a Passed Midshipman in 1905 he was one of the young officers assigned special temporary duty to attend the Russian-Japanese Peace Conference held at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He made the World Cruise with the Battle Fleet in 1908, and later served in the Asiatic Fleet. In 1918 he accompanied the first CNO Admiral Benson, who was Naval Advisor to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris, France. Ingersoll returned with President Wilson's party handling communications for the President on his trip home. While Director of War Plans Division, he went to London twice. On his first trip in June 1936 he was Technical Assistant to the American Delegation at the London Neval Conference. In December 1937 he again went to London to discuss possible cooperation with the British against the Japanese in the Pacific.

Captain Ghormley had a normal cycle of shipboard and shore duty tours prior to becoming Aide to Assistant Secretary of Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. in 1923-192h and to Assistant Secretary of Navy Douglas Robinson, 192h-1925. He returned again to Washington in 1927 to serve for three years as Secretary to the General Beard. His duties immediately after serving as Director of War Plans Division were as Assistant CNO and Special Naval Observer in London.

<sup>17</sup> Graduates of the Naval Academy served at that time two years as Passed Midshipman before being commissioned as Ensign.

Cf. Chapter Four, p. 67.

<sup>19</sup>cf. Chapter Four, p. 76.

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Captain Crenshaw had less experience than his predecessors had prior to heading the War Plans Division, his duties being the normal career pattern. Crenshaw had been an assistant to Ghormley in the War Plans Division and, when the latter moved up to become Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Crenshaw became Director of the Division. Since Ghormley's new job required thorough knowledge of the War Plans, he probably continued to influence the Division through Crenshaw.

captain Turner served in various billets as an ordnance expert prior to entering and completing flight training at Pensacola, Florida at the age of forty-two. He had duty in the Asiatic Fleet and in 1932 was Technical Advisor for Naval Aviation to the American Delegation, General Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. In 1939 he was Commanding Officer of the USS ASTORIA when that cruiser transported the ashes of the former Japanese Ambassador, Hirosi Saito, from Annapolis to Japan. During the incident he made many personal friends among the Japanese, including the future Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura.

# Central Division (OP 13).

The Director of the Central Division had the most varied responsibilities by far of the assistants to the CNO. In addition to effecting liaison with the State Department, the Division functioned as a clearing house for legislative, regulative and organizational matters; reports of all types; matters pertaining to the administration of island governments under Navy control and miscellaneous matters such as honors and ceremonies. The charge seems well supported that "[The Central Division] was in effect a catchall for the solution and handling of any Navy Department administrative matter involving the CNO that could not logically and immediately be assigned to

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Prior to the progressive build-up of international tension during the 1930's, the Navy Department's liaison with the State Department consisted of requests for ships and planes to visit foreign ports and requests for passports for naval personnel and their dependents to travel outside the country. Even after the accelerated tempo of crises after 1936, the liaison between the two departments was limited.

#### 13-1. DUTTES:

#### (a) International affairs.

(1) Treaties and treaty interpretation.

(2) Liaison with Department of State regarding:

(a) Naval forces in disturbed areas or areas under naval occupation.

(b) United States naval ship movements in disturbed areas.(c) Visits by United States naval vessels to foreign ports.

(d) Plane flights of United States naval aircraft in foreign jurisdiction.

(e) Visits of foreign ships or aircraft to United States territory.

### (b) Legislation, regulations, and organization.

(1) Proposed legislation and arrangement of priority.

(2) Revision and editing of Navy Regulations, formulation of General Orders.

(3) Review and coordination of bureau manuals and publications...

(4) Courts, boards, investigations, etc., referred to the Chief of Naval Operations.

(5) Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

(6) Organization of the Navy Department.

(7) Recommendations and statements concerning the budget.

# (c) Island governments.

(1) Assist in the supervision of the governments of the dependencies of the United States which are under naval administration.

<sup>20</sup> Furer, op. cit., p. 118.

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### (d) Reports and statements.

(1) Preparation of the Chief of Naval Operations' data for the Secretary's annual report.

(2) Preparation of the Chief of Naval Operations: amual report, and statement for the Bureau of the Budget and for congressional hearings.

(3) Handling and routing annual and special reports from

Naval forces.

### (e) Miscellaneous.

(1) Honors and ceremonies; courtesies to foreign officials and naval forces visiting the United States.

(2) Recommendations in connection with appropriation

"Contingent Navy."

(3) Weather matters not assigned to specific cognizance of any Bureau, or Division of Operations.

(h) Matters which can not appropriately be assigned to

another division of Operations.

(5) Such other matters as the Chief of Naval Operations may direct.

- 13-2. In matters assigned to its cognizance, the Central Division is responsible for necessary liaison and coordination of effort within the Navy Department and Liaison with other agencies of the Government.
- 13-3. The Director of the Central Division is a member of the Joint Economy Board. 21

Officers who served as Directors of the Central Division, 1936-1941, were:

Captain Bruce Livingston Canaga

Captain (later Vice Admiral) Olaf M. Hustvedt

Captain (later Admiral) Arthur D. Struble

Captain (later Read Admiral) Roscoe E. Schuirmann

July 1934-October 1936

October 1936-July 1938

July 1938-June 1939

Captain (later Read Admiral) Roscoe E. Schuirmann

July 1939-August 1942

The career patterns of the Central Division chiefs were almost as varied as the duties of the office which they headed. Captain Canaga served in various fleet assignments, had duty in Scotland and Germany in 1919, and was a member of the U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil from February 1921 to November 1922. Captain Hustvedt received a Master of Science at George Washington in 1914 and served in a battleship division which operated with the British

<sup>21</sup>cno Manual, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

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Grand Fleet in World War I. Captain Struble participated in the Haitian Campaign in 1919.

Captain Schuirmann was by far the most experienced of the above group when he became Director in 1939. By that time he had had duty in the Asiatic Fleet, in the Sixteenth Naval District at Cavite, Philippine Islands; and in the Office of Naval Intelligence. From April 1933 to July 1935 he served with the General Board, acting as Secretary from September 193h to July 1935. He was Technical Adviser at the Naval Conference at London 1935-1936, and upon his return from that duty he was Administrative Aide to the Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admirals Milliam H. Standley and William D. Leahy, successively. The records in the National Archives show that he worked much more closely with the State Department than any of his predecessors, a partial explanation undoubtedly being that there was so much more need for liaison in the years immediately preceding the war.

### The Joint Board.

The oldest of the inter-service agencies was established in July 1903 by agreement between the Secretaries of War and Navy without statutory authorization. The need had always existed to coordinate planning between the two services, but the Spanish-American War with its overseas operations and logistic problems brought the urgency of joint planning to the forefront. The Board was suspended, strangely enough, in 1913 and 1914 by President Wilson because "he did not wish it to enter discussions of subjects that he considered to be the President's prerogative and that might lead to political repercussions."

The Board "renewed its meetings in October 1915, and was

<sup>22</sup> Furer, op. cit., p. 649.

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finally reconstituted by new orders at the end of [World War I]." The new charter for the Joint Board specified the membership to be: the Army Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of the War Plans Division.

Just as the General Board was consultative and advisory to the Secretary of the Navy, so was the Joint Board consultative and advisory to the Commander in Chief. It took no executive action unless required to do so by higher authority. There were no required meetings of the Joint Board, on masse, unless there were matters to be discussed. While European armics marched in the initial maneuvers of World War II, there were no meetings of the Joint Board between October 11, 1939 and February 21, 1940 or in the months of March and August 1940. In late 1940 the Board came to meet much more frequently and in July 1941 began formal weekly sessions.

The organization which permitted the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and their immediate assistants not to waste time in unnecessary meetings was the working arm of the Joint Board, the Joint Planning Committee. Made up of the War Plans Division Chiefs and their assistants, the Committee met often, discussed their particular problem with the other service's representatives, reached an understanding and presented the tentative agreement to the Joint Board. Usually there was no further discussion in the Joint Board meetings on tentative agreements, since both

<sup>23</sup> Watson, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>24</sup> Furer, loc. cit.

<sup>25</sup> Watson, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

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service chiefs kept informed on subjects by briefing and being briefed by their War Flans officers. Discussions in the Joint Planning Committee conferences in reality reflected the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Disagreements were resolved during Joint Board meetings or by the President, if necessary. By May 19hl the work load of the Joint Planning Committee had increased to the point that another level in the staff structure was added. The assistants to the War Plans Directors formed a Joint Strategic Committee to work out details of joint war and operating plans and to reach agreement if possible, before submitting their work to the Joint Planning Committee and ultimately to the Joint Board for approval. Planning matters other than joint war and operating plans were normally referred to ad hoc committees of the Planning Committee.

The organization of the Joint Board was sound and it continued its work until superseded by Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942. The primary mission had been to coordinate war planning and in this effort it must be considered a success. Implementation was another matter.

In the foregoing chapter the evolution of the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations was discussed to show the gradual change in the position of naval officers to influence foreign policy. In the earlier periods of the Navy Department, the Secretary had exercised very positive control over all components of the naval forces. By the first part of World War II, Congress and the President accepted extensive control over the Fleet and supporting shore activities by a single officer, albeit under the authority of a civilian Secretary. Even before the military side of naval leadership

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

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The organization of our Joint House was need and it and in principles and the residual field and the residual and field in 1994. The principle dended and but they have a security see placement in the residual to the security see placement and the security and the security and the security and the security and the security.

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reached this zenith of control, the President by executive order had directed that the Chief of Naval Operations and his Army counterpart work directly with him on certain matters. Those matters generally pertained to war plans.

As the authority of CNO increased, so increased the need for competent Staff assistants to help solve the many concurrent problems. The two divisions of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations whose mission involved working with other governmental agencies were the War Plans Division and Central Division. Additionally CNO and his assistants in common causes with the Army formulated plans within the framework of the Joint Board of the Army and Navy and its subsidiary committees. In the next chapter the plans so derived will be discussed.

The evaluation of enemy potentialities, proposed courses of action and estimates of own future requirements which emanated from the above discussed officers influenced in varying degrees the political decisions made relative to Japan from 1936 to 1941. The nature and degree of influence in certain areas are discussed in the following chapters.

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#### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN WAR PLANS AGAINST JAPAN

Introduction.

Traditionally the period between wars has been used by professional military men to study past mistakes and successes and to prepare for future operations. The latter employment finds expression in staff estimates, studies and, finally, war plans. Ideally, the finished product would serve as an exact blueprint for successful operations against an enemy, utilizing forces available which are equal to forces required. Aside from errors in estimates of enemy and own force capabilities and courses of action, the ideal is hardly possible because forces required in offensive operations are seldom available in the peacetime periods which allow for leisurely war planning.

The war planning by American military officers between the two World Wars of the twentieth century was generally done within the framework of the Joint Board and Joint Planning Committee discussed in the previous chapter. Subsidiary war plans by Fleet, Army, Force, Corps and other descending subordinate commanders were based on the plans generated by the Joint Board. The one plan relative to a foreign power upon which most of the planning effort was spent was the Orange Plan, which considered action against Japan.

Orange Plan underwent numerous changes between its initial appearance in 1924 and final revision in 1938—each change reflecting a change in the relative power positions of Japan and the United States. Superseded by a new sequence of Rainbow war plans in 1939, Orange Plan was never executed as an operational plan. The investment of time spent on Orange Plan was not lost, however. Experience in joint war planning and the development of

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strategic thinking on Pacific problems facilitated the writing of the Rainbow Plans and unified the American Staff in discussions with the British in early 1941 over proposed actions in the Pacific.

#### The Orange Plan.

In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the Joint Board, in an idealistic General Staff approach, undertook to prepare detailed plans for action in any conceivable emergency. A color was assigned as the code word for each emergency and applied as well to the country visualized as the enemy in that emergency. Orange was the code word for Japan and actions with Japan and Red applied to the British Empire. Blue for the United States was less war plan than a plan for the national position of the American military forces in certain contingencies with no particular enemy specified. Most of the hypothetical situations were highly improbable in the peacetime era of the early 1920's. No country menaced the United States, and few were physically able to do so after the devastations of World War I. Likewise, the Blue Plan was unrealistic in that the skeleton army of 1921-1910 could never fulfill its assigned missions without general mobilization. \*As strategic plans, most of the ten or twelve color plans developed between the wars were worthless, because they bore little relation to contemporary international political and military alignments. The major exception was the Orange Plan, for war against Japan. That plan called for moving large Army units to the Philippines and extensive naval operations. The color plans were valuable as abstract exercises in the technical process of detailed

Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, a volume in the series, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Department of the Army, 1951), p. 36.

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military planning. One former Assistant CND, who, of course, was a member of the Joint Board by virtue of his office, said:

I have always thought that our Orange Plan was chiefly useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in War Flanning and to serve as a basis for asking for appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities. As to actual executing the O-1 plan I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.<sup>2</sup>

There were valid reasons even in the 1920's for considering Japan as the potential enemy in the Pacific, and therefore a special subject for planning purposes. A review of the rapid changes in control over the Pacific islands will show part of those reasons. In 1898 the United States annexed Hawaii and after the short war with Spain acquired the Philippine Islands and Guam in the Marianas Islands. The next year Wake and part of Samoa were claimed. In unprecedented time the United States hurdled across the Pacific to become a Far Eastern Power, simultaneously securing a sequence of potential bases extending all the way from its west coast to the Philippines.

Spain, shortly thereafter, bowed out of the Facific by ceding the remainder of her island possessions in that ocean to Germany, who already controlled the mid-Pacific Marshall Islands to the east of the Spanish-owned groups. Germany received the Caroline and Marianas Islands, less Guam, without serious American objection because at the time Germany posed no threat in becoming a major naval power in the Facific. Even the foremost naval strategist of the day, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, Could see "no sufficient

Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Divestigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, United States Government Printing Office, (Washington, D.C., 1946, 39 vols.), Part 16, pp. 924-925, Ltr: Adm. Richardson to Adm. Stark 26 January 1940. (Hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Attack).

<sup>3</sup>cf. Chapter One, pp. 3-9 for Mahan's theories.

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reason for our opposition." The subsequent events certainly were not anticipated. Japan and Britain signed a Treaty of Alliance in 1902 which the British invoked in 1911 to get Japan to clear the Pacific of German cruisers. In the process the Japanese occupied the Marshall, Caroline and Marianas Islands "temporarily." The temporary occupation stretched into near permanency when in 1920 the League of Nations confirmed the former Cerman islands as a mandate of Japan. Although the non-fortification clause in the Washington Naval Treaty 1921-22 was to remove offensive threats in the Pacific, the mere control of the former German islands gave Japan the potential to isolate the Philippines and Guam and to sever American lines of commerce to the Orient. American suspicions over Japanese intentions and preparations in the islands increased annually as Japan continually refused visits by Americans or Europeans to the various island groups.

"Strategy of the Pacific" was a topic discussed by the Joint Board in 1919, but not until after the League of Nations had blessed Japan's position astride the route to the Philippines did The Joint Planning Committee recommend a war plan. The War Plan Orange was completed, approved by the Joint Board and the Secretary of the Navy in August 1924 and by the Secretary of War on September 3, 1924. According to the Orange plan, the United States would conduct "an offensive war, primarily naval, directed toward the isolation and harassment of Japan, through control of her vital sea communications and through offensive sea and air operations against her

Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 32.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. Chapter Seven for discussion of attempts to get permission for American ships to visit the Mandated Islands.

Watson, op. cit., p. 466.

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naval forces and economic life, followed if necessary, by such further action as may be required to win the war." The initial mission for the Army and Navy was to gain superiority over the Japanese in sea power in the western Pacific. In order to accomplish the mission a major naval base was required, and Manila was considered the best location for such a base.

Manila Bay and the approaches thereto were to be held by forces in the Philippines and by the Asiatic Fleet until reinforcements could arrive from the United States. In the original plan 50,000 men were to sail from the west coast within ten days after the start of hostilities. At the time of the plan the assigned missions for the Army and Navy were beyond their capabilities. They were to become even more unrealistic as the Army further deteriorated in the peacetime economy.

The Army planners became increasingly more concerned over obvious deficiencies in forces available for planned operations. Brigadier-General Stanley D. Embick who designed the defenses of Corregidor and was Commander of Marbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays, wrote in 1933 while in the Philippines, and later reiterated in 1935 while serving in the War Plans Division, that "To carry out the present Orange Plan-with the provisions for the early dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters-would be literally an act of madness." Corregidor could hold against the Japanese for at least a year, but the surrounding land around Manila and Cavite would fall with little if any resistance. Embick's contention was that as long as Corregidor held, Manila Bay would be denied to the Japanese as a base, but as long as

<sup>7</sup> Louis Morton, American and Allied Strategy in the Far East, Military Review, December 1949, Vol. XXIX, No. 9, p. 23.

awatson, op. cit., p. 415.

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the Japanese held the surrounding area Manila Bay would be denied the United States as a base.

After the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in March 193h granting Philippine independence, the American military and naval commanders in the Philippines recommended to their respective departments that, if the United States were going to defend the islands regardless of their independence, an adequate base be built and forces increased. If the United States were not going to defend the islands regardless of independence, the recommendation was that American forces, other than those necessary to internal order, be withdrawn. The Army section of the Joint Planning Committee, in analyzing the recommendations of the Philippine commanders, maintained that the question of being able to defend Manila Bay depended upon the ability of the Navy to guarantee safe passage of troop reinforcements immediately after the start of war. If the Asiatic Fleet could not delay the Japanese advance long enough, or, if the Pacific Fleet were not strong enough to escort sufficient troops to the Philippines, then the mission of the Philippine Department of the Army would have to be changed. In other words, the Philippine phase of the Orange Plan would have to be revised. At this stage, the Navy apparently believed that it could perform its part of the mission. And so the recommendations of the Philippine commanders were rejected by the Joint Board. An awareness of weaknesses was obvious, however, because the Joint Board stated that forces in the Philippines should be increased to 155 planes, 2k submarines and 15 patrol planes and that the harbor defense, anticraft and mobile troop strength be augmented.

<sup>9</sup> Iouis Morton, Military Review, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

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A year later in May 1935 Orange Plan was revised again. The change in the Navy concept was significant, since it was the strategy ultimately used in World War II. The Pacific Fleet approach to the Philippines would be a progressive movement. The first objective, to be undertaken as soon as practicable, was to seize the Marshall and Caroline Islands from Japan in order to develop advance bases and secure the lines of communications to the Western Pacific. The next year thore was another revision. The earlier missions of the Army and Navy forces in the Philippines had been two fold: to hold the entrance to Manila Bay, and to hold the Manila Bay area itself as long as possible. The second part of the mission was dropped. In addition, the proposed 50,000 troops from the west coast to be embarked within ten days of hostilities was dropped from the Orange Plan. The defense force of the Philippines would consist of a 10.000 United States troop garrison, the Philippine Army and such troops as could be evacuated from China. These troops were to hold out for six months until the Navy could open the line of communications across the Central Pacific.

Prior to the last revision of Orange Plan an incident occurred relative to Presidential interest in the war plans. While on a South American cruise in December 1936, President Roosevelt inquired of his Naval Aide, Captain Bastedo, about the status of the War Plans. (In the light of subsequent history, the question could be considered a harbinger of change in Presidential emphasis. His first term had been devoted to social experimentation in solving the domestic problems of the country. Increased international tensions and the overwhelming victory of the previous November seemed to turn

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

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affairs.) Captain Bastedo directed the President's question to the Chief of Naval Operations. The paragraph relative to the Pacific in CNO's answer indicates the general nature of the reply to the Naval Aide.

Plan for War in the Pacific. This plan requires the maximum effort on the part of the Navy. Its conception is that if the United States is attacked by a Pacific Power, the war can only be terminated and a decision reached by carrying the war to the Western Pacific. Practically all detailed planning is confined to this plan as the Joint Board had decided that war in the Pacific is more probable than war with any other major naval Power.

national mobilization of Pascist Germany and Italy suddenly confronted the United States military leaders with problems of the first magnitude. The Navy, so long considered the "first line of defense" was munerically a one-ocean navy. The Anny was near its lowest ebb and incapable of mustering an expeditionary force for offensive operations any place. On March 17, 1937 the Joint Board restudied the current draft of the Basic Grange Flan in the light of recent events. On November 16, 1937 the Board approved a recommendation by the Anny Chief of Staff, General Graig, to rescind the plan and to prepare a new plan in line with forces available. A new plan offered by Joint Planning Committee was rejected and on January 19 the two service authorities on Pacific problems, Major-General Stanley D. Emblek and Rear Admiral James O. Richardson, were directed to make a further Pacific study. Their efforts were accepted as a new Orange Plan by the Joint Board

Memo: CNO to Pres. Naval Aide, 12 Jan. 1937; NHD File: Al6-3/Warfare,

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on 21 February and by the Secretaries of War and Navy a week later. On the basis of this latest plan the Navy asked for and received from the President and Congress authorization for a twenty percent increase in size. The same set of facts that prompted a review of the war plans and their revision also prompted the Navy to send a representative to London to seek possible British cooperation against the Japanese.

Although the latest Orange Plan related to Japan only, it was obvious to the planners that the European situation would increasingly bear upon the American strategic position. On November 12, 1938 the Joint Board instructed the Joint Planning Committee

various practicable courses of action open to the military and naval forces of the United States in the event of (a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist powers, and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand Japanese influence in the Philippines.

The planners presented their study five and a half months later. They concluded that Germany and Italy could violate the Monroe Doctrine by supporting Fascist revolutions in Latin America. The relegation of such countries to the status of colonies would give to their European exploiters the advantages of trade, access to raw materials, and military and naval bases. From such bases the Panama Canal possibly could be attacked. Finally the planners discounted the German or Italian action in Latin America unless:

<sup>(1)</sup> Germany believed that Britain and France would not intervene and

<sup>(2)</sup> Japan were to attack the Philippines and Guam and even then only in case

<sup>12</sup> Watson, op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>13</sup>cf. Chapter Four, p. 67 for details of the visit.

Watson, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

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the United States had responded to the Japanese attack by counterattack in the western Pacific.

The Rainbow Plans.

However, to overcome glaring deficiencies in present war plans concerning concerted action by Germany, Italy and Japan, the Joint Planning Committee recommended that future plans reflect the new possibilities. That recommendation received immediate approval and action. In less than three weeks, four of a new family of tentative plans were offered by the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board for approval. They were Rainbows 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The most limited plan (RAINBOW 1) would provide for the defense of the Western Hemisphere south to the bulge of Brazil (10° south latitude) -- the Western Hemisphere being taken to include Greenland (but not Iceland, the Azores, or the Cape Verde Islands) to the east, and American Samoa, Hawaii, and Wake (but not Guam or the Philippines) to the west. Two other plans would provide alternatively for the extension of operations from this area either to the western Facific (RAINBOW 2) or to the rest of South America (RAINBOW 3). The directive also called for modification of the first three plans under the contingency (RAINBOW 4) that Great Britain and France were at war with Germany and Italy (and possibly Japan), in which case it was assumed that the United States would be involved as a major participant.

Reexamination of the possibilities under Rainbow 4 led the planners to the conclusions that if all the major powers were at war using their current forces, operations in Latin America would probably be very limited in scope while operations by Japan in the Pacific would probably be extensive in scope. The recommendation was made that there be two plans covering United

Matloff, Maurice and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Flanning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, in the series United States Army in World War II, (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

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States participation with Britain and France against Germany, Italy and
Japan. One plan provided for the United States to furnish armies for a
maximum effort in Europe against Germany and Italy, while the other plan
called for NOT providing maximum effort in Europe, maintaining the Monroe
Doctrine and carrying out "allied Democratic Power tasks in the Pacific."

The Navy by this time, June 1939, had had talks with the British over
cooperation in the Pacific against the Japanese and unofficial agreements had
been reached over cooperative action. The Joint Planning Committee recommended
that the plan for the United States to concentrate in the Pacific be moved
up in priority to the Rainbow 2 position where it might "conceivably press
more for answers" than plans other than Rainbow 1 would. Part of the
justification for the change in priority read:

Whether or not we have any possible intention of undertaking a war in this situation, nevertheless we may take measures short of war, and in doing so should clarify the possible or probable war task that would be involved. 17

A week later on June 30, 1939 the Joint Board approved the recommended change in priority. The revised description of the new five Rainbow plans read:

a. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 1:

Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting that territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the vital interests of the United States can be threatened, while protecting the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade. This territory is assumed to be any part of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude ten degrees south.

This plan will not provide for projecting U.S. Army forces farther south than the approximate latitude ten degrees south or outside of the

Western Hemisphere.

<sup>17</sup> Toid., p. 7.

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- b. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 2:
  - (1) Provide for the missions in a.
- (2) Under the assumption that the United States, Great Britain, and France are acting in concert, on terms wherein the United States does not provide maximum participation in continental Europe, but undertakes, as its major share in the concerted effort, to sustain the interests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific, to provide for the tasks essential to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces in the Pacific.
- c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3:
- (1) Carry out the missions of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan -- Rainbow No. 1.
- (2) Protect United States' vital interests in the Western Pacific by securing control in the Western Pacific, as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in a.
- d. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 4:
- (1) Prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting all the territory and Governments of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression while protecting the United States, its possessions, and its sea-borne trade. This Plan will provide for projecting such U.S. Army Forces as necessary to the southern part of the South American continent or to the Eastern Atlantic.
- e. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5:
  - (1) Provide for the missions in a.
- (2) Project the armed forces of the United States to the Eastern Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European Continents, as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in a above, in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both. This plan will assume concerted action between the United States, Great Britain, and France. 18

With the definitions of strategic objectives having been clarified, the Joint Planning Committee had the basis for all future planning until war came to the United States in December 1941. \*A shifting emphasis in the priority of developing the five Rainbow plans resulted from changes in the international situation. All the plans must be reviewed here because of their bearing on

<sup>18</sup> Tbid., pp. 7-8; quote from JPC Report 27 July 1939, JB 325, serial 642-1.

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the plans against Japan, Rainbows 2, 3 and 5.

As should be expected the security of the Western Hemisphere received first priority. Rainbow 1 was submitted to the Joint Board on 27 July 1939, where it was studied, slightly changed and submitted directly to President Roosevelt in accordance with his order of 5 July 1939. The President approved the plan orally on 14 October 1939.

While the plan was before the Fresident, Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, sent to Under Secretary of State Mr. Welles a memorandum dated 14 August.

There is enclosed a secret memorandum relative to the political aspects of the plan—Rainbow No. 1. I believe it is necessary for your background but feel that since it quotes joint basic war plans it should be destroyed or otherwise adequately protected after you have read it.

Part of the enclosed secret memorandum read:

...The General Situation under which these plans are being prepared is as follows: Germany, Italy and Japan, acting in concert, violate the letter and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Japan, supported by Germany and Italy, violates by armed aggression vital interests of the United States in the Western Pacific. It is to be assumed that aggression initiated by one or two of these powers will be eventually supported by the concerted action of all three.<sup>21</sup>

The next priority after Rainbow 1 applied to Rainbows 2 and 3, the two Pacific area plans. "The Joint Board had directed the Joint Planning Committee in June 1939 to give priority to the development of plans for United States naval offensive in western Pacific (Rainbow No. 2 and No. 3) in the

<sup>19</sup> cf. Chapter TWO, p. 23.

<sup>20</sup> Cline, op. cit., p. 56; (2) Watson, op. cit., p. 103.

Memo: CNO to Under Sec. State, 14 August 1949; MHD Files; A16-3/Warfare, Misc.

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event of war with Japan." Even after war broke in Europe a few months later, the strategic thinking continued to emphasize the plans against Japan. Since Britain and France controlled the Atlantic, and to a lesser degree the North and Mediterranean Seas, the most likely action to involve the United States in war would be an attack by Japan in the Pacific. Planning for such an eventuality was much more complex than planning for Grange plans in the past. Not only were other "Democratic Powers" involved in the Pacific, but additional potential enemies who might act in concert existed in the Atlantic.

Another problem facing the planners was how far the Japanese would advance and in which directions before the United States and the "Democratic Fowers" could take action.

The Navy planners at the outset set up three alternative hypotheses. The first was that Japan would not have begun moving southward from Formosa. In that case the U.S. Fleet might move to Manila Bay, "with certain groups visiting Singapore, Kamranh Bay, and Hong Kong." Ground forces might be moved to the western Pacific at the same time or later. The Navy planners thought that these acts might prevent Japanese moves southward, and hence prevent a war in the Pacific. The second hypothesis was that Japan had taken Hong Kong, Kamranh Bay, and begun operations in the Netherlands Indies, that the United States would react by moving forces to the far Pacific, and that the Japanese in turn would begin operations to seize Guam and the Philippines. The third hypothesis was that the Japanese would already have control of the Netherlands Indies and would have forces in position to isolate Singapore and take the Philippines. In this case, as the Army planners pointed out, "the principal advantage of Allied participation will have been lost and the problem becomes essentially that of an Orange War. "23

The second hypothesis became the basis of the development of Rainbow 2 and 3. "On 10 April 1940 the Joint Board had further directed the Joint

Captain Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, Unpublished Monograph on the United States Navy in World War II, on file in Navy History Division. Sect. III, Vol. I, Note 83, p. 240.

<sup>23</sup> Methoff and Smell, op. cit., p. 9.

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Planning Committee to proceed immediately with the completion of plans for an immediate projection of U.S. forces into the Western Pacific (Rainbow No. 2)." The initial movement of forces was planned for Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, to be supported, if the second hypothesis held true, across the Atlantic, around the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean. To insure that Singapore would be available to the U.S. Fleet, the Navy recommended that the British be asked to send a division of capital ships to reinforce their Far Eastern naval forces. The Navy further recommended that the British, Dutch and French authorities be contacted diplomatically to ascertain their proposed actions in the Pacific vis á vis Japanese aggression. Another explosive political question was whether U.S. forces would be used to defend the European colonial possessions. Before these questions could be answered events in Europe turned attention from the Pacific.

In rapid succession in the Spring of 1940 Dermark, Norway, Holland and Belgium fell. France was falling fast in June and within the American military circles there was genuine fear that the French and possibly even the British Fleets would fall into German hands. In May, before France had fallen, the President, Mr. Welles, Admiral Stark and General Marshall had agreed that "we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not concern ourselves beyond the 180th Meridian, and that we must concentrate on the South American situation." Work was suspended on Rainbows 2 and 3, but evidently only by the Army, as will be shown shortly. Rainbow 4 received top priority—

<sup>2</sup>h Kittredge Monograph, loc. cit.

<sup>25</sup> Matloff and Snell, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 26 Thid., p. 13.

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To provide for the most effective use of United States' naval and military forces to defeat enemy aggression occurring anywhere in the territory and waters of the American continents, or in the United States, and in United States' possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway.<sup>27</sup>

The Plan was finished in May and forwarded by the then Secretaries of War and Navy, Harry H. Woodring and Lewis Compton, respectively, to the President on June 13. On July 12 the President asked the new Secretaries of War and Navy, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, to read the plan. They resubmitted it on July 26 and the President approved it on August 14.

In the meanwhile the Navy had continued to work on Rainbow 3, although in November 1940 Admiral Stark wrote his Plan Dog which closely paralleled Rainbow 5. On November 29 General Marshall expressed grave concern over the plan of the Navy (Rainbow 3) calling for holding the Malay Barrier against the Japanese southward movement. He suggested:

...readjusting war plans on the basis (1) that our national interests require that we resist proposals that do not have for their immediate goal the survival of the British Empire and the defeat of Germany; and (2) that we avoid dispersions that might lessen our power to operate effectively, decisively, if possible, in the principal theater — the Atlantic. Such a basis might provide

a. that our naval threat should be continued in the Pacific so long as the situation in the Atlantic permits.

b. that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should avoid dispersing our forces into that theater. We should, however, assist the British to reinforce their naval setup in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligations in the Atlantic. This would provide a more homogeneous force for Malaysia and would, in effect, concentrate rather than disperse our naval establishment.<sup>29</sup>

Stark answered with a memorandum the same day. "Should we become engaged in

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 28 Ibid., ns.

<sup>29</sup> Watson, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

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the war described in Rainbow 3, it will not be through my doings, but because those in higher authority have decided that it is to our best national interests to accept such a war." Other evidence of the CNO's tenseness over possible Japanese action in the Fall of 1940 to take advantage of the European situation is shown by a memorandum exactly a week earlier to General Marshall; "Over here we are much concerned with the possibility of having a war on our hands due to precipitate Japanese action." One of the largest areas of doubt was British intentions. Those doubts were soon to be resolved in the forthcoming American-British meetings in January.

The discussions with the British in early 1941 are described in detail in the next Chapter. During the conversations, planning on Rainbow plans was suspended. The American position during the conversations was basically that found in Rainbow 5, and as soon as the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations had approved the ABC-1 Report a new Rainbow 5 was ordered. The first draft was completed on April 7 and three weeks later it was submitted by the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board for approval. On May 14 the Joint Board approved Rainbow 5 and ABC-1. On June 2 the two plans were sent to the President, the Secretary of the Navy having approved on May 28 and the Secretary of War on June 2. The President read the documents and returned them without approval or disapproval on June 7. The Presidential military aide offered this explanation:

The Fresident has familiarized himself with the two papers; but since the report of the United States British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been approved by the British Government, he would not approve the report at this time; neither would he now give approval to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Flan-Rainbow No. 5, which is based

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 122. 31 Ibid., p. 121.

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upon the report ABC-1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned to the President for his approval. 32

The general assumptions and the concept of war of the joint Rainbow 5 were identical with those of ABC-1. The Army and Navy each wrote a supporting Rainbow 5 plan for the guidance of their respective forces. The Navy Rainbow 5 plan was promulgated on May 26, 1941. Many of the tasks assigned were by now familiar, since some had been in the Orange Plan and all were in general terms in ABC-1.

The Pacific Fleet was assigned the task of diverting enemy strength away from the Malay barrier by the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and by raids on enemy bases and communications. The Pacific Fleet was also to defend Wake, Guam, Midway, Samoa, and other American islands, as well as "prepare to capture" the mandated islands and establish an advanced base at Truk. These moves would be necessary preparatory steps to the maintenance of the line of communications between the United States and the Philippine Islands, and the establishment of American naval superiority in the Western Pacific. 34

The defensive strategy in the Pacific and the plan to exert maximum effort against the European enemies first, precluded any reinforcements being sent to the Pacific. Rainbow 5 reflected that defensive thinking. The preceding Orange Flans had been unrealistic for want of forces. The Rainbow plans were by comparison quite sophisticated in that deficiencies were recognized and planned for in the period until the United States could mobilize and build up the supplies of materials to support its allies and itself.

<sup>32</sup> Memo: Col. Scobey to CNO, 9 June 1911; NHD File; Misc. 1.

The Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 is found in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 18, pp. 2875-2940.

<sup>3</sup>h Morton, Military Review, op. cit., p. 38.

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The evolution of war plans in the years between the two world ward had one continuous feature. War with Japan was considered the most probable war the United States would fight. Work continued on Orange Plans and their revisions until changes in the balance of power in Europe raised new threats to United States and Western Hemispheric security. In the new circumstances Japan was even more a potential enemy. For her relative and actual military power in the Pacific had increased and she had gained possible (later actual) allies in Europe. The shift to the Rainbow group of plans placed the probable war between Japan and the United States in the perspective of world conditions. Even considering the more immediate threat of Germany and Italy to national interests in 1939, the second and third priority plans, Rainbows 2 and 3, related directly to action against Japan. With further changes in the military picture in Europe in the Spring of 1910, the decision was made to concentrate on defeating Germany by assisting Britain. War with Japan was still considered highly probable, but it would have to be defensive. The offensive plan against Japan, Rainbow 2 and 3, were finally cancelled on 6 August 1941. Rainbow 5, which encompassed the whole war effort, was the plan with which the United States entered the war. Not until & May 1942 were Rainbow 1 and h cancelled. Although the strategy in the Grange Plans of progressively advancing through certain island groups to defeat Japan was ultimately used in the Pacific, Rainbow 5 was the plan adopted. Germany, not Japan, had highest priority on the list of enemies.

<sup>35</sup> cline, op. cit., p. 57.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

## THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE FACIFIC

Introduction.

The period immediately preceeding 1936 (the point of departure for this paper) was marked by extreme economic doldrums, social pressures resulting in governmental experimentation and general military inactivity. After World War I the United States had rejected "foreign entanglements" by refusing to join the League of Nations. In the subsequent search for peace without using force the United States gave up a position sans pareil in the ship building race to overcome the British maval supremacy and in a complete reversal led, the way to drastic naval scrapping and limitations. In the same search for peace by treaty, the United States joined with France in promoting world acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to "renounce was as an instrument of national policy."

The journey down the idealistic path to peace led past signosts which indicated that all was not well with the world. The examples of Manchuria, Ethiopia and the Rhineland served as evidence of how the rising military power of Japan, Italy and Germany would be used. How to act effectively against incipient political/military power diametrically opposed to national interests without generating public hysteria or negative reaction is a problem inherent in a democracy of elected officials. (Fear of public opinion vis a vis unpopular actions has dampened if not deterred many political decisions.)

One course of action against a patential enemy is the obvious alignment of allies. If planting are done in secret between the military groups of the United States and possible allies, national strutegic war plans might

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thereby be derived. Future collective military action might then be executed almost immediately after political approval of such plans.

A review of the study of War Plans in the preceding Chapter will show the relative readiness of the Navy for certain action against Japan and the pitiful impotency of the Army to defend the continent much less field the expeditionary force to move through the Pacific Islands. It is no small wonder then that the Navy should desire to investigate the possibilities of British cooperation to complement its own courses of action against Japan; or that the President should desire to deter further successes of opposing ideologies by naval action if possible or that there should be similar desires in Britain for cooperation against an enemy in common.

This Chapter is devoted to the review of the growth of British-American cooperation from simple exploratory talks in London in January 1938 to full scale cooperation as World War II involved first the one then the other of the English-speaking opponents of Japan.

Background.

Extremis from open hostility concomitant with the birth of the latter to the nicest sense of cooperation in the two world wars of the twentieth century. British naval tradition, organization and tactics transposed to the embryonic American fleet remained from colonial days a latent common bond. The American Navy, through lack of funds and national apathy deteriorated into insignificance after the victories of 1812. In fact, the omnipresent British Fleet and its excellent system of world wide bases, while protecting the Empire lines of commerce, also provided the bulwark behind which the Monroe Doctrine and American Far Eastern policy matured with no serious

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outside challenge.

The changing political and military balance of power in Europe in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century found the British naval supremacy effectively challenged by a modern German fleet. The immovation of submarine warfare aggravated the seriousness of the international position of Britain. The British retaliated with blockade measures. American commerce and American lives quickly became pawns in the game. The diplomatic exchange of notes between the United States and Germany and Britain over the first submarine warfare campaign did bring about a cessation of sinkings without warning in April 1916. However, shortages in American antisubmarine forces and the Navy in general left President Wilson with a weak hand in his coercive attempts to force Germany and Britain to respect our neutral status. His proposal for a conference to end the war was rejected by both sides. He concluded then that it was necessary to provide naval forces sufficient to take care of our rights as neutrals. independently. since the Allies did not want the United States in the war on its own terms and the Germans were not ready to compromise. He therefore persuaded Congress in August, 1916 to vote a large naval building program. The program came too late to influence the Germans. In February 1917 the second submarine campaign started "to isolate England by sea despite any effort the

Cf. Frnest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), Part II, p. 113ff. for an excellent discussion on German-American relations relative to the first submarine campaign.

The program called for construction within three years of ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, sixty-seven submarines and thirteen miscellaneous type vessels.

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United States might make."

The General Board anticipated the outbreak of war and on February 4, 1917 recommended to the Navy Department a possible war program with the following points:

(a) mobilize fleet and start patrol work and mine sweeping; (b) dock and repair all ships; (c) increase personnel of navy to 150,000 and Marine Corps to 30,000 officer personnel being increased in proportion; (d) rush to completion all vessels building or authorized and build up aviation forces as rapidly as possible (e) take possession of all vessels of the Central Powers and remove all enemy aliens who might do harm; (f) arm merchant vessels; and (g) prepare plans in cooperation with the Allies for offensive operations against the enemy.

Early in 1917, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, discussed with American Ambassador Walter Hines Page a visit to London by an American Admiral. Rear Admiral William S. Sims, Head of the Naval War College, chosen for the mission, left for London with no instructions and reportedly with this admonition from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William S. Benson:

Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans.

Sims with an aide, Commander J.V. Babcock, traveling under aliases of

Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1948), p. 384.

Donald W. Mitchell, History of the Modern American Navy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 199.

Kittredge Honograph, Vol. I, Sect. III, Part A, Chp. 10, p. 209.

Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), p. 338.

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S.W. Davidson and V.J. Richardson, respectively, arrived on April 9. Sims was anazed to be informed most confidentially of the true gravity of the submarine situation from Admiral Jellico. Sinkings of merchant ships had reached 540,000 tons in February and almost 600,000 tons in March, and were then progressing at the rate of nearly 900,000 tons for April — three or four times the amounts which the public had been led to assume. The urgent call for destroyers was answered slowly but gradually the increased number of American destroyers and the system of convoying merchant ships urged on the British Admiralty by Admiral Sims proved the telling difference against the submarine and Germany's attempt to negate Britain's naval supremacy.

The flag secretary to Admiral Sims during his tour as the Senior

American Naval Officer in European waters was Lieutenant Commander Harold R.

Stark. Stark had brought his command, a flotilla of torpedo boats, from the Asiatic Station to help the British in the Mediterranean and English Channel.

His experience in working with the British under wartime conditions would prove valuable twenty-four years later when he was the Chief of Naval Operations.

The interim period between world wars found both British and American naval officers attempting to balance forces under the treaty limitations on

<sup>7</sup> The British conferees to the ABC meetings in Jan. 1941 came as members of a purchasing committee.

Mitchell, op. cit., p. 205.

<sup>9</sup> Knox, op. eit., p. 387.

The Nevy Department was inclined to disbelieve the urgency for the destroyers and did not order the first ships to be fitted out until the lith of April. As late as July 5th only thirty-four destroyers had arrived at Queenstown. Ibid., p. 388.

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size and new construction in their respective navies, with little contact existing between the two services except at the conference tables.

Pre-Pearl Harbor Planning.

marly in 1937 the Joint Board restudied the draft of the joint Army and Navy Basic Flan Orange which dated from 1928. The shortcomings, especially in the non-existent Army expeditionary force and, in a more limited sense, the naval requirements, were obvious to the planners. The Navy, aware of British interests and responsibilities in parts of the western Pacific and the possibility of future cooperation against a militant Japan, decided to conduct private conversations with the Admiralty. Il Actually the conversations were to have a two-fold purpose; to find out what could be done if the United States and Britain found themselves at war with Japan and to take up with the British the question of getting out of the qualitative limitations of the size of battleships which had been stipulated in the London Treaty of 1935 and 1936.

<sup>11</sup> Watson, op. eit., p. 92.

<sup>12</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 9, p. 4273.

<sup>13&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 4276.</sub>

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<sup>6</sup> m/ - 1 - 3 / 2 2 mile of

Mr. Anthony Eden. who had cancelled a post-Christmas holiday to see Inversell. Inversell told Mr. Eden that U.S. Navy plans of action in the Pacific were based on certain assumptions about the dispositions the British might be able to make and that the same was probably true about their plans. X President Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy thought the time had come "to carry matters a stage further by exchanging information in order to co-ordinate our plans more closely." Ingersoll was free to disclose the American dispositions under certain eventualities and desired to learn what the British dispositions would be under like circumstances. In answer to a question from Mr. Rien relative to possible courses of action now or in the future. Ingersoll replied that the discussions which were to be held between himself and the Admiralty "would be limited to future incidents against which joint action might later be taken, but that no move could be made at all in the Pacific, unless full preparation had been made for every eventuality, including war." Ingersoll thought the technical examination between the two countries should come first, after which any considerations on political decisions should be easier. The technical talks were held with Captain Thomas Phillips, Ingersell's opposite in the War Plans Division of the Admiralty.

Ingersoll noted his impressions during his visit in a diary report to the Chief of Naval Operations:

Mr. Mden appeared more interested right now in immediate gestures to impress the Japanese than he was in long-range planning...British not counting on any aid from

Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 619-620.

Fearl Harbor Attack, Part 9, p. 4273.

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rough thatbody throng per 8, p. A273,

Russia. France or Dutch... British interested in Manila as base. Fear Hong Kong too vulnerable from land attack ... British do not believe the Japanese would attempt to take the Philippines while occupied in China and believed they are safe if the British Fleet were at Singapore and the United States Fleet were at Hawaii or to the westward thereof ... Their fleet should start for Singapore and ours for Hawaii to arrive approximately the same time. Should blockade be decided by the government they would hold a line roughly from Singapore through the Netherlands Fast Indies past New Guinea and New Hebrides eastward of Australia and New Zealand ... Admiralty would provide communications codes and ciphers for use in coordinated communications ... Admiralty believes that a show of strength by the two fleets may be necessary, even if there are no hostilities with Japan, in order to bring about peace terms between China and Japan which will continue the principle of the "open door, "10

The official "Record of Conversations" of January 12, 1938, signed by Captains Ingersell and Phillips agreed to recommend cooperation in case of war with the Japanese, the British basing a fleet at Singapore and the United States concentrating a fleet at Yearl Harbor.

Admiral Leahy, CND, took special cognizance of the British statement of intentions as understood by Ingersoll. In a letter to the two key fleet commanders he stated:

In the event that the United States and British Governments should, at some indefinite time in the future, decide that parallel action by the two governments in regard to their Far Eastern policies (including naval operations) is necessary, certain assumptions must be made in order to adopt existing Orange Plans to the changed situation - that is Blue and Red against Orange... Extractions from the assumptions found in enclosure to basic letter. Should the British Government decide to send a naval force to the Far East it would send the force as a single tactical

Memo: Capt. Ingersoll to CND, Jan. 1938; NHD File: Correspondence British-US Conversations in London 1938-1939.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 9, p. 4275, (2) S.E. Horison, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 49.

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unit and its strength would be sufficient to engage the Japanese Fleet under normal tactical and strategical conditions... In the event of a general Buropean war resulting, it would almost certainly be necessary for the British to effect a considerable reduction in their naval strength in the Far East. With the reduction of British strength in the Far East under such conditions there would probably be required direct tactical cooperation between the United States and British Fleets in the Pacific... Should the British Government send its fleet to Singapore, the advance of the United States Pleet to Truk or some other position in the same general area can be assumed as the first phase of operations of the United States Fleet, after the decision is made to dispatch the United States Fleet beyond the Hawaiian Islands... Should parallel action be decided upon by the two governments, it can be assumed that the British will withdraw their garrisons in North China and the major units of the British China Fleet to Hong Kong or Singapore and that such withdrawals would probably be timed with the movement of the British Main Fleet to the Far Fast 18

Less than ayear later the assumptions were invalid as regards the British ability to send a fleet to Singapore. The Muropean situation had again drawn as a powerful magnet the major units of the British Fleet to Duropean waters. What could have been suspected by even an amateur strategist studying the deepening crisis in 1939, was confirmed by informal talks in Washington in June 1939. The British Naval Attache, Captain L.C.A. St. J. Curzon-Howe and Commander T.C. Hampton of the British Admiralty met with Admiral Leahy and Read Admiral Robert Chormley, chief of War Plans Division.

Commander Hampton stated he was enroute to duty in Asiatic Station and had been sent by the Admiralty to inform the Chief of Naval Operations that the situation in Europe and the Far East had changed so much during the past one and one-half years that the Admiralty now

Letter CNO to CINCUS and CINCAF, Serial 218 2 Feb. 1938; File: Correspondence British-WS Conversations in London 1938-1939, NHD, CNO Files.

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desired to inform the Navy Department that in view of the threat of Germany and Italy against England and France that the Biropean situation demanded the presence in European waters of all capital ships and most of the other vessels of their Fleet, so that if Japan threatened, the British would not be able to send the force to the Far East that had been contemplated in the conversations with Rear Admiral Ingersoll. It is the present intention for the British to maintain a portion of their Fleet in home waters and the remainder, except part of the China Detachment and the Dominion Forces, in the Mastern Mediterranean. That in case of war in which Japan became involved, they would concentrate on Italy, the supposed weak link, and as soon as Italy could be reduced, naval forces would be available to send reinforcements to the Far Hast, if and when the Defense Council so desired. At the present the Admiralty is inclined to believe that Japan is less likely to join Germany and Italy than she was one and onehalf years ago.

Admiral Leahy said of course he could give his personal views only, that he could not commit our Navy Department to any definite agreement, that he did not know what action Congress would take in case of trouble, nor could he discuss any other action other than "parallel action"... In case of an European war in which Japan is involved, with the United States neutral, we would doubtless send most of our naval forces to Hawaii, ... 19

Admiral Leahy reacted with a message to his fleet commanders directing them to change their War Plans to reflect Britain's inability to send a large force to Singapore due to the world situation.

A year after Commander Hampton's visit to Washington, the "phoney war" in Europe which had remained nearly static erupted into devastating action. The German war machine appeared more and more invincible, as Mr. Winston Churchill became the new Prime Minister. Referring to himself as the

<sup>19</sup>Memo by RADM Chormley on informal conversations 12 June 1939 found in File cited nl8.

Letter CNO to CINCUS and CINCAF, Change to Serial 218 of 2 Feb. 1938; Serial 286 23 June 1939, found in File cited in nl8.

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"Former Naval Person" he had renewed his correspondence with President
Roosevelt. On May 15, 1940 he apprised Roosevelt of the seriousness of the
situation and listed his immediate needs:

First of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers to bridge the gap between what we have now and the large new construction we put in hand at the beginning of the war. This time next year we shall have plenty. But if in the interval Italy comes in against us with another one hundred submarines, we may be strained to breaking-point. Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft, of which you are now getting delivery. These can be repaid by those now being constructed in the United States for us. Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition, of which again there will be plenty next year, if we are alive to see it. Fourthly, the fact that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden, from North Africa, and perhaps from Northern Spain, makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United States. This also applies to other materials. We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same. Fifthly, we have many reports of possible German parachute or air-borne descents in Ireland. The visit of a United States Squadron to Irish ports, which might well be prolonged, would be invaluable. Sixthly, I am looking to you to keep the Japanese quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient. 21

There was also fear of the Japanese going into the Netherlands East
Indies if the Germans took the Netherlands. The Joint Army and Navy Board
then recognized that the United States was the only power in a position to
restrain the Japanese action in the Netherlands East Indies. In connection
with the studies of possible cooperation with the Allies, the Naval Attache
in London was instructed by the Board at this time to obtain full information
as to facilities that might be available at Singapore for a naval detachment,

Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 24-25; (2) Watson, op. cit., p. 107; (3) Matleff and Snell, op. cit., p. 20

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should the American Government decide to support British and Dutch resistance to any further Japanese move to the south. The Admiralty expressed a strong desire that the 'United States Government guarantee the Netherlands East Indies.' The Naval Attache in London reported on 17 May 1940 a proposal by the Admiralty that the United States send naval forces to Singapore but while Japanese intentions seemed obscure, Admiralty Staff Officers pointed out that, if Japan moved southwards, they could easily cut British lines of communications between Australia and India.

As the defense in France crumbled the British position became even more precarious than Churchill had indicated to Roosevelt. Since Roosevelt had declined the request for the desperately needed destroyers by averring that Congressional action was needed and "pointed to the concentration of the 25 American Fleet at Fearl Harbor" in answer to the plea for the American use of Singapore, the Admiralty increased the discussions on how to favorably influence the Americans. To this end a special committee headed by Sir Sidney Bailey was appointed on June 15. Five days later the Naval Attache was advised that informal conversations between British and American Staffs either at London or Washington were to be proposed. The Bailey Committee held meetings from 20 June to 8 September 1940 examining "each of the major technical aspects of future naval cooperation." It recommended at the

<sup>22</sup> Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. III, Part C, Chp. 12, p. 267.

Loc. cit., quoted by Kittredge from ALISMA London despatch 101200 May 1940.

<sup>2</sup>h Ibid., p. 269, quoted by Kittredge from ALUSNA London despatch 171815 May 1940.

<sup>25</sup> Churchill, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>26</sup> Watson, op. cit., p. 107.

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July 15 meeting that cooperation with American naval authorities should 27 conform closely to the 1917-1918 precedent.

\*The pressure for naval cooperation was also exerted through the regular diplomatic channels. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, with a recollection of the fruitful services of Admiral William S. Sims, as a Special Naval Observer in Lordon in 1917, suggested to President Roosevelt in 19hO the sending of another senior American Admiral, and the idea so impressed the President that he discussed it with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Admiral Stark. On 12 July they proposed Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and former head of War Plans Division, who was already fully informed on the past conversations. Roosevelt while briefing Chormley prior to his departure for London informed him that he "still was not convinced that the United States would be forced to intervene as a belligerent in the war against the Buropean Axis, or would be forced to fight Japan in the Pacific to prevent continued Japanese expansion." In addition to Chormley, the President decided to send for a shorter period of time an Army representative, General George V. Strong. A third member was selected to represent the air arm, Major General Delos C. Emmons of the GHQ Air Force.

The trio arrived in London August 15 and were joined by the U.S. Naval Attache, Captain Alan G. Kirk and the U.S. Military Attache, Colonel

<sup>27</sup>Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. III, Part B, Chp. 11, p. 253.

<sup>28</sup> Watson, op. cit., p. 113.

<sup>29</sup>Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. III, Part A, Chp. 10, p. 213.

<sup>30</sup> Watson, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

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Raymond E. Lee. The meetings with the British which ensued were referred to as "The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee" although the discussions covered many matters of joint planning and possible cooperation, particularly on the part of the two fleets. The American delegation repeatedly stressed that they were present as individuals for discussions and recommendations, but this did not deter the British from "fielding their first military team" or from speaking with complete candor. In the British group were Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord; General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Emperial General Staff; and Air Chief Marshall Sir Cyril L.N. Newall, Chief of the Air Staff. It was Sir Cyril Newall who gave the crux of British strategical thinking at the time:

... That in our plans for the future we were certainly relying on the continued economic and industrial co-operation of the United States in ever-increasing volume. No account, however, had been taken of the probability of active co-operation by the United States, since this was clearly a matter of high political policy. The economic and industrial co-operation of the United States were fundamental to our whole strategy. 32

East pointed up the fact that the earlier British assumptions were admittedly invalid relative to possible Japanese action. First, it had been assumed that the threat to British interests would be seaborne; secondly, that a fleet could be sent to the Far East. The Japanese now threatened to expand through the southeast in such a way as to make land invasion of Malaya possible; and the British were obviously in no position to send a fleet to the Far East. At this juncture,

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 114; (2) S.E. Morison, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>32</sup> Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 22, quote from Min, 21 Aug. 40, WFD 4402-1.

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important as Singapore and Malay were, they could not be supported at the cost of the security in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean.

The British position impressed the American delegation them and was to prove an area of disagreement later.

Generals Strong and Ammons continued on in London through the height of the German air blitzkrieg which was to have brought England to her knees. Impressed by the British coolness and determination under heavy attack, they returned to Washington the last part of September confident that Britain would stand—at least for the immediate future. Admiral Ghormley stayed on in London as a Special Naval Observer.

Admiral Chormley conferred almost daily with the Bailey Committee.

The Committee, on the assumption that the United States Fleet would be concentrated in the Pacific, had recommended that strong forces should be moved into the Southwest Pacific and China Sea, in order to restrain Japanese movements to the South, and particularly into the Netherlands East Indies.

Admiral Chormley, in commenting on this recommendation, reviewed the problems that would be involved for the United States Navy moving such detachments across the Pacific. He pointed out that the First Sea Lord and other officers of the Admiralty Naval Staff had themselves suggested that the Royal Navy was not sufficiently strong in the Atlantic. Assistance from the United States Navy would probably be required in the Atlantic, in

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 22-23; (2) Watson, op. cit., p. 114.

Cf. p. 89, this Chapter and Chapter NINE, below.

<sup>35</sup> Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 22 and Morison, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 40.

Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic September 1939-May 1943, Vol. I in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), p. 41.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Ct. r. 59, thin Chemoan and Chemoan Living Lives.

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addition to whatever action might be taken in the Pacific. Admiral Ghormley referred to the existing strength of the Inited States Navy in the Atlantic.

A large proportion of these naval forces would probably be needed to cooperate with the British in the Atlantic although this would depend upon developments in the relations with Japan and on the attitude which the administration and public opinion might take, should the United States enter 37 the war.

The revised text of the Bailey Committee reports were sent by Admiral Chormley to Admiral Stark, with a record of the discussions which had been proceeding since September 17. The Chief of Naval Operations, in a despatch of October 2, suggested that the Naval Attache should return to Washington to be available for consultation there while these proposals were under consideration. This was confirmed on October 10 when Captain Kirk received orders to proceed to Washington for such discussions early in December. In mid-October Lord Lothian revived the proposal for Staff conversations, this time on a "comprehensive" basis, and two days later in London Admiral Pound spoke to the same purpose in a conversation with Admiral Chormley.

<sup>37</sup> Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. III, Part B, Chp. 10, pp. 254-255.

Ibid., p. 260.

Of Watson, op. cit., p. 119 n80. Lord Lothian presented the Prime Minister's proposal for Staff conversations to Mr. Roosevelt on 14 October. First favoring the proposal, Mr. Roosevelt reconsidered the matter, perhaps in the light of the 1940 election campaign (both candidates promised that no American boys would go abroad to fight), and on 27 October returned the memorandum to Lord Lothian without action.

Loc. cit.

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On November 12, Admiral Stark's memorandum, Plan Dog, a summation of the national strategic position and possible courses of action, was submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, with copies to General Marshall, Admiral Ghormley and Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief United States

Fleet. The concluding two paragraphs of Plan Dog emphasized the importance of staff talks with possible allies as the point d'appui for military decisions.

No important allied military decision should be reached without clear understanding between the nations involved as to the strength and extent of the participation which may be expected in any particular theater, and as to a proposed skeleton plan of operations.

Accordingly, I make the recommendation that, as a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with the British military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian military authorities in Washington, and with British and Dutch authorities in Singapore and Batavia. The purpose would be to reach agreements and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war under any of the alternative eventualities considered in this memorandum.

The Navy then on both sides of the Atlantic was eager for more serious discussions and it was the Army which agreed to the proposals. General Marshall gave credit for the proposition and the setting up of the forthcoming meeting to Admiral Stark.

Likewise it was Admiral Stark in the Plan Dog paper who set the tenor of the American position in the Army-Navy

<sup>&</sup>quot;Dog" was the phonetic word for the letter "D"; the fourth plan considered was Plan Dog. Cf. Watson, op. cit., p. 118 n79.

The original Plan Dog, Memo CNO to Sec. Nav., Op-12-CTB of Nov. 12, 1940 is in the Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

A copy of Plan Dog is found in Appendix A.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Fart 3, p. 1052.

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conferences held before the meetings with the British. Basically, that position was that we must help Britain defeat Germany in the Atlantic for our own safety's sake, and avoid unlimited war in the Pacific. "The full national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather than be expended in areas far distant from each other." If it became necessary to wage war with the Japanese, it would be fought in a containment sense, limiting the area of offensive operations to the holding of the Malay Barrier severing lines of communication and raids.

The proposed position of the United States as advanced by Admiral Stark was not completely acceptable to the other factions in the decision making scheme. The President in no way committed himself to the theory of strategy outlined in Plan Dog. Whatever he had had to say to Admiral Stark relative to his memorandum in mid-November apparently did not become a matter of record. The Army planners, on reviewing the proposal for possible limited action against the Japanese by denying them the use of Malaysia, went on record -

...that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should avoid dispersing our forces into that theater. We should, however, assist the British to reinforce their naval setup in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligation in the Atlantic. This would provide a more homogeneous force for Malaysia and would, in effect, concentrate rather than disperse our naval establishment.

Admiral Stork himself was not satisfied with the present knowledge of the

<sup>45</sup> Admiral Stark in Plan Dog, p. 10.

Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 26.

Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 28; also Cf. nh3, loc. cit.

Watson, op. cit., p. 122, quote from Memo CofS to CNO, 29 November 40; WPD 4175-15.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;The flow and mally one other, or all also on The Tall

Make as more city, p. 121, pote from the cott to drop 21 avectur hits we have as

British plans.

I consider it essential that we know a great deal more about British ideas than we have yet been able to glean. 49

The President authorized conversations between representatives of the American and British staffs to explore the problems raised by Stark. instructed Admiral Ghormley, whose exploratory conversations in London had reached the limit of their usefulness, to make arrangements with the British for serious staff conversations to begin in Washington early in the new year. Regarding British ideas of American naval deployment in the Pacific as inacceptable, Stark instructed Chormley to inform the Admiralty that anyone they sent to Washington "should have instructions to discuss concepts based on equality of considerations for both the United States and British Commonwealth, and to explore realistically the various fields of war cooperation." Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, answered this himself, assuring the Chief of Naval Operations that the ideas already expressed by the Admiralty were not to be regarded as "an unalterable basis of discussion. On December 2, Admiral Chormley announced the names of the British staff who were to come to Washington in January.

The announcement of the British acceptance of the invitation to converse in Washington lent urgency to the determination of an agreed military policy. The Joint Planning Committee reported to the Joint Board on

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

Matloff and Smell, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>51</sup> S.E. Morison, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 44

Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 28.

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December 21 on its study and offered a tentative draft of a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State, War and Mavy. Not unexpectedly it emphasized the primacy of operations in the Atlantic. "Our interests in the Far Bast are very important. It would, however, be incorrect to consider that they are as important to us as is the integrity of the Western Hemisphere, or as important as preventing the defeat of the British Commonwealth. The issues in the Grient will largely be decided in Europe." The final proposed recommendations from the Secretaries to the President as drafted by the Joint Planning Committee were;

1. A rapid increase of Army and Navy strength, and abstention from steps which would provoke attack by any other power.

2. A decision not willingly to engage in any war

against Japan.

3. If forced into war with Japan, restriction of Pacific operations so as to permit use of forces for a major offensive in the Atlantic. Acceptance of no important Allied decision save with clear understanding as to common objectives, as to contingents to be provided, as to operations planned, and as to command arrangements. St

Mr. Hull declined to approve the proposed recommendations since he doubted the propriety of his joining in recommendations to the President concerning technical military statements. Out of the conference over the State Department's acceptance of the policy, a long overdue change in upper echelon liaison became effective. Mr. Hull suggested, and it was agreed, that the three Secretaries would meet each Tuesday on National

Memo JFC to JB 21 Dec. 1940, part of JB 325, Serial 670, quoted Watson, op. cit., p. 123.

Loc. cit.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 123, (2) Matloff and Small, op. cit., p. 28.

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Defense matters, thus superceding the Liaison Committee of Mr. Welles and the military representatives.

The written record does not show the rationale leading to the event, but it is reasonable to assume that the calling of the three Secretaries, Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the White House on January 16 was prompted by the immediately past discussions on national and military policy. General Marshall made a memorandum record of the conversations as he remembered them the following day.

Yesterday afternoon the President had a lengthy conference with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army. He discussed the possibilities of sudden and simultaneous action on the part of Germany and Japan against the United States. He felt that there was one chance out of five of such an eventuality, and that it might culminate any day...

He discussed the publicity we might give our proposed courses of action-in relation to the Philippines, fleet, continuation of supplies to Great Britain, etc .. He devoted himself principally to a discussion of our attitude in the Far East towards Japan and to the matter of curtailment of American shipments of war supplies to England. He was strongly of the opinion that in the event of hostile action towards us on the part of Germany and Japan we should be able to notify Mr. Churchill immediately that this would not curtail the supply of material to England. He discussed this problem on the basis of the probability that England could survive six months and that, thereafter, a period of at least two months would elapse before hostile action could be taken against us in the Western Hemisphere. ... there would be a period of eight months in which we could gather strength.

General Marshall then recorded the final directive from the President:

That we would stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii; that the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet would have the discretionary authority as to how long he could remain based in the Philippines and

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

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<sup>. 181 . 1</sup> c. 120.

as to his direction of withdrawal--to the Fast or to Singapore; that there would be no naval reinforcement of the Philippines; that the Navy should have under consideration the possibility of bombing attacks against Japanese cities.

That the Navy should be prepared to convoy shipping in the Atlantic to England, and to maintain a patrol off-

shore from Maine to the Virginia Capes.

That the Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake it; that our military course must be very conservative until our strength had developed; that it was assumed we could provide forces sufficiently trained to assist to a moderate degree in backing up friendly Latin-American governments against Nazi inspired fifth column movements.

That we should make every effort to go on the basis of continuing the supply of material to Great Britain, primarily in order to disappoint what he thought would be Hitler's principal objective in involving us in a war at this particular time, and also to buck up England. 57

Meanwhile the Joint Planning Committee at the suggestion of Rear Admiral Richmond W. Turner had been directed on December 11 to draw up instructions for the Army and Navy representatives for holding conversations with the British staff due to arrive the next month. The report was evidently submitted to the Joint Board initially on January 13 and again with additions on January 21. After criticizing most of the leadership in Britain during the recent past, the basic report gave a general evaluation of suspected British proposals:

... It is believed that we cannot afford, nor do we need, to entrust our national future to British direction, because the United States can safeguard the North American continent, and probably the Western Hemisphere, whether allied with Britain or not.

Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD, 17 Jan. 41, sub: White House Conference of Thrus 16 Jan. 41, WPD 4175-18, quoted Watson, op. cit., pp. 124-125 and Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>58</sup> Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 30, nh8.

of. Watson, op. cit., pp. 370-371 and n60 infra.

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United States Army and Navy officials are in rather general agreement that Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the United States provides that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far greater degree of material aid than is being given now; and that, even then, success against the Axis is not assured.

It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British Commonwealth.

Never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests.

It is understood that the British military staffs have recently been engaged in the preparation of a new "appreciation" of the military situation of the British Commonwealth. It is possible that this appreciation may now have been completed. This should be made to the United States representatives....

In order to avoid commitment by the President, neither he nor any of his Cabinet should officially receive the British officers; therefore the Joint Planning Committee recommends that the British representatives be informally received by the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff...

The accompanying enclosure to the basic report on the forthcoming conversations contained agenda items and a clear statement of United States intentions. It was approved verbatim by the military chiefs and evidently forwarded to the President via the service Secretaries, for on January 26 the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy with minor changes recommended:

I think this procedure is all right. In Appendix II - paragraph one -

I would change the word "allies" to the word "associates."

In the last line of paragraph two I would substitute the words "be compelled" for the word "decide."

Letter JPC to JB, JB No. 325 Serial 674, 21 Jan. 1941; NHD; Files. Director, SPD Special File. The date on citation n59 was 13 Jan. 41.

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In paragraph five, Section B, I would make the last few words read "or mayally in the Mediterranean regions."

The same change is suggested in the last line of Section D.

F.D.R.

The statement of the American position as finally given by the two service chiefs contained the Roosevelt changes;

2. As understood by these two officers the purpose of these staff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of the war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities. Therefore no specific commitments can now be made except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged must for the present remain contingent upon the future political action of both nations. All such plans are subject to eventual official approval by both governments.

Li. The present national position of the United States is as follows: Defend the Western Hemisphere; Aid the British Commonwealth against Germany; and oppose by diplomatic means any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

5. If the U.S. Government decides to make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that:

a. The broad military objective of the United States operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also maintain dispositions which under all eventualities will prevent the extensions in the western hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

b. The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principle military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.

c. The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or attacking the Dutch.

d. Should Japan enter the war, the United States operations in the mid-Facific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principle military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.

<sup>61</sup> Memo: F.D.R. to SecNav 26 Jan. 1941; NED File: Misc. #1.

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 e. As a general rule the imited States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived from the United States-British joint plan.

f. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportions as to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany. 62

The selected parameters within which the conversations were to take place were indicative of the keen appreciation of possible political repercussions from any agreement. The descriptive term applied to the conversations by Ingersoll in London and Stark in Plan Dog, and through their completion in March 19hl was "on technical matters." and the connotation of "technical" was a very restrictive "military." Considerations, the nature of which required obvious decisions by the heads of government, were "political" and ruled out of the purview of the military planners. Although joint military plans, per Se, have political significance when executed or made public, as in a threat to use same, joint preliminary planning may be readily accomplished in a strictly "military" sense. Under certain stated assumptions, with no political decisions required, military representatives may draw up quite intricate disposition plans, command arrangements, tasks assignments, etc.. Such were the rules to be followed in the joint talks with the British. As added warranties to guarantee the maintenance of the "military" status, no member of the government was to be present and no Cabinet official would formally receive the visitors.

<sup>62</sup> Appendix II to letter cited n60.

Originally Under Secretary of State Mr. Welles was to welcome the group. Neither he nor any other government official actually was present the first meeting.

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the military services were each represented by senior officers, they were not the highest in any case, so the requirement for approval by higher authority was tacitly understood throughout the talks. The American military chiefs absented themselves after the initial meeting.

The flexibility enjoyed by the military planners in this case was unique. In essence they could make plans which were not binding on either side and yet were detailed enough to be the basis for effective cooperation when approved by their respective political superiors. The planners likewise were not bound in the scope of their conversations to a rigid policy position which would have been inherent if the participants included political representatives or the senior military leaders.

ABC-1, American-British Conversations, January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941.

## United States Representatives;

Major-General S.D. Embick, Army representative on the Fermanent Joint Board Defense (Canada-United States)
Brigadier-General Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Brigadier-General L.T. Gerow, head of the Army War Plans Division
Colonel J.T. McNarney, an Air officer

Rear-Admiral R.L. Ghormley, Special Naval Observer in London Rear-Admiral R.K. Turner, head of Navy War Flans Division Captain A.G. Kirk, Assistant to RADM Turner and former Naval Attache in London Lt. Colonel O.T. Ffeiffer, U.S. Marine Corps

#### British Representatives:

Rear-Admiral R.H. Bellairs, head of the British Delegation Rear-Admiral V.H. Danckwerts Major-General B.L. Morris Air Vice Marshall J.C. Slessor, of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington

Captain A.W. Clarke, Assistant Naval Attache in Washington

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#### Secretariat:

Lt. Colonel W.P. Scobey, U.S. Army Commander L.R. McDowell, U.S. Navy Lt. Colonel A.T. Cornwall-Jones, British Army

on January 29, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff welcomed the British delegation in a room set aside for the meetings in the Main Navy Building in Washington. In addition to presenting the American position which had been approved by the President the American military leaders stressed the urgency for secrecy, especially in light of the lend-lease bill which was then being discussed in Congress. The British replied that they came as a corporate body representing the British Chiefs of Staff, that they had complete freedom to discuss the general strategic position and to consider dispositions in the event the United States should 66 enter the war. Both sides accepted the necessity of confirmation by their respective Chiefs of Staff and Governments of any derived agreements.

During the interim period between the announcement on December 2 of the British intention to come to Washington and their departure from Britain, neither Admiral Ghormley nor Brigadier General Raymond Lee, the U. S. Military Attache in London was able to get any advance information on the British position. The British explanation was logical and simple — it would jeopardize the security of their war plans to give the information at that time. The long list of questions posed by Ghormley and Lee

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, p. 1487.

<sup>65</sup> cf. n62.

Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 33, quote from Statement by U.K. Delegation 29 Jan. 41, B.U.S. (J) (41)1.

<sup>1</sup>bid., p. 34 n8. Both had reported their failure to get information.

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Street grow descriptors 15, p. 1107.

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washington. The list included questions on British strength and capabilities in the different areas of the world, on the relative importance of those areas in their Strategic thinking and what their proposed courses of action would be under certain conditions. The questions were answered in detail and made available to the Americans after the party left Britain. In their opening talk the British gave a clear summation of their views and three propositions of general strategic policy:

The European theatre is the vital theatre where a decision must first be sought.

The general policy should therefore be to defeat

Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan.

The security of the Far Eastern position, including Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the cohesion of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the key to the defence of these interests and its retention must be assured. Of

The first two propositions were in direct accord with American feelings; the retention of Singapore certainly was not: The British repeatedly had told American representatives since Hampton's visit in June 1940 that they were unable to send major forces to the Far East. Their proposition amounted to an open invitation for the United States to defend Singapore.

The policy to retain Singapore in the face of mounting Japanese power and the British maneuverings to gain American acceptance of the idea became formidable obstacles upon which the meetings almost foundered. The British saw Singapore as more than just a military base. For political, economic and psychological reasons it was a symbol of British Commonwealth unity and security in the Far East. Thus for many reasons it was part of British strategic thinking, and they never were to give up trying to make it part

<sup>68</sup> Loc. cit., citation same as n66.

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of British-American strategic plans.

churchill's message on 15 May 1940 might be considered one starting point in the Singapore controversy, though to be sure Singapore had been discussed with Captain Ingersoll in January 1939. Receivelt had wisely dodged the offer "to use Singapore in any way convenient." Probably as a compromise the American fleet had been ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor shortly thereafter. On 4 October 1940 Churchill again wrote Roosevelt mentioning the possibility of war with Japan over the re-opening of the Burma Road and the fact that Japan had joined the Axis Powers.

....I know how difficult it is for you to say anything which would commit the inited States to any hypothetical course of action in the Pacific. But I venture to ask whether at this time a simple action might not speak louder than words. Would it not be possible for you to send an American squadron, the bigger the better, to pay a friendly visit to Singapore? There they would be welcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way. If desired, occasion might be taken of such a visit for a technical discussion of naval and military problems in those and Philippine waters, and the Dutch might be invited to join. Anything in this direction would have a marked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration of war upon us over the Burma Road opening. 70

Admiral Stark opposed the suggestion and even the reinforcement of our own Asiatic Fleet because of the situation in the Atlantic, and the President again agreed with his naval advisers.

With such a past history of British proposals on Singapore, it was not surprising that the American planners would be wary of similar proposals at

Cf. p. 7, supra, n21 (2) Hull, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 831 (3) Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>70</sup> Churchill, op. cit., pp. 497-498.

Cf. Watson, op. cit., p. 118; (2) Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 35.

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the Washington meetings. At the sixth Plenary Meeting on 10 February 1941 the Far Eastern situation was the chief subject discussed. The British again emphasized their concern at the position of Singapore. They urged that the United States should take early action both to keep Japan out of the war, and to essure the defense of Singapore against a Japanese attack. The proposal at this time was that the United States should send four heavy cruisers, an aircraft carrier, planes and submarines to Singapore. The next day the British represented a detailed paper: "The Far East — Appreciation by the V.K. Delegation."

At the same time that the American military was being presented the paper Lord Halifax, the new British Ambassador, was communicating the substance of the same paper to Secretary of State Cordell Hall.

The British paper on the Far East pictured Singapore as a symbol of British ability and determination to protect the Dominions and colonies and their trade with Britain. The loss of Singapore would greatly weaken the hand of the political leaders in Australia, New Zealand, India and China who believed in the value of British friendship. The British representatives admitted that even if Singapore were lost Australia and New Zealand could be held and the Japanese kept out of the Indian Ocean, but insisted that Singapore was a necessary "card of re-entry" when the European war should have taken a turn for the better. Without the base at

<sup>72</sup> Wittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Part A, Chp. 14, p. 348.

<sup>73</sup>Hatloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 35 quete from Min, 6th mtg, 10 Feb.
41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 6.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 36 Paper part of B.W.S. (J) (41)13.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 35 nl6.

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Japanese across the thousands of miles from the nearest base. In short, the British stand on Singapore was based "not only upon purely strategic foundations, but on political, economic and sentimental considerations which, even if not literally vital on a strictly academic view, are of such fundamental importance to the British Commonwealth that they must always be taken into serious account." What the British could not say specifically and what was obvious to the Americans was that the prestige of the British Empire in the Far Fast and at home was at stake.

The seriousness with which the British held to the Singapore position is shown by two key statements in the subject paper:

(a) The security of the Far Mastern position, including Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the maintenance of the war effort of the Associated Powers. Singapore is the key to the defense of these interests and its retention must be assured....

(b) If Singapore were in serious danger of capture, and the United States still withheld their aid, we should be prepared to send a Fleet to the Far East, even if to do so would compromise or sacrifice our position in the Mediterranean.

The loss of Singapore, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff

...would be a disaster of the first magnitude, second only to the loss of the British Isles. ??

On February 13 the Army and Navy representatives met to discuss the British paper. Rear Admiral Turner had prepared his reply:

Giving the background for the British proposals, Read Admiral Turner said that when the Japanese, some 2g years ago, began their movement to the southward, the President and Secretary of State more or less

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-37, quotes from "The Far East Paper," Cf. n74.

<sup>77</sup> Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Part A, Chp. 14, p. 350.

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committed the United States Fleet to actions in conjunction with the British forces in the Far East. When Rear Admiral Ingersoll engaged in staff conversations on this subject in London, the British proposed that the United States send their whole fleet to Singapore and that the then combined United States and British forces should start a campaign against the Japanese. In this war the British are unable to send a strong force to the Far East, but still would like the United States to send their whole fleet, together with a large United States Army, to engage against the Japanese. It was not until the last staff conversations that they modified their requests for reenforcements to a force of four heavy cruisers, aircraft and submarines.

The general discussion which followed developed the following points:

(a) That a concerted drive was being made by the British to influence the United States into accepting the British point of view in reference to the Far East situation.

(b) That the United Kingdom, while accepting the United States' Staff Committee's decision not to send the Pacific fleet to the Far East, continues to push their requests for United States' commitments in that theater.

It was suggested by Major General Embick that it was the duty of the United States Committee, as military advisor to the President, to present to him sound military opinion with reference to the Far East strategic situation with a suggested course of action...

At this juncture the American delegation became quite perturbed upon learning of the Halifax-Hull discussion of the British military paper on the Far Rast. To have their own Secretary of State learn from a foreign diplomat about the controversial Singapore question was embarrassing, for the Americans had rigidly adhered to the "military" nature of the talks by not informing the State Department of the nature or progress of the joint meetings. To have the same unilaterally originated paper used in preliminary military talks discussed at the highest diplomatic levels violated a cardinal premise upon which the conversations were to take place. A

<sup>78</sup>Min Joint mtg Army and Navy Section, U.S. Staff Com, 13 Feb. 1941,
Serial 09212-11, NHD File: US-UK Conversations 1941 Serial 09212.

the meant discussive which fallowed developed the following worther

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protest was officially registered with the British delegation that the action appeared to the Americans to be an attempt to secure political pressure to influence their decision on Singapore. Before condemning the British action, it should be remembered that the British military group in Washington was the best source of military information and strategy the British Ambassador had in this country and, conversely, the Ambassador was the highest government representative in the area to whom the military could refer. The exchange of information between the British representatives in Washington was certainly understandable; the use to which the Ambassador put information so gained was the crux of the objection.

The British delegation replied to the protest and their answer was discussed by the Navy Section of the U.S. Staff Committee on 20 February:

Rear-Admiral Ghormley referred to the Note by the United Kingdom Delegation in reply to the Declaration of the United States Staff Committee (serial Ol1512-7), stating that he thought this reply had clarified the situation to the point wherein the plenary conversations could be resumed.

One Navy member / stated his conviction that the United Kingdom Delegation should give assurance that not only would no further United Kingdom Delegation papers be communicated to the State Department, but that in addition, none of the United Kingdom Delegation points developed in the course of the Staff Conversations should be presented orally to the State Department through diplomatic channels. These Staff Conversations are on a purely military plane, and when concluded will have been the basis for sound military decisions representing, in the considered judgment of the combined membership, the best measures to be undertaken for the successful prosecution of the war. However, until such joint decisions are reached, the presentation by British diplomats to the United States State Department of any matter under discussion is ex-parte, tending to induce the latter to arrive at incorrect conclusions which would be

<sup>79</sup> Matloff and Smell, op. cit., p. 36.

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difficult to change, since the United States Staff Committee is not now furnishing the State Department with its own views. 80

Further open conflict over Singapore ceased in the Washington conversations after the American representatives presented "The U.S. Military
Position in the Far Fast" on 19 February. While admitting that the loss of
symbolic Singapore would be a serious blow, it did not follow that serious
blows always lead to final disaster. The security of the North Atlantic
and the British Isles was the common basis of American-British strategy,
and it was up to the British to do the best they could to take care of
their interests elsewhere. The United States goal was to eliminate the
German threat to the security of the North Atlantic and the British Isles.

Admiral Stark, CNO, had been kept informed of the various stages of the discussions. He felt that the whole question of policy to be followed by the United States in the Far East should be submitted to the President. In view of the disagreements of the United States and British Delegation as to the strategic concepts which should govern any plan for combined action in the Far East, it seemed necessary that in any policy discussions between the State Department and the British Foreign Officer, or between the President and the Prime Minister, the views of the American Naval Staff should be clearly understood. 82

It soon became apparent that Admiral Stark's views on the importance of defeating Germany first continued to enjoy President Roosevelt's approval. The Flan Bog concept was the touchstone of the "U.S. Position" given to the British on 19 February and

Report of mtg Navy Sect. of US Staff Committee 20 Feb. 41, Serial 09212-16; NHD File: US-UK Conversations 1941 Serials 09212.

<sup>81</sup> Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>82</sup>Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Part A, Chp. 14, p. 352.

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The President informed the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, of his approval of the position adopted by the American Delegation in the Staff Conference. He further agreed that this position was in conformity with the CNO memorandum of the 12th November 1940, the conclusions of which had, in fact, been accepted by the Army and Navy Joint Board, by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and by the President.

Singapore had become a dead-letter in the ABC effort. The final report of the Staff Conversations, called ABC-1, was finished on March 27, 1941. The basic report reiterated the general policy positions of the two Governments, dealing almost exclusively with the Atlantic conflict. The two key paragraphs pertaining to Japan are significant. The first mentioned neither Japan nor Singapore though the actions of the former and the importance of the latter had recently been argued.

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort. (emphasis mine.)

The second paragraph was the only subdivision of ten which mentioned

Japan under a heading: "Plans for the Military operations of the Associated

Powers will likewise be governed by the following:"

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Fowers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Fowers to deploy their

<sup>83</sup> Doid., p. 355.

<sup>84</sup> The official title was: U.S. Serial Ol1512-12(R), B.U.S. (J)(41)30; Cf. Pearl Harbor Attack, Fart 15, pp. 1485-1541.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, p. 1490.

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forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. (emphasis mins.)

Annex 3 to ABC-1 was a United States-British Commonwealth Joint
Basic War Plan. Forces and tasks were assigned by areas and by countries.
Under tasks assigned American Naval Forces in the Pacific were:

(a) Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy communications and positions.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly with the enemy.

(c) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

(e) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extention of enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

(f) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

In the Far East the American naval tasks were generally the same as in the Pacific Area, i.e., raids, destroying communications and attacking

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., pp. 1491-1492.

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A "Special Command Relationships" section was included which vessels. would promote more plans and disagreements in the future.

> 30. The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers in the Far Fast Area will be the responsibility of the respective Commanders of the Military forces concerned. These Commanders will make such arrangements for mutual

support as may be practicable and appropriate.

31. In the Far East Area the responsibility for the strategic direction of naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Thilippines, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, China. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

32. The British naval Commander in Chief, China, is also charged with responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australia and New Zealand Area...88

The guide lines for conversations between the British and American Commanders in Chief in the Far East were given here. How they were followed will be discussed in the next chapter.

The associations of the British and American Navies had reached one high point in World War I when the United States supported Britain in the defeat of Germany. Certainly another high point was the agreements reached in ABC-1. Discussions had covered strategic concepts, objectives and the exchange of information on forces to meet those objectives. A basic war plan had been produced and general tasks assigned primarily to defeat Germany using American forces should the United States be "compelled to resort to war."X The problems in the Pacific were not so neatly resolved. The thinking there was defensive with each Government responsible for the defense of its own territories. Despite the positiveness of the American position on the

<sup>88</sup> Tbid., p. 1516.

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Singapore question in February and the fact that there would be no reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, latitude was still given for discussions on mutual support between the on-scene Commanders in Chief.

The evolution of cooperation in the Pacific between the British and Americans was not complete with ABC-1 but it had reached a "point of no return." The United States was irrevocably tied to Britain in two oceans; in the one to defeat positively an European enemy, while in the other the action was to be defensive against the Asiatic enemy. In both areas the use of the Navy was most important, and in the Pacific beyond Hawaii it was the only American force ready for us. How the two navies would cooperate in the Far East will be discussed in the next chapter. ABC-1 immediately became the basis for United States War Plan Rainbow 5 and the matrix against which future agreements in Singapore would be compared and rejected.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. item 30 n88, p. 98, supra.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Chapter Three supra for discussion of Rainbow 5.

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### CHAPTER FIVE

# THE QUEST FOR A COOPERATIVE DEPENSE AGAINST JAPAN BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND DUTCH MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE FAR EAST

Introduction.

In Chapter One the provisions of the Four Power and the Nine Power
Treaties were discussed. The United States hoped that those treaty provisions
would eliminate the necessary for military alliances and action in the
Pacific. The idealistic dream of peace without force was shattered in 1931
when Japan successfully conquered Mancharia without Occidental military
opposition. As the militant attitudes and power of Japan increased, the
need for collective action grew, but the rapid shifts in military and
political power in Europe in the late 1930's did much more than Japan's
actions, per se, to change the status quo in the Far Rast. The diminution
of British and French naval forces in the Orient, to augment their home
forces against Germany, increased the relative strength of Japan much more
quickly than her economy or shipyards were capable of doing in an arms race.

The strategic position of the United States forces in the Far East was known to every Admiral in the Navy, for with few exceptions most senior officers had had a tour of duty in the China Station. Admiral Stark was no exception. In his Plan Dog written in the Fall of 1940 on the problems of national defense, the decision was made that the best course of action for the United States was to help Britain in her Atlantic struggle, and, if forced to fight Japan, to fight a defensive war in the Pacific. Even a defensive war required forces, and the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets combined were numerically less than the Japanese Fleet. The only hope to bridge the

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difference in naval strength was to join with other powers in a common cause against Japan.

In addition to the Philippine Islands, the rich Dutch East Indies and strategic Singapore seemed likely objectives for the Japanese. The Dutch and British therefore were logical allies since both had something to fear from the Japanese and both had naval forces in the Far East. The holding of the Malay Barrier against further expansion to the south by the Japanese was one of the strategic principles in Plan Dog and later became part of ABC-1. The American goal was to encourage the Dutch and British military commanders in the Far East to adopt a strategic plan of action based upon holding the Malay Barrier and reflecting the willingness of the United States to cooperate in the plan if she should be compelled to resort to war with Japan.

This chapter will give the background, participants, significance and results of conferences at Batavia, Singapore and Manila in the quest for cooperation against the Japanese.

## Background.

Military commanders on duty in peacetime on foreign stations, have one mission in common: to protect the lives and property of their respective nationals. For centuries in the Far East the "foreign nationals" have been Europeans. Dutch merchants, among the first of the Europeans in the Orient, established a highly profitable trading monopoly through the Dutch East India Company in the first half of the seventeenth century. The twentieth century found them still in possession of the richest islands in the Pacific, appropriately still bearing the name of the original company. The Eritish, operating through a rival company in the same era, developed

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mercantile enterprises throughout the Orient. The Straits Settlements, with Singapore at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, and Hong Hong, off the China coast near Canton, were strategically located in the mainstream of world commerce. Both Britain and the Netherlands traditionally kept units of their fleet in the Far East.

Since 1784 American traders had ventured to the Orient from their own east coast but there was never a serious attempt at conquest of territory or the establishment of bases to support military forces operating in the area. Commodore Verry, after "opening" Japan in 1854, proposed a naval base in the Bonin Islands, Formosa or the Ryukyus only to have his suggestions negated by President Tierce. American naval units operated in the Far East, without a naval base, as the East India Squadron, 1835;

Asiatic Squadron, 1866; and Asiatic Fleet since 1902 (except 1907-1910).

The annexation of Hawaii by joint congressional resolution, approved by President McKinley on July 7, 1898, set a new precedent for American extracontinental expansion. The imperialistic-minded politicians, influenced by the theories of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, U.S. Navy had their appetites whetted. The Treaty of Paris in December 1898, following Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila the previous May, ceded the Philippine Islands and Guam to the United States. The American flag and frontier advanced across the Pacific in record time as the United States suddenly possessed potential naval

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chapter One for Commodore Ferry's part in the "opening" of Japan.

Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942, Vol. III in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), p. 28 (2) Cf. Chapter Six for discussion of Asiatic Fleet.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Chapter One for Mahan's theory on the influence of sea power.

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bases from the west coast to the Orient. Concomitant with the military interest in the westward movement were commercial and religious interests. The announcement by John Hay of the "Open Boor" Folicy in China in 1899, followed by the modernization of the U.S. Navy under President Theodore Roosevelt in the next few years, enhanced the American position in the Pacific. By 1905 ten new battleshins and four armoured cruisers had been added to the fleet, and in 1908 part of the new fleet sailed around the world to serve visible notice on other powers of the new might to protect the new oversea possessions. However, a number of cross currents had played on the expansionist momentum. The hope of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 led many pacifist and cost-conscious congressmen to question the wisdom of a large naval expeditures when we were at peace with the world. A disorganized array of prominent figures argued against any foreign committments or possessions. The aura of possessing far away islands was severely dimmed by the expenses incurred in putting down the Philippine Insurrection.

What to do with 7,100 islands and islets populated by a mixture of Orientals speaking sixty-five dialects with customs and culture foreign to any previous American standards? The Americans, unlike their neighboring British and Dutch colonizers, did not have the propensity to emploit their stronger position. Once opposition to the American government had ended throughout the islands, limited self-rule was allowed under Presidential-appointed governors-general. A Philippine Assembly, the lower house of the legislature, was permitted and in 1913 free trade with the United States was

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As if to shed the cloak of oversea responsibility and the stigma of having "possessions" unnecessarily, Congress passed a bill granting independence to the Philippines over the veto of President Hoover in January 1933 only to have the bill rejected by the Philippine Legislature. The next attempt fared better and the Tydings-WcDuffie Act of 193h was passed and approved by the United States Congress and the Philippine Legislature. The Act provided for a ten year transitional period after which the United States would abandon all military installations in the Islands. The question of future naval bases was left open, however, with the proviso that the President could negotiate with the Philippine Government for naval bases within two years of the date of recognition of independence.

The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 contained a non-fortification clause prohibiting the building of defenses in the Philippines. After the expiration of the agreements in 1936, the United States did not see fit to build defenses in an area which would be given its independence in a few short years or to invoke unfavorable reaction from Japan. Consequently, the Asiatic Fleet had no secure base from which to operate. However, the fleet, or a part of it, spent a few months in Philippine waters each year and paid courtesy visits to Japan, Singapore, Hancel, Hong Kong, Batavia and other Far Bastern ports. On October 30, 1936 the perceptive Admiral H.E. Yarnell

Louis Morton, The Fall of the Pulippines, fourth in a subseries: The War in the Pacific (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), p. 4.

Louis Morton, op. eit., p. h.

S.E.Morison, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 29.

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became Commander of the Asiatic Fleet. In his first report to the Chief of Naval Operations on November 17, 1936 he made this observation relative to our position in the Philippines:

... The subject that the British intelligence officers and others seemed more concerned with than any other in their conversations with our officers related to the future status of the Philippines. They asked if we really intended to leave the Philippines to its political fate and withdraw all United States protection from that gateway to Singapore and India. Some senior officers expressed an opinion that the Japanese menace could only be met with British-American cooperation and that the Japanese projected "southward expansion policy" could be prevented by a strong naval base in the Philippines plus the Singapore base. Opinion was also expressed that they thought it very doubtful that the United States would leave its only sure foothold in the Far Hast after years that have been spent in building up trade and commerce. Such opinions were probably advanced for the purpose of drawing forth the opinions of our officers. Of course, no one had definite information as to the eventual. political independence that has been granted by the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

The British interest in the Philippines is not merely academic for various British intelligence officers have travelled throughout the Philippines within the last two years... (Emphasis mine.)

After three years as Commander in Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet, during which he witnessed first hand the Japanese push into China after the 1937 "incident," Admiral Yarmell reached the following conclusions which he passed on to the Chief of Naval Operations:

2. In case of a single-handed war, we cannot move our fleet to Eastern waters due to lack of a base.

3. I do not believe our government will ever build a first class Naval base in the Philippines.

<sup>1.</sup> We should never engage in a war single-handed against Japan if at all possible. Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands are virtually interested and should take part.

<sup>7</sup> Letter: CINCAF to CNO, 17 November, 1936, NA, Navy File FF6.

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4. We can never compete with Japan in transporting

U.S. troops to the Far East.

5. The war should be a Naval war, - cruisers, submarines, and aircraft operating against lines of communications. (Emphasis mine.)

Within weeks of the Yarnell report, supra, another outspoken Admiral reported to the Chief of Naval Operations after inspecting bases in the Pacific. Admiral Ben Noreell, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks commented:

...When we consider that the total cost of these three major bases [Pearl Harbor, Guam and Cavite] approximates the current cost of running the national government for a period of about two weeks, the modesty of the sum involved is apparent. The maintenance and operating costs of these bases would be a permanent burden, but the presence of these bases would enable us to reduce to some extent, the costs of operating existing bases.

It is my belief that as long as nature breeds men of ability and without scruples, and provides them with millions of willing followers, just so long will we have the elements essential to international disorder. Our only protection is a willingness and ability to maintain our rights by FORCE. To do this we must be prepared to go in whole-heartedly and energetically; halfway measures are of no avail, and, in some cases, worse than worthless. We should get in or get out!

A quick review of history will show that the United States did not "get out" and did not begin to "get in" until it was too late.

In February 1940 Admiral Stark wrote a long letter to Admiral Thomas C.
Hart, who had recently become Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Floot. In
addition to general advice on War Plans, strategy, and the use of the limited
forces, the letter gave the first indication found in the records of Admiral
Stark's views on the cooperation with other powers urged by Hart's predecessor,

Memo: ADM Yarnell to GNO, 2 September 39, NND, GNO File: A16-3 Warfare, Misc.

Memo: Rear Admiral Moreell to CNO, 15 Aug. 39; MID File: A16-3/FF Warfare.

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Admiral Yarnell.

...You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never percipitate (sic) anything in the Western Pacific unless the principally interested powers (United States-French-British-Dutch) act in concert. The possibility of getting such concerted action appears to me to be improbable during the present unpredictable state of affairs in Durope. We have been turning over in our heads whether you could use Hongkong, Singapore, North Borneo, or French or Dutch possessions, but there is no indication that any of them would be available...10

X By September 1940 France and the Netherlands had fallen before the German drive, and with Britain fighting for her very survival, fear that Japan would take advantage of the opportunity to move south was well founded. The Joint Planning Committee in a report to the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff reported:

.../T/here is no assurance that Japan will not, within the next few months, move swiftly either against the Dutch East Indies or against the Philippines or Guam. especially if the Japanese Government should become increasingly embarrassed by embargoes from the United States to Japan, and at the same time should become convinced that despite protests by the United States it was only throwing a bluff and would back down in the face of a serious situation ... Within the near future, the United States may be confronted with the demand for a major effort in the Far East, an effort for which we are not now prepared and will not be prepared for several years to come. If, in the near future, we should be confronted with the necessity of armed opposition to Japan, in the face of the potential threat in the Atlantic, that effort probably will be limited to the employment of minor naval surface and air forces operating from Singapore and Dutch East Indies bases, plus the interruption of Japanese shipping in the eastern Pacific.1

In line with the thoughts on cooperative action in the Far East against

<sup>10</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2146.

Memo: JPC to CNO and Cofs, 27 Sept. 40; NHD File: A16-1, Sept.-Dec., 1940.

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the Japanese threat Admiral Hart's Assistant Chief of Staff, Commander F. F. Thomas, went to Singapore for preliminary talks with the British in 12 October, and received a copy of the British Far Eastern War Flan. 13 Meanwhile in London Admiral Chormley, the Special Naval Observer, who was conferring with the Bailey Committee and other Admiralty members reported the British to be expectant of active American participation in the war now that the President had been reelected. They talked about the defense of the Maley Barrier and an "alliance between themselves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Burope." Admiral Stark, who wrote the above information to Admiral Hart continued:

... We have no idea as to whether they the British would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese... Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can...make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framswork for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, thet the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would emplore the fields of: Command arrangements, General objectives, General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment ... The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attaches to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon: possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you

<sup>12</sup> Watson, op. cit., p. 392.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2149.

Cf. Chapter FOUR.

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<sup>12</sup> Auras op. osles 7. 302.

13 Auras op. osles 7. 302.

via air transportation...15

A month later the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded two copies of Rainbow III to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet stressing the "possible eventuality" of war with Germany, Japan and Italy and directing that high priority be given to operating plans and the preparations of vessels, aircraft and personnel.

...One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in London and Washington, but as far as concerns an allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that ragion. It is believed that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There is considerable doubt as to the extent of the conversations which may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan.

Tou are, therefore, authorised to conduct staff conversations with the British and Dutch Supreme Commanders, with the specific understanding that you are in no way committing the United States Government to any particular political or military decisions, and that the purpose of the staff conversations is solely to facilitate joint operations should war eventuate under the approximate conditions shown in the Assumptions of "Rainbow 3". It is requested that these conversations be conducted in secret; in particular the most extreme care should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become aware of your attempt to establish contact with the Dutch.

In December 1940 Captain W.R. Purnell, Chief of Staff to Admiral Hart, had attended a British-Dutch meeting at Singapore. In January Purnell conferred with Vice Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich and his staff at Batavia on possible joint defensive action against the Japanese. The Dutch feared an

<sup>15&</sup>lt;sub>nl3</sub> supra.

Letter: GNO to GINCAF, 12 Dec. 10, op-12-Dy; MID File: A16-3/A7-3.

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attack by the Japanese and were highly desirous of support. That support did not appear to be forthcoming from the British authorities at Singapore whose interest, one Dutch committeeman remarked "caustically," dwindled as the 17 scene moved eastward from Singapore. Captain Furnell's report continued:

... I asked what steps would be taken by the Dutch in case of Japanese attack on Singapore, Captain van Staveren replied that the British and Netherlands governments have not given each other guarantees of mutual help. He also stated that the Singapore Conferences had made a proposal to the two governments, that if the Japanese moved in force south of the 6° North parallel, the British and Netherlands East Indies forces would be free to attack them without further declaration of war. The Netherlands Government has rejected this proposal; they did not know yet the decision of the British Government.

The Dutch were much concerned over two points, namely, in case of a Japanese attack against the Netherlands East Indies coming through the Sulu Sea, 10 what would be our action; and what would we do about the protection of shipping from Netherlands East Indies to our West Coast in case of Japanese-N.E.I. war, the United States remaining neutral?

To the first I replied that we would guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines to the extent of attacking with all forces available, would notify them as well as all other nations of serious breaches of neutrality, and would probably maintain a benevolent neutrality toward Dutch and British. To the second I replied that I thought a war Zone would be prescribed and that conditions would be the same as now exist in European Waters. As an entirely personal view I also stated that I believed the United States would take the necessary steps to protect shipping, or secure the materials, if the loss of these materials would seriously hamper United States production. Asked at this point if I thought the United States would go to war with Japan if she attacked the Netherlands East Indies, I stated, emphasizing it was my own personal view, I thought she would.

Watson, op. cit., p. 392, (2) Cf. nl9 infra for Captain Furnell's report used by Watson.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Fearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2208 for discussion of ADM Hart's attempt to close the Sulu Sea.

Report by Capt. Furnell, Batavia talks 10-14 Jan. 41, Encl. "C" to LTR: CINAF to GNO, Serial S 5, 18 Jan. 41; NHD File: ABDA-ANZAC Correspondence 1941-1942.

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The Dutch authorities reciprocated by furnishing Purnell with "copious data on such matters as their own sea and air strength, facilities, ports, bases, and storage."

In mid-February when the question of defending Singapore was warming up the American and British staff conversations in Washington, another British-Dutch meeting in Singapore was announced. The record does not show that a United States representative was invited, but since American cooperation was so urgently being sought in all quarters, there must have been an invitation. On February 15, the Chief of Naval Operations sent Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet a directive to attend:

Under conditions of utmost secrecy British and Dutch Staff conversations will be held in Singapore beginning February twenty-second X You are directed to have your representative participate in these conversations with powers to agree to a Joint Plan of operation of United States British and Dutch forces but without making political commitments I Agreements are subject to your and my approxal X Terms should be approximately in accord with your previous instructions and include provisions for a common acceptance of equality of political economic and military control and be based on the use of only the forces now at your disposal X Strategic plans adopted should be fully realistic X Your representative will express my view that British and Dutch strategic arrangements which depend for their efficacy upon intervention by the United States would not be sound since there is doubt that Congress would declare war in case Japanese aggression against powers other than the United States X In any case a delay might ensue pending final decision of the issue X I recognize that this places you in a difficult position but more definite instructions can not now be given you.

Two weeks later Admiral Hart reported to CNO the disappointing results of this latest attempt to develop a definite agreement without American

Watson, op. cit., p. 392.

<sup>21</sup> Despatch: CNO to CINCAF, 15 Feb. hl; NND File: same as nl9 supra.

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guarantees of cooperation. That which the naval leaders sought and did not get was a strategic plan of operations against the Japanese in which the United States would participate if it should be "compelled to resort to war" against the Japanese.

The results were disappointing. The conference was for the purpose of making an Anglo-Dutch-Australian plan, - the first step. The conference not only didn't met beyond that step, but did not - in our estimation - even complete the step. It was a big gathering, with separate representatives of Army, Navy and Air arms for the British, and Australians; Army and Navy for the Dutch; many officials. They made certain agreements, subject to the approval of their respective governments, for cooperative action, but didn't really get down to cases nearly enough ... They all, except for some Dutch promises, have altogether a defensive attitude on the water as well as on shore. - even after they get as much Royal Navy reinforcement as they can, at the present stage, have any hope for. Their navies are now intended primarily for guarding their own ship lanes not at all for going after the enemy's ... Now upon our making a definite commitment toward participation, I am convinced that we can get the Dutch and British local navies (not the Anzacs) to do most anything we say, IF they feel that their own sea supply and reinforcement lines are reasonably secure, - because of our own, or the Royal Navy's, effort ... please think over the advisability of this Fleet's making a Netherlands East Indies cruise just as a matter of peace- 22 time course, scmething that has been done in former years.

The disappointment expressed by Admiral Hart and reechoed in Washington would prove to be the rule rather than the exception relative to other Singapore talks.

Admiral Hart's letter reporting the lack of progress being made in the Far East planning scheme arrived as the ADC-1 Plan was nearing completion. The Far East agreements had been sought to complement the Washington talks, and the unfavorable report prompted Admiral Stark to attempt corrective action. Copies of Hart's letter were sent to the President and Secretary of State in

<sup>22</sup>LTR: CINCAF to CND, 4 Mar. 41; NA 811.30AF/926 1/2.

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the belief that a word from each of them "may do much toward getting the British, the Dutch, the Australians and the New Zealanders together." The Navy would do what it could toward this end. Stark's memorandum to the President continues -

... It is now many, many weeks since I directed Admiral Hart to hold conversations out there and do all he could to have a plan ready - just in case. Regarding Hart's Netherlands East Indies cruise, no immediate decision required, but I like the idea provided it is properly timed .... I say I like the idea, because I think it the most positive move we could make, it is in line with our war plans, so if war were to break, we would be sitting with our surface ships where we want them. In this connection I might mention that semetime ago Admiral Hart asked permission to pay a visit to Hongkong with his flagship. Like the above, I thought it would have been a good move but deferred to State Department's objections. Regarding Admiral Hart's proposed Netherlands East Indies visit, we will of course make no recommendation to you without prior consultation with the State Department, whose views you would want ... [handwritten at end] Secretary has read and approved.23

The agreements in the Report ABC-1 were reached with the full approval of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, who, though not in attendance at the meetings, kept currently informed on the staff conversations. As a result of the accord with the British in Washington, "the Joint Planning Committee were given a new directive for the preparation of the Joint Basic Plan - Rainbow No. 5, based upon the report of the United States British Staff Conversations, Dated 27 March 1941 (ABC-1) and upon the Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (ABC-22)."

...Steps were immediately taken by Admiral Stark and General Marshall to implement the ABS-1 agreement, both by arranging for detailed planning in conformity therewith by War and Navy Department Staff and Commands, and by taking action immediately on the points suggested in the letter of transmittal of 29 March 1941. Instructions were immediately sent to the military and naval commanders (General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas G. Hart) to

<sup>23</sup> Memo: CNO to President; NA, loc. cit.

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complete arrangements with the British and Dutch Commands for a Far Eastern Staff Conference at Singapore at as early a date as possible. 24

On April 2 General Marshall sent by courier a complete copy of ABC-1 to Major General George Grunert, commanding general of the Philippine

Department. The purpose in sending the copy was to permit advance planning with Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet and Commander Sixteenth Naval District (Manila). Grunert was specifically ordered act "to discuss" the matter with the British or Butch. On April 4 the restriction not "to discuss" was revoked by a message from Marshall that a conference had been called in 25 Singapore. A parallel message from CNO to CINCAF was sent on April 5:

IN SINGAPORE ON 18 APRIL A STAFF CONVERSATION WILL CONVENE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF US AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES FOR PREPARING PLANS FOR THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPORT OF UNITED STATES ERITISH CONFERENCE, TWO COPIES OF WHICH ARE ENROUTE TO YOU BY OFFICER MESCENGER X YOU ARE DIRECTED TO ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION FOR RETRESENTATIVE OF COMMENT PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT AND TO SEND YOUR REPRESENTATIVE BUT THESE TWO SHOULD NOT DEPART UNTIL AFTER YOU HAVE HAD TIME TO STUDY REPORT WHICH SHOULD REACH YOU BY THE 14TH X YOUR ATTENTION IS INVITED TO PARA 31 ANNEX 3 X SUBJECT TO MY APPROVAL ARE AGREEMENTS REACHED X26

The conference in Singapore lasted from 21 to 27 April with the United States represented by Captain Purnell, who by now was a familiar person at Far Bast conferences; Colonel A.C. McBridge, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Military Forces Philippines; Captain A.M.R. Allen, U.S. Maval Observer

<sup>2</sup>h
Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Part A, Chp. 1h, p. 372 (2)
Kittredge is incorrect in calling General MacArthur, the military commander.
Major General George Grunert was the military commander until MacArthur's recall to the active list on 26 July 1941.

Watson, op. cit., p. 394.

Despatch: CNO to CINCAF, 5 Apr. 41; NED File; same as n 19 (2) Cf. Yearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, p. 1516 for Para. 31, Annex 3.

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Singapore and his Army counterpart, LT. Col. F.G. Brink. The British representatives were the ranking British officers in the Far East, Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popher, Commander in Chief, Far East and Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, Commander in Chief China. The ensuing ADB agreement reflected a decidedly British position, possibly due to the influence of the much more senior British officers. The official ADB report was not received in Washington until June 9; however, the British Military Mission received from London a telegraphic summary of the report and circulated it to the American delegation on May 6.

The information in the summary on the recommended defense of the Philippines was the first major fault found with the report. It prompted the American military chiefs to inform the British Military Mission of their reaction without waiting for the complete report. Commander McDowell, American Secretary for Collaboration to the British Joint Staff Mission, was instructed to inform the British Mission in Washington that

... The United States intends to adhere to its decision not to reenforce the Philippines except in minor particulars, such as the addition of several minesweepers and a few torpedo beats... The principal value of the position and present strength of the United States forces in the Philippines lies in the fact that to defeat them will require a considerable effort by Japan and may well entail a delay in the development of an attack against Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. A Japanese attack in the Philippines might thus offer opportunities to the Associated Powers to inflict losses on Japanese naval forces, and to improve their own dispositions for

Cf. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, pp. 1554-1555 for list of delegates. Complete ADB Report loc cit., pp. 1551-1584.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. p. 116ff infra for American objections to British positions.

<sup>29</sup>Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 66, n9. (2) Watson, op. cit., pp. 395396.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Mestad! and covelly up, city, p. 66, 16. (2) measure up, city, 19, 315-

Operations and the Chief of Staff do not agree that Hong Kong is likely to be altogether a strategic liability, rather than an asset. The possibility cannot be dismissed that Hong King might, as in the case of the Philippines, perform a useful service in containing or delaying Japanese forces that might otherwise be employed in a more decisive theater...As regards AHD (sic), the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they must reject this paper in its entirety, as either being contrary to the commitments of ABC-1, or as relating to matters which are the sole concern of the British Government.

The dissatisfaction over the ADB Report registered in June with the British Military Mission in Washington was just a preview of a longer, stronger and more detailed denunciation a month later after the American military staffs had had time to study the full report. A joint letter from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff directed the Special Naval and Military Observers in London to inform the British Chiefs of Staff that the United States was unable to approve the ADB Report for "several major, as well as numerous minor particulars." The major differences may be summarized as follows:

- (a) Statements requiring political decisions were included in the report; specifically; that an attack on one of the Associated Powers would be considered an attack on the other powers (para 6 and 8); counter-attacks on Japan would be recommended in the event of certain listed Japanese actions (para 26); a call for increased assistance to China (para 78).
- (b) The creation of a new intermediate command not envisaged in ABC-1.

  The "Eastern Theater" and Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet had not been planned in ABC-1. The United States had agreed to British naval strategic

Letter: CDR L.R. McDowell, Sec. for Collaboration to Capt. A.W. Clarke, RN, Sec. BR Mil Mission, 7 June 41; NND File: same as n19 supra.

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direction of naval forces not engaged in the defense of the Philippines.

There had been no agreement to the use of U.S. forces by the British outside the Far East Area.

- (c) The strategic importance of the Netherlands East Indies was not appreciated.
- (d) After the arguments over the importance of the defense of Singapore during the ABC-1 conversations and as a concession to British insistence in the final writing of the Report, the following was included as part of paragraph 11(b):

"A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."

In addition paragraph h of the ADB Report had listed as the most important interests in the Far East: (a) the security of sea communications and (b) the security of Singapore. Yet, in spite of the importance repeatedly stressed by the British of the Malay Barrier to the security of Singapore and the whole Far East, only three of forty-eight British ships in the Far East were assigned

... to operate in the vicinity of the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor to offensive operations designed to close the passages of the Barrier to the passage of Japanese raiders. All British naval forces are assigned to escort and patrol work, most of them at great distances from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital." It may be pointed out that the naval defense of this position is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States and Dutch forces ... Since the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far East is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British position in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to

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The incongruity between the British position in Washington that Singapore was sine qua non to their Far Eastern security and the British position in Singapore of assigning none of their ships directly to support that theory was undoubtedly the major provocation for American rejection of the ADB Report.

- (e) The assignment of U.S. naval aviation units to British control was in violation of paragraph lh (f) of ABC-1.
- (f) There was no strategic plan in the ADB Report. Although American and Dutch forces had clearly defined tasks, those tasks assigned the British could "be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in Appendix 1."

The Report was completely unacceptable to the American military chiefs. This instant failure, immediately following the concordance of strategic considerations in ABC-1, and the history of past failures to get the Far Eastern military commanders of the Associated Powers to agree on a strategic plan of action against the Japanese, induced the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff to suggest:

If further conferences are to be held in Singapore for drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers... the conference would have its work simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been agreed upon in advance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands Bast Indies...31

Before another Singapore meeting could be scheduled or the need arise for an agenda, the British Chiefs of Staff attempted, after the Atlantic

<sup>31</sup> Fearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, pp. 1677-1679.

edistrue their amessaus to possit the advet trates saidle fleet to operate under initial strategia direction in that home.

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Conference in August, to salvage the ADB Report by bringing it in line with ABC-1. On October 3 the Revised Report, designated ADB-2, was rejected by the Americans.

...[Y]ou are informed that we have given very careful study to the Admiralty's proposals for a new Far East Area agreement, as shown in ADB-2. While the proposals have met some of our objections, we do not feel that the fundamental defects have been eliminated. In fact, I am inclined to think that the ADB agreement not only is not an advance on the ABD-1 Report, but that it actually

represents a retrograde step.

While neither the Army nor the Navy has reached a final decision, at the present time they are inclined to believe that, until such time as a really practicable combined plan can be evolved for the Far East Area, it will - be better to continue working under an agreement for coordination of effort by the system of mutual cooperation. The various Commanders in the Far East Area are exchanging ideas and are establishing technical procedures required for cooperation. Therefore, failure to issue a plan for unified command will not greatly retard progress. We feel quite strongly that the defense of the Malay Barrier is primarily a concern of the British and Dutch. My suggestion would be that the British Chiefs of Staff in London give this matter their earnest attention, and endeavor to prepare an effective campaign plan that will have real teeth in it.33

Admiral Turner in his letter rejecting ADB-2 mentioned to the British representative that "the military situation out there has changed considerably since last Spring, and will change more after the U.S. reenforcements, now planned, arrive in the Philippines."

It was more than just planned reenforcements that changed the desperate strand of pessimism found in 1939-1940 to a fiber of hopefulness and finally restrained optimism. The dynamic

<sup>32</sup> Matloff and Smell, op. cit., p. 76.

letter: RADM Turner to RADM Dankwerts, RN, 3 Oct. 41; NHD File: same as n19.

<sup>34</sup> Toid.

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personality and confidence of General Douglas MacArthur, recently recalled to active duty to command U.S. Army Forces in the Far East; the mobilisation and intensive training of native Philippine troops; the enthusiasm for the offensive power in the newly preven B-17 bombers which were to be flown to the Philippines in increasing numbers; and additional patrol planes, submarines and torpedo boats for naval use in the Philippines all gave substance to the belief that within a few months the Philippines could be defended against a Japanese attack regardless of other agreements in the area.

While the United States was accelerating efforts to defend the Philippines, the British were re-examinating their plans for defense of their interests in the Far East. The Special Naval Observer in London told the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch on October 25 of a most important decision made by the British.

Admiral Phillips former Vice-Chief Naval Staff with RADM Pallister as Chief of Staff and additional able staff officers are going at once direct to Far-East in Prince of Wales as Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet. Hemisphere Defense Plan Five and early repairs have enabled British to plan early dispatch of battleships to Eastern Fleet to eventually bring total out there to six. Only 8 destroyers available of which h are modern. Admiralty feels that ADB is dead and that ABC-1 is sound and that what is needed is strategical operating plan which can be drawn up in London or Washington, but better in Far-East. Such a plan might require use of Manile as an advance base for ADB naval forces and development of adequate air routes throughout (sic) area for concentrating of air-forces. Admiralty believes disadvantages of Manila due to proximity to Formosa and possible effective air attacks disproved by present war. It is apparent that British are taking prompt steps to meet Japanese threat by sending able officers to theater of possible operations, by desiring to make sound strategical plan and by re-enforcing naval forces there-in heavily. These forces however deficient in destroyers, submarines and strategically located secure bases.

<sup>35</sup> Despatch: SPENAVO LONDON to CNO, 251922 of Oct. hl; NHD File: same as n19.

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The informal message of the Special Naval Observer to Admiral Stark was soon followed by an official letter from the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound to Admiral Stark;

... I do not consider that either ADB-1 or ADB-2 meet the new conditions (change of government in Japan) and I would suggest that the need for a conference to draw up strategic operating plans for Far Eastern Area based afresh on ABC-1 has now become urgent... If you agree in principle to the abandoning of further discussions on ADB-1 and ADB-2 and to holding of a fresh conference on basis of ABC-1, we can then proceed to discuss the agenda... 36

Admiral Stark replied the next day, November 6, through the Special Naval Observer in London:

... The Chief of Naval Operations agrees that the need exists for prompt action by both United Kingdom and United States, in pursuance of this idea. Army is reenforcing both land and air forces as rapidly as practicable and training Philippine Army intensively. Navy is reenforcing Asiatic Fleet with 12 modern submarines 8 of which departed Hawaii 24th instant, remainder departed November 4th. Also has delivered 6 MTB to Asiatic and may send 6 more. CNO believes that ADB should not be revived as ABC 1 is an adequate major directive which should be implemented by a sound strategical operating plan drawn up between British Dutch and U.S. Navies and between British and Datch Air Forces and US Army Air Forces. Admiral Hart and Admiral Layton have agreed on the framework of various plans but these have been unrealistic because Admiral Layton is practically without naval forces. Due to the intricacies of the problem it seems preferable for the U.S. and UK naval forces and the three air elements in the Far East to coordinate operations by the method of cooperation and not by unity of command. 31

Stark approved the move by the Chief of Naval Staff in creating a new position, Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet, now that capital ships were being sent to the Area and suggested that the British consolidate their naval

Watson, op. cit., p. 399 quote from Cable Admiralty to Br Adm Delegation Washington, 5 Nov. 11 (2) Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 76.

Despatch: CNO to SFENAVO LONDON, 6 Nov. 11, DTG 052030; NHD File: same as nl9.

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forces under one flag officer. In answer to a query on the use of Manila by combined naval forces, Stark replied that Luzon was suitable for light naval forces and air elements but limited facilities and supplies precluded use by heavy naval forces. The United States was willing to assign eight destroyers to supplement the British capital ship force "if the U.S. is then at war with Japan." 38

Five days later on November 11, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggested to the Admiralty via the Military Mission in Washington the holding of new conferences in Manila. The three senior officers who could reach a strategic agreement, Vice Admiral Phillips, RN. Admiral Hart and General MacArthur, would attend. Admiral Phillips visited Manila on 4-6 December, terminating his visit without having reached an agreement because of the sighting of a large Japanese force proceeding towards Malaya. Phillips hurried to his flagship, the Prince of Wales at Singapore and together with the battle cruiser Repulse moved in position to intercept Japanese landing parties. Without protective air cover both ships were quickly sunk by Japanese aircraft. The loss of the only allied battleship and battle cruiser west of Hawaii was staggering, but to British-American cooperation the loss of Admiral Phillips was just as great. In the opening hours of the game it was he who had talked with Captain Ingersoll in London about American cooperation in the very area where he gave his life shortly after an eleventh hour effort to reach an agreement with the Americans.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 76.

Morison, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 190.

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The period of pre-war conferences was over. The attempts to derive a plan of action against the Japanese expansion had failed one after the other. The reasons for the failures were many. From an American point of view the countries involved were too concerned with their own interests, commerce, and position. National jealousies were very much in evidence. But before criticism becomes oppressively heavy, let it be remembered that the delegates were military men whose agreements had to pass the approval of their respective governments. Restrictions placed on them before a conference limited their scope of agreement. The U.S. naval representatives were given reasonable scope, considering the grand strategy of defensive war in the Pacific and, until the last phase, the position of not reenforcing the Asiatic Fleet. Consequently, the American representative had little to offer the collective force until the United States were at war. To the planners in the Far East this nebulous support was not enough. Whether that support if definitely promised and used collectively with other Associated Powers would have withstood the Japanese will never be known, for the plans of action which were often conceived but never born could never be tested.

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#### CHAPTER SIX

#### THE ASIATIC FLEET IN JAPANESE AMERICAN RELATIONS

#### Introduction.

Each of the major European powers which had interests in China had naval units stationed in the Far East; originally, to protect their respective nationals and their property from pirates; in the twentieth century, to protect against the prevalent war lords during China's civil unrest and to restrain the participants in the Sino-Japanese war from aggressive acts in the 1930's. The Japanese Navy, which was victorious over the Chinese in 189h and the Russians in 1905, was observed by American naval personnel in the Far East for years. In the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents in 1931 and 1932, respectively, the American naval officers had the opportunity to witness Japanese units in action first-hand. In fact, no other tour of duty in the United States Navy afforded a better chance to observe the operations, equipment and personnel of the most probable enemy than a tour in the Asiatic Fleet.

The term "Fleet" in "Asiatic Fleet" was misleading. The American naval units stationed in the Far East were far from being the balanced force possessing capital ship offensive capability usually connoted in the term "fleet." In 1835 the Far Eastern naval forces of the United States were called the East India Squadron; in 1866 the title was changed to Asiatic Squadron and after 1902 the collective ships in the Far East were called the Asiatic Fleet. It was a simple matter of prestige to call the ships a fleet and temporarily to promote its Commander to four-star Admiral rank with the

Samuel E. Morison, Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, op. cit., p. 28.

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equivalent rank with his British, French and Japanese counterparts. His force in the late 1930's consisted of approximately fifteen destroyers, twelve submarines, two cruisers, five small specially built river gunboats and a few auxiliaries. In addition to the vessels, the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet controlled the Fourth Regiment United States Marines stationed in the International Settlement in Shanghai and a Marine brigade acting as the legation guard in Peiping.

After the renewal of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937, the United States Navy became much more actively involved than just observing the Japanese. Naval units in the performance of their duties of escorting unarmed merchant vessels, of protecting American property and nationals, acting as communications stations for the Embassy and Consuls and making routine moves between ports met the Japanese face to face with increasing frequency. In December 1937 the river gunboat PANAY was attacked by Japanese aircraft and sunk. As the fighting intensified and advanced up the Yangtze Valley in 1938, it threatened to over-run American naval units located on the river. On one occasion the fighting did pass by the gunboat MDNOCACY, leaving it in Japanese occupied territory. Still another gunboat, the TUTUILA, providing communications for and located only a few hundred yards from the American Embassy in Chungking was bombed but not hit. On the high sea the Japanese on at least two occasions complained through diplomatic channels of American affronts or violations of international Naw. The creation of incidents to show the American marines in bad light in Feiping and Shanghai seemed to be part of a deliberate pattern of Japanese actions to force American naval units, marines, commercial interests and missionaries out of China.

The relations resulting from such incidents as mentioned above often

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involved the United States State Department, the Navy Department, the Japanese Foreign Office and the senior Japanese and American naval commanders in China. Some of the incidents will be described, not for the history of the event itself but to show the interplays of negotiations to reach mutually acceptable solutions between the Japanese and American naval commanders and within the diplomatic structure in Washington and Tokyo. The relationships of the United States Navy to the Imperial Japanese Navy in China are particularly interesting for they covered the full spectrum of relations from confiding the details of classified operations to the sinking and bombing of vessels.

# Relations between Admiral Harry Yarnell, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, and Japanese Military Forces in China.

When the Japanese renewed military operations in July 1937 against the Chinese war soon spread to the area of Shanghai near the International Settlement. When Japanese aircraft dropped occasional bombs in the International Settlements and in the same period had strafed a group of British horsemen in a Shanghai park, the cutspoken Admiral Yarnell issued an order to the Fourth Marines in Shanghai "to open fire in self-defense in case of attack by [airplanes]". By releasing the order to the press he created a reaction in the State Department that can best be told by that Department's own records. Max Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division wrote:

I called on Admiral Richardson at the Navy Department in reference to Admiral Yarnell's telegrams to the Navy Department—concerning instruction issued to American Marines at Shanghai authorizing the Marines to open fire in self-defense in case of attack by /airplanes/--I told Admiral Richardson that Mr. Hull had asked me to call . . . . It was not necessary to raise the question as to the merits of the order issued by Admiral Yarnell but that the Secretary of State felt that the giving of publicity to such an order operated to create serious embarrassment to the Secretary of State in the moderate



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course which he was endeavoring to follow in foreign relations. I said that Admiral Richardson was aware of public sentiment...and of the effect of sensational newspaper reports in regard to such orders...that such publicity played into the hands of the critics of the course which the Administration was pursuing. I referred to the fact that when Admiral Yarnell had issued certain previous orders and sensational publicity in the American press had resulted, the President in one instance had spoken to the Secretary of State in regard to the matter. I told Admiral Richardson that in view of all these various factors Mr. Hull felt that, if Admiral Yarnell could not be directed to refrain from giving publicity to such matters, Mr. Hull would lay the whole matter before the President for decision.

Admiral Richardson said he appreciated Mr. Hull's position in the matter, and that he thought that Admiral Yarnell did not take into account public sentiment in this country and the effect upon the public here of publicity of this type. Admiral Richardson said that... he would speak to Admiral Leahy...with a view to the Navy Department sending a telegram to Admiral Yarnell directing him not to give publicity in regard to such matters.

#### Mr. Hamilton continued his story the following day:

On October 29, Admiral Leahy telephoned me and said that he had discussed the matter with the Secretary of the Navy; that the Navy Department felt that Admiral Yarnell had a great many trouble(s) (sic) of his own; that the Navy Department did not wish to send him an instruction along the lines which we wished to have sent; but that the Navy Department would send a message if the State Department insisted. Admiral Leahy offered to come to the Department to discuss the matter with me. I suggested that I refer the matter to Mr. Welles.

I then told Mr. Welles of my conversation with Admiral Leahy and stated that the Navy Department did not view the matter as did this Department.

The next morning, October 30, Mr. Welles spoke to the President over the telephone in regard to the matter and the President stated that in his opinion the Navy Department should send a telegram to Admiral Yarnell asking Admiral Yarnell to endeavor to avoid publicity in regard to such matters. Mr. Welles thereupon telephoned to Admiral Leahy and Admiral Leahy said that the Navy Department would send such a message.

Memo: of Conversation: Mr. Hamilton and Admiral Richardson, 28 October 1937; NA793.94/10975.

Memo: Mr. Hamilton, State Department, 29 October 1937; Ibid.

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time: nr. Smilton, Even Department, 29 October 1937; Inid.

The American Consul General in Shanghai recorded the last step in the process of silencing Yarnell:

Admiral Yarnell told me this morning that he had received a message from the Navy Department in reference to his recent order to Marines to defend themselves if attacked.... The Admiral stated that he had replied pointing out that the order is based on a Navy regulation of long standing that naval forces must defend themselves if attacked. He remarked that he considered it necessary to let both sides know that the Marines have their orders, and that was why he had allowed it to be given to the press. In the future however it looked as though he would have to keep such things out of the press.

On December 21, 1937 the Commander in Chief Japanese Fleet in China issued a letter to the European and American naval commanders that "it is the desire of the Japanese navy that foreign vessels including warships will refrain from navigating the Yangtze except when clear understanding is reached with us." The joint letter from the America, French, British and Italian Commanders said in reply:

With regards to the movement of warships we will of course notify the Japanese authorities on the river of intended movement whenever practicable and will in any case be particular to give information of any intended movements through the Kiangyin barrier for the present. We cannot however, accept the restriction suggested by your letter that foreign men of war cannot move freely on the river without prior arrangement with the Japanese and we must reserve the right to move these ships whenever necessary without notification.

Four days after Admiral Yarnell had reported the above exchange with

Despatch: American Consul General Shanghai to Sec. State #1385, Enclosure No. 57, 20 April 1938, note of 1 November 1937: NA 793.94/13068.

Despatch: CINCAF to CNO, 0024 1834, 24 December 1937; NA 793.94/11791.

<sup>6</sup> Thid.

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the Commander in Chief Japanese Fleet in China, the Secretary of the Navy informed him that his "continued presence ... in Shanghai is thought to be desirable from the political and diplomatic point of view," but by March the tensions around Shanghai had eased so that by order of the President this instruction was cancelled.

It was not long after his release from the geographical restrictions on his movements that Admiral Yarnell was back in the middle of another controversy with the Japanese and State Department. He informed the American Ambassador to China who promptly relayed to the Secretary of State that he intended:

... to visit Nanking and Wuhu about 24-25 June in USS ISABEL. Future presence of the United States Maval. vessels in area Wahu-Rukow will depend on whether American nationals that area are in need of assistance. Due notice of movements of United States Men of War will be given Japanese and Chinese authorities ... While due care will be taken to avoid unnecessary exposure in dangerous areas, assistance to American nationals in evacuation of such areas is paramount mission of Navy and will be followed. It is not considered that warning given by Japanese Ambassador relieves that nation in slightest degree of responsibility for damage or injury to United States naval vessels or personnel. With reference to suggestions contained in second letter that Inited States mayal vessels should be made more distinguished "such as painting the greater part of the vessel scarlet or in other colors" this suggestion cannot be considered. United States naval vessels on Yangtze are painted white with large American flags painted on their awnings...

Whether Mr. Hill reacted to the Ambassador's message or to the press

Pospatch: SECNAV to CINCAF, 0028 1N40, 28 December 1937; NA 811.30 AF/370.

<sup>8</sup> Memo: Hornbeck to State Department, 7 March 1938; NA 811.30 AF/403.

Telegram: American Ambassador China to Sec. State, #286, 12 June 1938; NA 793.94/13197.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Month Marriage to State Department, 7 more 1930; IN 611.30 AS/Mod.

releases is immaterial; his reaction was immediate. His message was meant for Yarnell more than for the Ambassador in Hankow.

Newspapers carry today United Press story dated Shanghai June 12 with sensational headlines such as QUOTE Yarnell defies Japan UNDOTE ... There is a strong element of public opinion in this country which is opposed to the running of any risks of American embroilment abroad and which advocates complete withdrawal from any and all points of danger in the Far Mast, with insistence especially upon removal of all our armed forces. Any publicity suggestive of a bellicose attitude on the part of our people, whether official or unofficial, in China, simply plays into the hands of such elements ... In the light of the above, the Department questions the advisability of Admiral Yarnell making a visit to Manking and Wuhn at a time when active hostilities are imminent or in process immediately above Wahn. Navy Department has no indication what would motivate such visit ... This telegram is being repeated to Shanghai and will be shown to Admiral Yarnell. (In pencilled note at the bottom: "Agreed upon in conference Admiral Leahy Mill [Hamilton] & SNH /Stanley Hornbeck/")

Admiral Yarnell did not go to the Wuhu area, but remained at Shanghai.

History undoubtedly would have been more colorful had Yarnell's flagship
been trapped by Japanese river operations instead of the U.S.S. MONOCACY.

# The Sinking of the Panay.

As the Japanese approached Manking in the Fall of 1937 the American Ambassador was advised by Chiang Kai-shek's foreign office to evacuate. On November 22 the Ambassador and most of his embassy staff departed on the U.S.S. LUZON up the Yangtze, while the U.S.S. PANAY remained in Nanking to evacuate the remainder of the embassy staff. Mr. Grew notified the Japanese Government of the PANAY's planned movements on December 1, 1937. On December 12 the PANAY carrying embassy personnel and escerting three

<sup>10</sup> Telegram: Sec. State to American Embassy Hankow, #177, 13 June 1938; Ibid.

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<sup>10</sup> policement Son, Fintle in commitment becomes Values 1975, 13 June 1936;

American oil barges was bombed and strafed by Japanese aircraft despite the weather being clear and sunny and the large American flags at the masts and painted on the awnings. The attack sank the FANAY and two oil barges, wounded eleven officers and men, and killed two sailors and a civilian.

on order of Admiral Yarmell the United States held a Court of Inquiry in Shanghai into the facts of the sinking while the State Department on orders from the President demanded "an apology, indemnities, punishment of officers involved and assurances that similar incidents would not happen again." The findings of the Court of Inquiry were sent by the State Department to the Japanese Government on December 23, on which date the Japanese accepted the four demands originally ordered by the President. Indemnities of \$2,211,000 were paid by the Japanese on request of the State Department after agreement with the Navy Department on valuation of the various items in the claims.

# The U.S.S. MONOCACY Episode.

Second only to the PANAY case in volume of messages, and perhaps exceeding the PANAY case in amount of resulting negotiations, was the incident involving the U.S.S. MONOCACY. As the Japanese advanced up the Yangtze in the summer of 1936 the area of active fighting approached the city of Kiukiang where the MONOCACY was located. On July 17, 1938 Ambassador Grew in Tokyo telegramed the Secretary of State that the Japanese were quite worried over the presence of the MONOCACY near Kiukiang.

Hull, op. cit., Volume I, pp. 559-562; Samuel Morison, Vol. III, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942, op. cit., pp. 16-18. Cf. Foreign Relations, Japan 1931-1941, State Department, 1943, Volume I, pp. 516-563 for documents exchanged on PANAY sinking.

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While they are taking all precautions to prevent the recurrence of any untoward incident, having in mind the extremely unfortunate PANAY case, the Japanese naval authorities request that in view of the impending heavy fighting in and around Kiukiang, the MONOGACY be for the present withdrawn upriver to Hankow...The Japanese (one) requested the MONOGACY's withdrawal, (two) desired the MONOGACY to be especially marked or otherwise be made distinctly recognized from afar (and from high aloft).

The MONOCACY did not move since there were a number of missionaries in the area and an American oil installation nearby. Ten days later the MONOCACY witnessed the capture of Kiukiang by the Japanese, in the course of which a Japanese gunboat approached the MONOCACY, rendered honors and departed back down stream. It was the last friendly act by the Japanese to the MONOCACY for weeks. The harbinger of future treatment came with a letter from the Japanese Senior Naval Officer Kiukiang denying permission to contact the American nationals in the Kiukiang area or to move the vessel to the Standard Oil installation nearby. The next day the Japanese Navy representative at Kiukiang informed the MONOCACY that he would like to cooperate, but his orders came from the Japanese Army command at Manking and the future movements of the MONOCACY were in the hands of higher authority at Manking. Admiral Yarnell. Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, by this time was very perturbed over the treatment of the MONDCACY, little realizing that much worse treatment was yet to come. His message to the

Telegram: Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State, 17 July 1938; NA 811.30 AF/460. (Each of the citations which follow are from the same National Archive file 811.30 AF. Only the sub-designation of the particular document will be given as long as the source is NA 811.30 AF.)

<sup>13</sup> U.S.S. OAHU to CINCAF, 27 July 1938; /468. (The U.S.S. OAHU was located at Nanking and acted as a relay between the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet in Shanghai and the Japanese Naval authorities in China located in Nanking.

Thorny to CINCAF, 1 August 1938; /477.

<sup>15</sup> OAHU to CINCAF, 2 August 1938; /478.

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<sup>15</sup> th to street, 2 income 1930) /670.

Japanese naval commander at Nanking read:

Fighting is now over....it is obvious duty demands United States gunboat promptly gain touch with American nationals and assist them in every way; fuel also required. Request Admiral Oikawa issue necessary instructions in order for MONOCACY to proceed installation not later than Friday...16

The Japanese Army's authority over naval ships' movements was reemphasized in the Japanese Navy's answer to Admiral Yarnell's message. The message relayed by the OAHU at Nanking read:

Rear Admiral Kusaga, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, strongly objects any shift of borth of MONOCACY at this time...

Expressed sympathetic understanding our desire contact nationals and promises active cooperation to secure that end as soon as possible but refused to state date. Rear Admiral Kondo reported 31 July from Kiukiang that movement MONOCACY from present berth to city would interfere with Japanese operations and that consent of army should also be secured...Reiterated Japanese desire that third power ships be withdrawn from Hankow area. 17

On the next day, August 5, a Commander Tanaga stated that the Japanese Navy had no objection for the MONOCACY to berth at the Standard Vacuum Oil installation but that the Navy would not "agree to her doing so until permission had been obtained from General Hata in Shanghai because of 'previous unfortunate experience in Nanking.'" (The PANAY sinking.) The Japanese Army's answer was forthcoming. The MONOCACY was refused permission to shift berth to the oil installation on the grounds that the new location would "permit close observation their transports anchored that vicinity and other military operations." The United States Navy representative in Nanking "made a strong protest against military attitude on grounds we had no real

<sup>16</sup> OAHU to CINCAF, 3 August 1938; /481.

<sup>170</sup>AHU to CINCAF, 4 August 1938; /483.

<sup>18</sup> OAHU to CINCAF, 5 August 1938; /485.

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interest in their military operations, were deeply conscious of our neutral status, and that their illogical objections to our reasonable request were incompatible with their repeated official protestations of respect for American rights and interests in China." Since they had allowed the MONOCACY to contact the American nationals by letter, the Japanese Navy representatives considered the matter settled except "to try to obtain permission from military headquarters for the MONOCACY to...get fuel and then return to present anchorage."

At this stage Admiral Yarnell had almost exhausted the peaceful courses of action he could follow in the China area to get the Japanese to cooperate on the MONOCACY question. On August 15 he called upon the Navy Department to enlist the help of the State Department.

Necessary on account shortage fuel provisions and for relief personnel MONOCACY proceed Shanghai...Japanese admiral refuses permission to vessel to pass down river, this passage cannot conceivably interfere with the Japanese military operations. Commander in Chief reluctant to bring about incident by directing MONOCACY to proceed without Japanese consent. Request State Department take matter up with Tokyo in order secure assent to MONOCACY passage to Shanghai. 20

The Secretary of the Navy relayed Yarnell's message immediately to the State Department for appropriate action. In the Secretary of State's instruction to the Ambassador in Tokyo the American position was given on control of the river by the Japanese by virtue of their possessing a captured boom across the river.

<sup>19</sup> CAHU to CINCAF, 6 August 1938; /486.

<sup>20</sup> CINCAF to CNO, 15 August 1938; /502.

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...it would appear that the position of the Japanese authorities in regard to the right of foreign ships to traverse this section of the river is that having themselves cut a passage through the boom at Matung, the authorities have a right to close that passage to foreign vessels. This Government of course cannot admit any such right or the validity of the basis invoked in support of that asserted right.

Please urgently approach the Foreign Office in regard to this matter and ask that prompt instructions be given by the Japanese Government to the end that the opposition of the Japanese military authorities to the proposed passage of the U.S.S. MONOCACY be withdrawn and appropriate facilities be extended the vessel in connection with its movement through the passage. 21

Messrs. Hull and Grow still operated under the long established basis of international relations that responsible governments either controlled or were held accountable for the actions of their military forces. They soon found out that in the existing arrangement in the Government of Japan, the military commanders in China had the authority for ultimate decisions in the China area. A report of this development reached Washington on the same date via two routes. Ambassador Grew reported on his efforts to the Secretary of State on August 19:

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Our informal efforts to obtain authority for the MONOCACY to proceed to Shanghai have proved abortive. We were advised that ...it is not ... the intention of the Japanese Government to intervene in the exercise by Admiral Oikawa of the discretionary powers vested in him ... I therefore took up the case this afternoon directly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made strong oral. representations, basing my approach upon (a) practical considerations and (b) legitimate rights, and ... that I could not believe that the Japanese Government would leave entirely to the discretion of one of its subordinate officers the decision in a matter involving one of the primary rights of the United States ... after our initial representations the Japanese Covernment had immediately consulted Admiral Oikawa...his reply...could be summarised as follows: (a) the necessity of military operations render

<sup>21</sup> Secretary of State to American Embassy Tokyo, 15 August 1938; Ibid.

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compliance with our request difficult at the present time but every effort will be made to comply at the earliest possible moment; (b) the Japanese navy, on request from us, will be glad to cooperate by furnishing Japanese vessels or, if necessary, planes for the supply or transportation of provisions or fuel for the MDNOCACY and for the transportation of mails or personnel...I reemphasized the importance of principle at issue...I interpret this as a categorical refusal and while fully appreciating the seriousness of the issue here involved I think that there can be no doubt but that we have exhausted diplomatic resources.<sup>22</sup>

On August 19 Admiral Yarnell learned from Japanese naval sources in Nanking that decisions concerning the MONOCACY would be made in China.

Admiral Oikawa offered the logistical support for the MONOCACY mentioned in the Grew telegram above and reiterated previous objections to the gunboat's moving downstream as follows:

1. Movement would interfere Japanese naval strategy and tactics in manner not free to disclose but requests
Admiral Yarnell to accept his personal assurance of this as fact; 2. Danger from chance mines and unfavorable
American reactions and repercussions to possible injury
therefrom; 3. Possibility mistaken identity and firing
upon American vessel passing through hostile waters by
"excited Japanese gun crew;" 4. Matung barrier prize of
war through which as a Japanese controlled barrier we have
no more right to expect free passage than we had through
same unpenetrated barrier under Chinese control....
[Admiral Oikawa] earnestly requests that Admiral Yarnell
realize his desire to cooperate to the limit of his ability
short of giving his consent to MONOGAGY passage which must
be withheld for time being because of undisclosable
tactical considerations.<sup>23</sup>

The attempts to put the negotiations concerning the MONOCACY into the diplomatic system had failed and Admiral Yarnell's bargaining position was back to that of four days earlier with two new developments bearing on the

<sup>22</sup> Telegram: American Embassy Tokyo to Sec. State, 19 August 1938; /517.

<sup>23</sup> OAHU to CINCAF, 19 August 1938; /519.

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situation. In the first, Admiral Oikawa's hand was strengthened considerably by the Japanese Foreign Office deferring ultimate authority to the Japanese military forces in China. Admiral Yarnell had no immediate countermove, since he had just exhausted the possibilities of diplomatic assistance in obtaining a clearance for the MONOCACY to move. The second development was the assertion of cooperation and understanding by the Japanese Admiral to Admiral Yarnell. The Japanese restrictions on the freedom of movement had not changed. Their forces controlled the passage through the boom at Matung in the river and in this case possession equaled ten tenths of the law. The offer of Japanese logistical support to the MONOCACY had possibilities, and Admiral Yarnell recognized that the future of the MONOCACY necessitated his cooperation with the Japanese naval commanders on the Yangtze. He informed the Navy Department the next day:

Unless you direct otherwise reference CAHU [message] of yesterday will reply Admiral Cikawa that while cannot relinquish any right of free navigation Yangtze River by our vessels am prepared recognize special situation now existing below Kiukiang and will delay sailing MONOGACY until later date. Will accept Japanese offer transportation fuel provisions personnel since we lack any information of military operations now taking place near Matung boom and conditions in river. Consider it advisable retain MONOCACY Kiukiang until Japanese cooperation for her passage down river is secured...<sup>24</sup>

As the fuel supply of the MDNOCACY approached its very end, Admiral Yarmell commented to the Chief of Naval Operations that: "Before informing Japanese Admiral that MONOCACY must proceed Shanghai prior ten September due shortage fuel and provisions request your view." The Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet was informed the next day that the Navy Department "desires that

<sup>24</sup> GINCAF to CNO, 20 August 1938; /520.

<sup>25</sup> GINGAF to GNO, 29 August 1938; /563.

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you again discuss with Japanese command on the Yangtze the necessity for the USS MONOCACY to either proceed to Shanghai or to obtain coal from mill belonging to Anderson Myers, and that you very much prefer having the MONOCACY proceed to Shanghai, request escort through Matung boom at the same time for subject vessel."

In the Far Eastern Division of the State Department the problems of the MONDCACY were also being discussed. In a memorandum of August 30, Hamilton briefed the Secretary of State:

The Navy Department has just informed me that Admiral Leahy has an appointment with the President at 11:15 this morning. If you are still at the White House at that time you and Admiral Leahy may care to speak to the President in regard to the question of the USS Monocacy proceeding to Shanghai...[The records in the archives do not show the subsequent development of this suggested conversation.]

It is our belief that the Japanese will continue to object to the Monocacy proceeding down the river to Shanghai. Admiral Yarnell has no information in regard to the situation near the Matung boom. Should the Monocacy decide to proceed down river in face of Japanese objections, the Japanese could easily prevent the passage of the Monocacy through the boom. A Japanese pilot might be needed for pilotage through the boom. There would also be danger from mines.

In view of the foregoing, we do not believe that the issue or issues involved warrant (a) insistence on our part that the Japanese withdraw their objections or (b) the sailing of the vessel in the face of Japanese objections. Moreover, in view of the fact that we believe that a further approach to the Japanese would be unsuccessful, we suggest that no such further approach be made. Also, if by the time the Monocacy has exhausted its supply of fuel and provisions the situation on the river remains unchanged, we suggest that Admiral Yarnell's recommendation that he accept the Japanese offer for transportation of fuel and provisions be approved.<sup>27</sup>

Admiral Yarnell informed his representative in Manking to: "Call on Admiral Oikawa and tell him due to low provisions and fuel most necessary

<sup>26</sup> CNO to CINCAF, 30 August 1938; Ibid.

Memo: Max Hamilton to Sec. State, 30 August 1938; /563 1/2

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CNO to GIVEAF, 30 Au nust 1938; Toid.

Momo: Max Humilton to Sec. State, 30 August 1938; /563 1/2

MONOCACY leave [for] Shanghai by 10 September...Whatever the reason given, the fact remains the channel is open through Matung and the passage down river of one small vessel surely could not inconvenience operations. Also inform him the MONOCACY was refused access by the Japanese military to coal at Anderson Myers mill."

Admiral Yarnell's message setting September 10 as a deadline for the MONOCACY to move down river prompted Admiral Oikawa, in a most unusual show of trust in Admiral Yarnell's integrity, to confide in the Americans the difficulties experienced by the Japanese in their river operations and to show the inconvenience of moving the MONOCACY at the time.

The Japanese Admiral is armious that you more fully understand his position and states therefore that he is impelled to disclose information most of which he considers most secret and requests precautions be taken to prevent leaks to Chinese or third powers. Have swept only narrow channel between Wuhu and point 15 miles above Kiukiang, more than 700 mines destroyed and numerous casualties sustained by their ships ... Below Kiukiang and at 6 locations pointed out on charts Chinese detached units very active, necessary above Wuhu that all ships proceed in convoys with destroyer escort, all convoys subject sniping and indirect fire of Chinese field and heavy artillery located inland from river. Congestion in river caused by operation of hundreds of large ships and thousands of small craft above Wuhu. presents serious problem which would be complicated by passage even small gunboat. In addition passage down of MONDCACY would undoubtedly be followed by similar British demands for Cockchafer and passage up of reliefs and ships of third powers and proportionately increase difficulties; states his belief Japanese foreign office has never questioned fundamental right third powers to free navigation of Yangtze but Japanese navy does claim control passage through barriers by virtue their capture and military nature ... 2

Admiral Yarnell answered the following day:

<sup>28</sup> CINCAF to QAHU, 31 August 1938; /578.

<sup>29</sup> OAHU to CINCAF, 2 September 1938; /564.

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Give my regards and thanks to Admiral Oikawa for courtesies and frankness of his confidence which will be respected and also convey to him my regrets that he has been unable to assist in the passage of the Monocacy down the river at the present also tell him that in view of his consideration and friendly attitude I am willing to accede to his wishes and hold the USS MONOCACY at Kiukiang for the time being. 30

Meanwhile in Washington liaison between the working levels of the State and Navy Departments showed agreement that the Navy Department "would send no reply to Admiral Yarnell: in other words, the Navy Department would leave Admiral Yarnell free to accept the Japanese offer to transport mail, supplies, and possibly personnel."

Admiral Yarnell accepted the Japanese offer to support the MONDCACY, and on September 8 the flow of provisions upstream began from Shanghai for the MONDCACY. The first shipment of 16,000 pounds of naval stores, motion picture films and mail was shipped via HIJM STESHIO MARU.

A few days later HIJM AZUCHI MARU departed Shanghai with 68 packages refrigerated provisions, ships service and medical stores and one bag mail for the MONDCACY.

Coal continued to be a critical item for the MONOGACY. The USS OAHU was ordered to "inform Japanese naval authorities that while periodic access to Anderson Myers coal pile now permitted MONOGACY had no adequate equipment for transportation this fuel, SNO Kiukiang agreed to deliver fuel but yesterday stated navy has no facilities and unable arrange army to do so. Request that

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Memo: "M.M.H." (Initials of Max Hamilton) to State Department, 3 September 1933; /564.

Despatch: Navy Purchasing Officer Shanghai to MONOCACY, 8 September 1938; /566.

Despatch: Navy Purchasing Officer Shanghai to MDNDCACY, 12 September 1938; /576.

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<sup>1939/ /</sup>Soc.

<sup>1996, /576.</sup> 

arrangements be made supply gumboat with coal about 25 tons per week." So coal was added to the shopping list of supplies being delivered by the Japanese.

Further cooperation in Kiukiang was evidenced by a report from the MONOCACY that arrangements had been made with the Japanese Army "for MONOCACY officer [to] visit various missionaries to ascertain their needs and explain method of obtaining same from Shanghai. All contact since 6 August has been by letter through Japanese."

The following day, September 27, two months since the Japanese had taken Kiukiang, a MONOCACY officer "accompanied by army officer and Vice Consul visited Americans in city, they comfortable, no actual food shortage at present except staples becoming scarce, believe they now understand how obtain material from Shanghai."

Late in September the American Consul General in Shanghai reported to the Secretary of State the completion of one of the most interesting airlifts of the Sino-Japanese War.

> On September 11 twelve sailors relieved from duty on the MONOCACY were returned to Shanghai by Japanese airplane. On September 21 two officers and thirteen men replacements were flown from Shanghai to Kiukiang and on September 25 two officers and thirteen men relieved from duty on MONOCACY were returned to Shanghai by Japanese plane. This completes the transfer of the USS MONOCACY personnel.

The MONOCACT episode pointed up a number of factors which would bear on future Japanese-American relationships over the Asiatic Fleet forces. First,

<sup>34</sup> Despatch: Commander Mangtze River Patrol to OAHU, 14 September 1938; /579.

<sup>35</sup> MONDCAN to COMYANGPAT, 26 September 1938; /608.

MONOGACY to COMMANGPAT, 27 September 1938; /613.

<sup>37</sup>Telegram: American Consul General Shanghai to Sec. State, #1267, 26 September, 1938; /609.

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the Japanese military forces in China were the ultimate authority on relations with third powers where military operations were involved. Second, the Japanese Army held higher authority than the Japanese Navy and was prone to be less cooperative with the Asiatic Fleet. Third, the Japanese were meeting unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance which necessitated heavier Japanese effort than had been planned. Convenience to third powers would have a low priority. Finally, the Asiatic Fleet forces had to rely upon diplomatic representations to a government whose authority over its Army in China was limited at best. The safety of American naval vessels and citizens and the security of property were in the hands of the Japanese military forces in China. In 1938 the Japanese still needed American oil, machinery and iron for her war machine so limited cooperation with the Asiatic Fleet was to their national interest.

Admiral Yarnell's letter to the Secretary of Navy upon his being relieved as Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet contained his evaluations of the effectiveness of American foreign relations in the Far East and his military recommendation for strengthening the hand of the diplomat.

During the present controversy, the rights of Americans in the Far East have been upheld vigorously by the State Department. Had our notes been addressed to a government which retained control over its armed forces, some recognition of our rights might have been obtained. It is difficult to see how our position and policies could have been stated more clearly or more positively. It should be recognised however that the Tokyo government is generally impotent to deal with or give decisions regarding affairs and incidents in China. In many cases it is entirely ignorant of what is going on....The Gommander in Chief Asiatic Fleet has recommended that for every note written, there should be some increase in the United States armed forces in the Far East. When dealing with a nation whose policies are

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determined by a ruthless military clique which worships the sword and understands nothing but force, such a procedure may have merit.

## Relations between Admiral Thomas Hart and the Japanese Naval Forces in China.

Admiral Hart, who relieved Admiral Yarnell as Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet in April 1939, was as opposed as his predecessor to Japanese restrictions on movements of his units. Tensions over movements of the river gunboats continued, but fortunately for both sides there was nothing to compare with the MONOCACY case. On April 27, 1940 Admiral Hart reported to the Chief of Naval Operations:

We are again having troubles with the Japs when Glassford wants to move his gunboats. One such case is on right now. We are giving in on those points to an extent that irks me considerably. I sometimes feel that we are not taking stands which are strong enough. But I'll have to risk my personal reputation as long as the respective cases are in themselves unimportant. Don't want to have an "incident" over something which does not amount to much, per se. 39

Admiral Hart in reviewing his first ten months of his assignment restated the fact that delays in moving the gumboats were almost always caused by requests by the Japanese Navy at the insistence of the Japanese Army. He further believed that "their Army and Navy in Central China did not want any discussions of [delays] by the respective capitols....Our record during the ten months that I have been here is that in every instance we have had our way, though quite frequently having to delay a bit to get it."

letter: Admiral Yarnell to Secretary of Navy, Al6-3(190) 20 July 1939; NA 793.91/15339.

<sup>39</sup> Letter: Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark, 27 April 1940; NHD File: EA-EZ.

Letter: Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark, 7 June 1910; Ibid.

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A year after the MONOCACY incident another event involved Asiatic Fleet forces with the Japanese. This time the event occurred upon the high seas and resulted in a charge of violation of international law being leveled at the United States Navy. This incident varied from the previous cases in two significant ways: (1) This time the Japanese initiated the complaint, and (2) the complaint was handled in proper diplomatic channels rather than between the military commanders directly. The Comsul at Canton reported to the Secretary of State the initial facts received from the Japanese Consul at Canton. A destroyer division of the Asiatic Fleet was reported to have ordered a Japanese military transport to heave to on the high seas. The Japanese Consul requested "that appropriate steps be taken through your good offices in regard to this incident which creates a violation of international law and that I be informed of the results thereof; Anrthermore, that measures be taken to prevent its repetition."

Admiral Hart's investigation determined that the Japanese had mistaken a tactical signal flag being used by the destroyers to be an international signal directed to the transport. The relay of Admiral Hart's report by the American Consul in Canton to his Japanese opposite in Canton ended the case.

A second incident on the high seas occurred in January 1941 when a crew member of the U.S.S. MINDANAO took a photograph of a Japanese destroyer as the two ships passed in the South China Sea. The "Japanese Consul General acting on instructions from local naval authorities has registered verbal protest against passing too close and photographing Japanese naval vessel.

Telegram: American Consul Canton to Sec. State, 7 June 1940; NA 811.30

<sup>12</sup> Telegram: American Consul Canton to Sec. State, 31 July 1940; NA 811.30 AF/855, 869, 911.

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Japanese naval authorities demand apology, immediate surrender of film and assurances that there will be no recurrence. Admiral Hart's handling of the report was sufficient to cause the withdrawal of the complaint. He directed Rear Admiral Glassford to inform Admiral Shimada, Commander in Chief Japanese naval forces in China that he was amazed that the Japanese naval authorities at Camton should make such demands and that "he personally had witnessed the photographing of his own flagship by persons on Japanese men of war, notably the IDZUMO, and that he never dreamed of protesting such action."

This incident, which started in the same procedural sequence as the earlier one at Canton described above, was resolved by Admiral Hart's direct approach to his Japanese counterpart. Under the circumstances it was by far the easiest way to end the matter, because Admiral Hart obviously had the basis of a similar charge against the Japanese.

Admiral Hart's direct relations with the Japanese were much less frequent or involved as the relations between Admiral Yarnell and the Japanese. Among the reasons for the differences between the two commanders are: (1) The personalities of the two Admirals. Admiral Yarnell was more aggressive and outspoken than his successor. Admiral Hart, according to the records in the archives, was never in a position of having advocated a policy against the Japanese such that unfavorable reaction and countermeasures came from the

Telegram: American Consul Canton to Sec. State, 15 January 1941; NA 311.30 AF/919.

Telegrame American Consul Canton to Sec. State, 22 January 1961; NA 811.30 AF/922.

Telegram: Consul General Shanghai to Sec. State, 18 January 1941; NA 911.30 AF/921.

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had moved inland and become more stabilized. River traffic congestion was much less critical during Admiral Hart's tenure and, though his gunboats experienced delays in reaching stations, none was isolated like the MONOCACY.

(3) Tensions over strategic problems increased as war approached. Admiral Hart had problems of positioning his forces and timing their withdrawal at exactly the right time to meet his future mission of defending the Malay Barrier. He could not afford to get involved with the Japanese over minor incidents when his future assignment depended upon his flexible employment of forces.

In August and again in October 1941 the question of withdrawing the marines and gunboats from China was discussed between the Navy and State Departments. 46 In November the decision was made to withdraw the marines and two of the river gunboats to the Philippines. Admiral Hart, who had been given the discretion of employment of his forces to defend the Malay Barrier under the terms of war plan Rainbow 5, began to deploy his forces on November 20. Four destroyers and an auxiliary were sent to Balipspan and five destroyers and a cruiser to Tarakan, both ports in Borneo. His second cruiser, four other destroyers, six gunboats (three of which were Yangtze River gunboats) and submarines were in Philippine by the end of November. The Fourth Marines were evacuated from Shanghai the first days of December, but the transport bound for Northern China to evacuate marines from that area

Memo: State Department 26 August 1941; NA 811.30 AF/941 and Letter: CND to Sec. State, 3 October 1941; NA 811.30 AF/954.

<sup>47</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2456.

Memo of Conversation: State Department, 18 November 1941; NA 811.30

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British, Dutch and Asiatic Fleet surface forces had been expended in attempts to hold back the superior Japanese Navy with its supporting air cover. Six destroyers, "the cruiser MANDLEMEAD and two gumboats were the only surface fighting ships of the old Asiatic Fleet to survive the Java campaign."

The defense of the Malay Barrier was a military failure, but the intangible example of gallant fighting spirit could be credited to the United States Navy.

14

The Asiatic Fleet holds a unique place in the history of the United
States Navy. Its beginnings predated the opening and modernization of the
Oriental Power which ultimately proved to be its major opponent. The
mission of the Fleet changed as American interests changed from the original
coastal trading to extensive investments in China's commercial and religious
development. From the earlier protection for almost purely commercial
reasons the mission of the Asiatic Fleet took on a higher moral sense in the
twentieth century. There was more than just a trace of prestige and symbolism
in the presence of the naval vessels from the country which sponsored the
Open Door Policy. The Asiatic Fleet represented a country which defended
the principles of that policy by diplomatic maneuvers and moral influence to
gain acceptance from other commercial powers.

The renewed fighting between China and Japan in 1937 rapidly spread into the rich Yangtze Valley where extensive American investments and naval units

<sup>19</sup> Samuel Morison, Vol. III, Rising Sun in the Pacific, op. cit., p. 375.

<sup>50</sup> Told., p. 380.

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were located. It was insvitable that the Sino-Japanese military operations would adversely affect American interest and naval units. The diplomatic procedures followed by the United States on such occasions can be drawn from the records of the actual incidents. In the PANAY case the State Department handled the diplomatic demands on Japan, while the Navy carried on the military procedure of a court of inquiry. There was no attempt to make a show of naval strength as suggested by the British. Diplomatic procedure was effective and successful.

In subsequent cases the issues were not as clear cut or as dramatic as in the PANAY case. In the MONOCACY incident military convenience and the principle of freedom of navigation were balanced against the inconvenience to Japanese operations. In the procedural handling of the case are examples of the possible relationships which could have been used. The Japanese initially had warned the United States through diplomatic channels that impending fighting approached the MONOCACY's position and requested that the vessel be removed from possible danger. A Navy decision kept the vessel near American missionaries and an oil installation. For the next three weeks Admiral Yarnell made his requests concerning the movements of the MONOCACY directly to the Japanese naval authorities on the Yangtze. The Japanese Navy, limited in its authority by the Japanese Army who was in charge of the China operations, could not give satisfaction to Yarnell. Had the military situation been different on the Yangtze so that the MONOCACY's movement would not have involved the Army's operations, it might be reasonable to assume that the Japanese Navy would have cooperated to the extent desired. Admiral Yarnell's appeal to the Navy Department for State Department help was his

<sup>51</sup> Hull, op. cit., p. 561.

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the addressed that the date of the court and the same and the same at the same and to the Palet core. To the Contact Lincolne william provenience and the notes provided and described bounded over malaborate to entered the abulgation tendences was once our to purities of landscore out of our confirmed temporal of of the punities relationships which could have been used. The liquides total allowers carried the brains between the way of the starting somewhat alone and past depressors for modeling of Philipper and Servery and Applicances that THE PROPERTY AND POSTULE ASSESSMENT A PARTY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTY NAMED ASSESSMENT OF THE Angelong start maying and an old inglating and in most through the read through TRANSPORT AND TO DESCRIPT AND RELIGIOUS ASSESSED AND SOME ADDRESS AND ADDRESS could abstract will assessed and no matrix of the formation and an officeration Making the day noticestay by the Sengment Amy the was by what his bid dising questions, outdoor give satisfactories to farmille too the milliany named of addressing or origin at passivery always of territoria and has LINEAR AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY tionally spread to his they bearings the risks topograms but to be

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only recourse at the time. The failure of the diplomats to get permission for the MONDCACY to move on an international waterway was due primarily to the weak position of the Japanese Foreign Office relative to the military commanders in China. Even if the Foreign Office had agreed with Mr. Grew, it is possible that the Japanese Army would not have obeyed until it suited their operations.

Cooperation between the State and Navy Departments appears to have improved with time. The discussions over curtailing Yarnell's press releases in 1937 were referred to the President. Later discussions on Yarnell's acceptance of the Japanese offer of assistance in the logistical support of the MONOCACY though less important, were mutually agreed upon at the working levels in the Navy and State Departments.

Admiral Hart's relations with the Japanese did not necessitate having to resort to diplomatic help or prolonged arguments with the Japanese naval commanders. In the two examples of naval involvement, one was handled completely within the framework of international diplomatic procedure, while the less serious "picture taking incident" was taken out of the diplomatic channels and handled directly between the senior naval officers of the respective navies.

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#### CHAPTER SEVEN

RELATIONS RESULTING FROM VISITS BY AMERICAN AND JAPANESE NAVAL SHIPS

### Introduction.

The gains from naval ships visiting foreign ports fall into two broad categories: military and political. In the military category, the acquisition of intelligence in the broad spectrum of useful war planning information is the primary objective, while a show of friendly relations on the part of the visitors and an expression of good will on the part of the host country are the usual motivations on the political side. The desires for American naval visits to Japanese ports, therefore, stemmed from motives not unlike those which inspired the Japanese visits to American ports. In some cases the issue of military information by far outweighed the political consideration. Such a case was the Navy's desire to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands. On the other hand, a visit to the Home Islands of Japan by the Admiral of the Asiatic Fleet leaned heavily toward the political motive.

The Japanese visited with their naval vessels Manila, the Hawaiian Islands and the west coast of the United States. Since each individual visit involved entering territorial waters, a formal request was necessary from the Japanese Foreign Office to the State Department. The State Department, in turn, checked with the Navy Department to ascertain whether the Navy had objections to the visit at the time and place requested. Occasionally, fleet maneuvers or movements congested certain areas and the Navy suggested delaying or advancing the arrival time or destination to avoid confusion (and spying).

An obvious exception to the comparison was the use of Japanese naval tankers to carry oil from the United States to Japan. Cf. Chapter Eight, infra.

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The State Department informed the Foreign Office which passed the clearance to the Japanese Navy. Naturally, American naval requests for visits to Japanese ports worked in reverse.

### American naval visits to foreign ports.

One of the most frustrating problems facing naval war planners was the almost complete lack of intelligence on the Japanese activities in the Mandated Islands. The presence of military bases, even small ones capable of supporting submarines or aircraft, posed a threat to the lines of communications to Guam and to the Philippines. As previously noted, Guam was effectively surrounded by potential island bases. Although the mandate absolutely forbid the construction of fortifications, the American Navy was vitally concerned whether the mandate was being honored. Early war plans called for immediate reinforcement of the Philippines in the event of war. Later plans were more realistic and called for a progressive movement across the Pacific. Under either contingency, knowledge of energy capabilities in the islands, which stretched across the shortest route, was a sine qua non to effective planning.

Since the Navy periodically replaced ships in the Asiatic Fleet, often there were ships traversing the Pacific near the islands. To get close enough to observe bases and defense works necessitated entering territorial waters and that required prior permission. An occasion presented itself neatly to the scheme to see first-hand what was going on when the USS ALDEM was scheduled to sail for China and duty in the Asiatic Fleet.

In a letter of June 5, 1936 the Secretary of the Navy presented his

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Chapter Three for discussion of War Plans.

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case to the Secretary of State:

For some time there has been a strong undercurrent of conjecture and suspicion regarding the harbor development or fortification of the Pacific possessions of both the United States and Japan. With a view to allaying any such suspicion which might be held by the Japanese Government, the Navy Department recently has taken the stand that it would welcome the visits this year by two Japanese public vessels to certain of the Aleutian Islands and other ports not normally open to foreign vessels.

The voyage of the USS ALDEN to the Asiatic station offers a similar opportunity to the Japanese Government. It is therefore suggested that the State Government inform the Japanese Government regarding the proposed trip of this destroyer and suggest the desirability of an invitation from that Government for the U.S.S. Alden to visit informally certain of the larger unopened ports of the Mandated Islands, as well as the open ports of Saipan, Anguar, Palau, Ponape, Jaluit, and Truk...3

This first approach was to solicit an invitation to visit the former German Islands and to offer as a quid pro quo, visits to unopened Aleutian ports.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, did not sound optimistic in his telegram from Tokyo a few days later:

If the Japanese Government decides against favorable action on my informal suggestion that an invitation of its own volition be extended to the destroyer ALDEN to visit the closed ports of the Japanese mandated islands, it is quite possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will avoid communicating to me the unfavorable reply and will tacitly let the matter drop....If such proves to be the case I can see nothing to be gained by pressing for an answer because failure to extend the suggested invitation would be tantamount to a refusal ... if the Department ... feels that a definite even if adverse reply is desirable, it might be well that I seek a further interview with the Foreign Minister a few days before July 21. I shall not ... do so unless so instructed.

On July 21 the USS ALDEN was scheduled to depart Hawaii on its next westbound

<sup>3</sup>Letter: Sec. Navy to Sec. State DD211/A4-5(3)(360605) 5 June 1936; NA 811.3394/231.

Tolegram Am. Ambass. Tokyo to Sec. State #153 July 13, 1936; NA 811. 33621/15.

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leg. The Navy desired an answer if possible before that date.

On July 13 Captains Canaga and Puleston of the Central Division of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office inquired of Mr. Max Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department if anything further had been heard from Tokyo in regard to the visit of the ALDEN to the closed ports. Hamilton informed them of Ambassador Grew's telegram which is quoted above.

Their first reaction was that if the Japanese did not respond favorably to the approach which had been made by Mr. Grew, the American Government might notify the Japanese Government in the usual way that an American naval vessel desired to visit the open ports of the Mandated Islands. I replied that it seemed to me that as the approach which had been made to the Japanese in this instance had been based at least partially upon the thought that the Japanese might wish to extend such an invitation as a good will gesture, we might well await the outcome of the present approach before giving consideration to the question of an American naval vessels visiting the open ports of the Japanese Mandated Islands. Both Captain Canaga and Captain Puleston indicated they concurred in this view.

Captain Canaga said that he would speak to Admiral Standley in regard to Mr. Grew's telegram of July 13 and would ascertain Admiral Standley's view in regard to the question presented by Mr. Grew as to whether or not it would be advisable that Mr. Grew again seek an interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister with a view to pressing for a definitive answer.

Admiral Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations, conferred with his assistants in War Plans and Central Division on the subject of ALDEN's visit in the light of Mr. Grew's telegram. On July 15 Commander Hill of the Central Division called Mr. Hamilton on orders of Admiral Standley to tell the Far Eastern Division of the Admiral's views.

Admiral Standley was of the opinion that Mr. Grew should press the Japanese Foreign Minister for a definitive reply for the reasons (2) that in the past we had never been able to get a formal reply from the Japanese Government to

Memo by Mr. Mamilton July 14, 1936; Ibid.

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previous approaches which we had made to the Japanese Government with a view to the Japanese Government granting permission for American naval vessels to visit closed ports in the Japanese Mandated Islands, and (b) that should the Japanese Foreign Minister return an unfavorable reply, the Navy Department would then be in position and would wish to ask the Department to notify the Japanese Government that the Navy Department desired to have the U.S.S. ALDEN visit certain open ports in the Japanese Mandated Islands. Commander Hill said that Admiral Standley felt that in the event the Japanese Foreign Minister should be unfavorably disposed in regard to the question presented to him by Mr. Grew it was desirable that notification be made to the Japanese Government that American naval vessels proposed to visit open ports of the Mandated Islands in order that there might be inaugurated as a regular thing such visits by American naval vessels to the open ports of the Mandated Islands, or in order that this Government might have on record any disposition on the part of the Japanese Government to raise objection to visits of American naval vessels to open ports of the Mandated Islands.6

A formal request at this juncture for the ALDEN to visit the open ports would have put the Ambassador, Mr. Grew in an undesirable position. Having entered into informal discussions in a spirit of good will and asking for a mutual exchange of visits to show good faith, Mr. Grew was being asked by the Navy Department to change his approach to a more demanding formal one in which a definite answer would be required instead of the more discrete diplomatic silence. If the Foreign Minister for reasons which he could not disclose to Mr. Grew could not give an affirmative answer, he still was in a position to keep friendly relations by remaining silent. To force the issue after having tried to get mutual visits by the informal gambit would most probably embarrass the Foreign Minister and strain the existing good relations. In addition, to request to visit the open ports without waiting for an answer to the informal request to visit all ports would make it particularly difficult for the Japanese to accept, for it would show the

Memo by Mr. Hamilton, July 15, 1936, Ibid.

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actual motive was to see the Mandated Islands and not to promote good will by mutual visits.

...[A]fter some consideration, Admiral Standley said that he thought the best thing to do would be to let the case of the SS (Sic) ALDEN run its course; to send no further instructions on this case to Mr. Grew; and, in the event that the invitation should not be forthcoming from the Japanese Government, the AIDEN would proceed to the Asiatic station and the Navy Department would not request in the case of the ALDEN that this Government notify the Japanese Government that the ALDEN would visit the open ports of the Mandated Islands, Admiral Standley said that later the Navy Department would give consideration to the question of routing a naval transport which was proceeding to the Far Rast via certain of the open ports of the Mandated Islands and would make the usual requests of this Department that diplomatic notification be made to the Japanese Covernment of the proposed visits to open parts of the Mandated Islands. 7

The naval transport to which Admiral Standley had referred was the USS COLD STAR scheduled to make an Oriental cruise the following year. In February 1937 the Navy Department requested through the State Department permission for the COLD STAR to make informal visits as follows: Saipan, Tokohama, Kobe, Milke, Palau and Truk. After months of waiting for a reply the American Ambassador finally received the inevitable decision. Answering a telegram from the State Department, sent at the request of the Navy Department, "inquiring whether the proposed informal visits of the U.S.S. GOID STAR to certain ports in the Japanese Mandated Islands would be agreeable to the Japanese Government," Mr. Grew stated that he was "in receipt of a reply from the Foreign Office...dated July 31, 1937, stating that the Japanese Government is unable to give consent to the proposed

<sup>7</sup> Memo by Mr. Hamilton, July 16, 1936, Ibid.

Telegram Secretary of State to American Embassy Tokyo 3 February 1937; NA 811.30/250.

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visit." No reason was given since none was required, but the fact that earlier in the month Japan had renewed the conflict with China would indicate an unwillingness to be involved with American visits at that time. No follow-up request for other visits appear in the archive files. It must be assumed the Navy gave up trying to get Japanese permission to visit even the open ports in the Mandated Islands.

In the Japanese home islands the story was different. There United States naval ships visits frequently and generally were well received.

Usually during a tour in the China Station, the Admiral of the Asiatic Fleet made a formal visit to Japan. Since Admiral Narmell had not visited Japan since taking command of the Asiatic Fleet, he planned to visit that country in the summer of 1937. In May before his cruise to Japan he requested authorization to visit Vladivostok in July. Since the visits of an Admiral of a Fleet had political ramifications in the diplomatic frame of reference, especially if a second country is involved in the visit, the State Department advised the Ambassador in Tokyo of the Admiral's tentative plans. The

...conceives that it might possibly be advantageous from point of view of psychological effects, both positive and negative, upon both Soviet and Japanese officialdom, for Yarnell to make the visits to Vladivostok and to Japan on and as parts of one trip rather than as separate and therefore more conspicuously special visits. Department therefore desires that you lay this suggestion before and discuss it with your Naval Attache with a view to its being conveyed if only informally to Yarnell, perhaps with your comments, for his consideration. 10

The Ambassador replied to the Secretary of State the next week that the

PLetter: American Embassy Tokyo to Sec. of State #2522 h August 1937; NA 811.339h/270.

<sup>10</sup> Telegram Secretary of State to American Embassy Tokyo #68 May 11, 1937; NA 811.3394/255.

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Naval Attache concurs in my opinion that a naval visit to Japan during the summer months should be avoided, and he has recommended to Admiral Tarnell that considerations be given to a visit between October 1st and 20th or after November 15th owing to Japanese naval and military maneuvers between those dates or next Spring....Naval Attache feels and has so advised Tarnell that same political ends will be gained if announcements of proposed visits to Vladivostok and to Japan be concurrent but that the visits themselves need not be concurrent. I concur...ll

The recommendation that the summer months should be avoided was very prophetic. On July 7, 1937 the Japanese invaded China over an incident near Marco Polo Bridge, and Admiral Yarnell had to forego his formal visits for more active relations with the Japanese.

As the Sino-Japanese conflict spread and tensions between the United States and Japan increased, the use of naval visits took on new color. In March 1941 a formation of four cruisers and nine destroyers, on a highly secret mission unknown at the time of sailing even to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, left Pearl Harbor ultimately to visit Australia, New Zealand, Tahiti and the Fiji Islands. The purpose was to emphasize "to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British."

The cruise to Australia had been on the recommendation of the State

Department and it involved naval units which Admiral Stark wished to keep

concentrated at Pearl Harbor. His taking of definite exception to the

precedent set by the Australian visit was shown in a letter to Admiral Kimmel

Telegram: American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State #132 19 May 1937: NA 811.3391/257.

<sup>12</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 26, p. 341.

<sup>13</sup> Tbid., p. 267.

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on 19 April 1941.

The President said...just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to keep them popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing. This, of course, is right down the State Department's alley. To my mind a lot of State Department's suggestions and recommendations are nothing less than childish (don't quote me) and I have practically said so in so many words in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going...we did keep them on a flank to be in position to go to work or to retire if something broke...

Now when the question of "popping up everywhere" came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President: "How about going North?" He said: "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere."

The Chief of Naval Operations had the carte blanche he wanted from the President. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy he described a "project for carrying out the directive by the President for a northern cruise by units of the Pacific Fleet." The plan was timed to take place a few days after Matsucka arrived in Tokyo from his Berlin visit. One carrier, one cruiser division, one destroyer squadron and a tanker were to maneuver off Attu, to inform the U.S.S.R. of the maneuvers and to request the visit of a few cruisers and a destroyer division to Petropavlovsk. The carrier and the remainder of the ships were to stay in the Aleutians during the visit. The visiting ships were to rejoin the carrier group and visit Kiska, Unalaska, and Kodiak before returning to Hawaii. On the day of arrival at Petropavlovsk the American Ambassador would inform the Japanese of the visit and "that it does not reflect on our relations." If the U.S.S.R. refused permission to visit, the plan was to be executed without the Russian visit. The motive was to influence Japanese policy.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2163.

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The trend of Japanese policy at the moment appears less aggressive than it was up to about two months ago. Japan has apparently not yet reached a decision concerning further moves to the south, even into Indo-China. The Japanese will probably have extended discussions as to future policy after Matsucka returns. Within two weeks after his return we may be able to discover what decisions they have reached. The effect of the proposed northern cruise upon the Japanese ought to be carefully considered before the cruise starts. It might accelerate the present recession from their previous aggressive attitude. On the other hand, they might view such a cruise as an open threat, and might become more than ever determined to stick to the Axis and proceed with the southern program....Please note that the force recommended for this demonstration is considerably greater than was suggested by the President. It is a real striking force, operating in an area well situated to cause concern to a people which might fear bombing raids. Because it is stronger, and because of the necessity for a concurrent diplomatic effort, you will doubtless wish the President to re-examine the project ... When you subsequently take this up with Mr. Hull, I suggest you ask that the least possible number of persons in the State Department learn of it. You will recall that three or four times recently matters under discussion by the State and Navy Departments have promptly found their way to one or the other of two pairs of newspaper columnists. If this project be approved, we want, so far as possible, to insure no leak.15

The northern cruise never took place because, as Admiral Stark had hoped, it was vetoed by the State Department. Admiral Stark continued his letter to Admiral Kimmel quoted supra.

Northern cruise; I thought for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might make them haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many good points. It still conforms to the flank, and a detachment on an occasional sortie up in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can see what a striking force of the composition I gave you, and known to the Japs, would mean to them, in view of their unholy fear of bombing. This striking detachment would have been right in position for

Memo: CNO to Secretary of Navy, 7 April 1941; NHD File: Director WPD Special File.

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most anything.

I had a broad inward smile when the State Department in effect said; "Please Mr. President, don't let him do it"; or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them. 10

There were no more visits by groups of naval ships after the Australian cruise. Admiral Stark had won his point. Fear that the President might succumb to suggestions to send ships to visit Singapore was gone and the policy not to divide naval forces and to keep a strong group on the flank of any southern movement by the Japanese remainded as the deterrent threat. Stark would be ready to move addition ships to the Atlantic on entry of the United States in war, since Germany, and not Japan, was the primary enemy.

## Japanese naval visits to American controlled ports.

In Cham the Japanese were allowed to operate a very old transport, the MARIANA MARU, in the copra trade during the depression years. Since the administration of the island was a responsibility of the Navy, the Governor of Guam sought Navy Department authority to terminate the privileges of entry on September 30, 1938, the expiration date of the current permit. The Governor had information that upon renewal of permission of entry authorization, the Japanese planned to replace the MARIANA MARU with a bigger more modern transport and to ask that the entry privilege be transferred to the newer vessel. At that time the Hepburn Board, appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to investigate and make recommendations on air and naval base needs, was looking at Guam as a future bastion in the Pacific.

In a July 28, 1938 letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy reviewed the Guam situation in the light of Japanese visits and defense

<sup>16</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2164.

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needs and suggested action by the State Department.

For your information, the Executive Order of September 23, 1912, to which reference is made in paragraph 4 of the Governor's letter, states that Guam is not, and that it shall not be made, a subport of entry for foreign vessels of commerce, and that said harbor shall not be visited by any commercial or privately owned vessel of foreign registry; nor by any foreign national vessel, except by special authority of the United States Navy Department in each case...

In view of present developments as reported in the inclosure, the Navy Department is approving the recommendation of the Governor to rewoke the privilege of entry of the MARIANA MARU when the term of her current permission expires.

It is therefore suggested that the Japanese Ambassador be informed that no action on his request to replace the MARIANA MARU appears to be necessary since the Navy Department has recently decided to close Guam to the entry of all vessels of foreign registry, and that pursuant to this decision the temporary privileges of entry previously granted the MARIANA MARU are to be revoked on the expiration date of the current permission September 30, 1938.17

Ironically, the first step in the improvement of Guam as a base, a bill to authorize dredging Apra Harbor, failed to pass in Congress. There was almost nothing of military interest in Guam. In the Hawaiian Islands the attempts by the Navy to close ports other than Honolulu were not so successful. Visits by naval vessels of Japan to the ports of Hilo, Hawaii and Honolulu, Cahu were a cause for much alarm among the intelligence and security officers in the Hawaiian Islands. The largest foreign ethnic group in the islands were Japanese and the occasion of visits by Japanese ships were usually festive with deliberate programs to promote goodwill on the part of the Japanese Navy and the local Japanese citizens. Numerous instances of photographing of facilities, measuring piers and buildings and exchange of packages were observed by American personnel. In Hilo lack of customs and immigration officials made the problems of control even worse.

<sup>17</sup> Letter: Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, EGEL/L21-1, 28 July 1938; NHD File: CNO July 1938.

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The concern over Japanese visits to the Hawaiian Islands was not solely a naval officer's phobia. As far back as August 10, 1936, the Commander in Chief expressed himself in very positive language:

One obvious thought occurs to me — that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with their officers or men should secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.

As I told you verbally today, I think a Joint Board should consider and adopt plans relating to the Japanese population of all the Islands. Decision should be made as to whether the Island of Hawaii could or should be defended against landing parties. From my personal observation I should say off-hand that it would be extraordinarily difficult, as the Island is quite far from Oahu. The chief objective should be to prevent its occupation as a base of operations against Oahu and other islands. 18

In October 1939 the visit of a Japanese Training Squadron to Hilo,
Hawaii generated a new request from the Navy to close ports in Hawaii other
than Honolulu to visiting foreign ships. Among the irregularities during the
visit were the posting of an armed sentry on the dock and the abuse of mail
privileges. The Secretary of State's reply referred to a discussion at an
inter-Departmental committee meeting in November 1937, when it was decided to
make a recommendation to the President as follows: "the State Department to
consider, in consultation with the Navy Department, withholding from Japanese
public vessels permission to visit ports in the Hawaiian Islands other than
Honolulu."

This Department is of the opinion that the recommendation of the Navy Department, if affirmatively acted upon at the present time, might adversely affect the relations between our naval forces in China waters and the Japanese Navy and might be prejudicial to the efforts of our naval forces to

<sup>18</sup> Memo: President Roosevelt to Chief of Naval Operations, 10 August 1936; NHD File: A8/Intelligence.

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render protection to American interests in China during the continuance of the current hostilities in so far as such relations and such efforts are dependent upon the good-will of the Japanese Navy...

In the circumstances this Department inclines to the view that the present would not seem to be an opportune time to put into effect the recommendation under consideration. However, should the Navy Department still consider that in the interest of national defense its recommendation should be adopted, this Department would be disposed to agree in principle provided that it was made applicable to the government vessels of all foreign countries. 19

Further discussions on the subject took place between Admiral Stark, General Marshall and Mr. Welles of the State Department. On June 28, 1940 General Marshall recommended, and Admiral Stark concurred, "that the Department of State, when presented with future requests from foreign governments for permission for their public vessels to visit ports in the Territory of Hawaii other than Honolulu, will reply that such visits are inconvenient." In identical letters to the War and Navy Departments on July 5, 1940 the State Department reiterated its position.

The Department of State is doubtful whether, apart from the legality of such action in time of peace, it would be practicable from the standpoint of policy to close open ports in the Territory of Hawaii to visits of peaceful foreign merchant ships even though it may be suspected that their primary purpose in making such visits is other than commercial. The Department of State ventures to suggest, however, that the wide police powers accorded to the United States Customs authorities by the Presidential Proclamation issued June 27, 1940 under the authority of Section 191, Title 50, of the United States Code may afford the opportunity to institute routine safeguards which would seriously hinder any propaganda activities in the Hawaiian Islands. The War and Navy Departments may care to consult in this connection with the appropriate officials in the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department. 20

<sup>19</sup>Letter: Secretary of State to Secretary of Navy, 21 February 19LO; NA:894.3311/610.

<sup>20</sup> Letter: Secretary of State to Acting Secretary of the Navy, 5 July 1910; Ibid.

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A letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, which encompassed the Territory of Hawaii in March 1941, is the last evidence in the Navy files of the final position of the Navy relative to visits to Hilo.

The Navy Department does not desire at this time to recommend to the Department of State that the government vessels of all foreign countries be excluded from all ports in the Hawaiian area except Honolulu...When it appears in individual cases that the visits of Japanese public vessels to Hilo will not be agreeable, the State Department will be so informed and Honolulu or some other port will be suggested as an alternate port of call. 21

The National Archives files do not show further request to visit Hilo or other Hawaii ports after this date. Thus, in effect, the Japanese solved the problem by using their ships to better advantage elsewhere.

(Visits of Japanese ships to west coast ports will be discussed in the next Chapter in conjunction with a discussion of the oil embargo.)

In retrospect the value of the ship visits by the American and Japanese Navies in the period prior to World War II pales into insignificance.

Neither the good will derived from American visits to Japan nor the indication of solidarity with New Zealand and Australia by visits there noticeably affected Japanese policy toward the United States. Japanese visits to Hawaii had certain military advantages, but post war analysis showed that most military intelligence work in Hawaii was by trained military personnel working in the area. Japanese naval attempts to weaken the Japanese-American loyalty to the United States failed miserably. Japan did have one

<sup>21</sup> Letter: CNO to Commandant lith Naval District, 26 March 1941; NHD File: CNO A4-5(1)/EF12.

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big success: that of keeping American ships out of the Mandated Islands, the one place where visits were most desired.

In this study the significance of the visits was not so much that which was gained, but the relationships between the State Department and the Navy Department over what steps should be followed. The State Department was not willing to risk a crisis to force the Japanese to give permission to visit their islands to verify suspicions of illegal fortifications. On the other hand, the State Department did not want to close our ports in Hawaii other than Honolulu to Japanese visits for fear of repercussions in China, where the safety of Americans and their interests depended on the tenuous good will of the Japanese. From the Navy point of view. it was a frustrating time. It could not get support in their own government to penetrate the restrictive wall around the Mandated Islands, and it could not restrict Japanese activities by denying ports in Hawaii. \* Admiral Stark's planning of the northern cruise to force a change in State Department suggestions on the use of American naval ships for visits is indicative of the lack of harmonious cooperation between the two departments. Fortunately for national strategy, the visits by both Navies played a minor role.

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#### CHAPTER EIGHT

#### THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN THE MMRARGO OF OIL TO JAPAN

Two of the major prerequisites to any war machine are steel and petroleum and in both categories Japan since its modernization depended heavily upon imports. The necessity for oil in modern warfare encompasses the needs for aviation gasoline and lubricants, fuel oil for ships, gasoline for land vehicles and the various forms of oil used in the civilian economy which supports the war machine. Approximately eighty per cent of Japan's crude oil and refined stocks in the early 1930's was imported from the United States and from those imports Japan began to accumulate an oil reserve for war. By 1939 that reserve had grown to a peak of 55,000,000 barrels. With a subsequently reduced oil reserve Japan went to war with the United States and "it is highly probable that the aircraft which attacked Pearl Harbor and the carriers which transported them across the Pacific operated on American fuel."

The heavy use of petroleum products in the Sino-Japanese War cut into the reserved oil. Only an increase in volume of imports would allow the reserve to be maintained and, of course, to build up the reserve in the face of increased use required an even larger volume of imports. Reports of the startling demands made for accelerated imports reached the State Department in June and July 1940. France recently had fallen and Britain was fighting for her existence. Did the increased demands for oil portend a Japanese move

Oil in Japan's War, Report of the Oil and Chemical Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (a copy in MHD Files), p. 11; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 263.

<sup>2011</sup> in Japan's War, op. cit., p. 1.

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he rejected suggestions that he advocate to the President the cutting of Japanese exports to their normal dimensions. Perhaps Mr. Hull remembered the words of warning of Ambassador Grew to President Roosevelt in 1939:
"I...said that if we cut off Japanese supplies of oil and that if Japan then finds that she cannot obtain sufficient oil from other commercial sources to ensure national security, she will in all probability send her fleet down to take the Dutch East Indies."

On the day Hull left for the Havana meeting the President conferred with Stimson, Knox and Welles on a proposal passed to him by Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau. The proposal had been suggested in part by Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador, who had discussed the matter with Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau and the Australian Minister at a dinner party the previous evening.

This was the plan: The United States was, on the ground of national defense, to stop all exports of oil; Britain was to get all its oil from the Caribbean area; Britain was to arrange with the Dutch government to destroy the oil wells in the Indies; and, finally, it was to concentrate bombing attacks on the synthetic oil plants in Germany. Where then, and how, would Japan and Germany get oil for war?

Welles, who objected to an embarge against Japan because he believed that it "would cause Japan to make war on Great Britain, ... "entered into a series of consultations with the President and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations." A ban on oil might force the Japanese to make a decision about

Feis, op. cit., p. 89. Ibid., p. bl.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

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going into the Indies and Welles doubted that the American people were ready to support a counter military move. He thought he had impressed the President with his arguments, and, from later evidence, he most probably had Stark's support.

Other members of the Cabinet were much more prone to take a firm stand against Japan. The "hard line element" of Morgenthau, Stimson and Knox actually succeeded in getting the President to sign a proclamation on July 25 to establish export controls over all kinds of oil and scrap metals. Welles and "his worried subordinates" in the Far Eastern Division were disturbed on learning of the President's move, because they feared that the embarge would "provoke a crimis with Japan sooner or later, and probably sooner." Welles argued his case again and managed to persuade the President to issue a State Department version of a control proclamation "to make clear the proclamation of July 25." That version applied export controls only to "aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap."

The term "aviation motor fuel" was further defined in the Presidential Proclamation of July 26, 1940 as: "high octane gasolines, hydrocarbons, and hydrocarbon mixtures which, with the addition of tetraethyl lead up to a total content of 3 c.c. per gallon will exceed 87 octane mumber, or any material from which by commercial distillation there can be separated more than 3 per cent of such gasoline, hydrocarbon, or hydrocarbon mixture." The question of circumventing the restriction on petroleum exports based on octane level became the center of controversy between those who viewed the

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 90-91. 7 Ibid., pp. 92-93.

Memo: Commander McCollum to Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 November 1940; NHD File: CNO Lll-4/EF 37.

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proclamation as a minimum move in the right direction and who wanted "tight" control and those who viewed the proclamation as a guide to maximum limits of control egainst Japan.

Within the Navy were many officers who wanted the export controls rigidly enforced by applying restrictions to all fuels which could be made to serve as aviation fuel through the use of additives and/or further distillation. The one section of the Navy Department best informed on efforts to circumvent the octane limits and who were anxious to restrict the Japanese efforts to increase their reserve was the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence informed the Chief of Naval Operations:

l. Information from highly reliable sources has reached this office regarding negotiations being carried on between the Associated Oil Co., Standard Oil Co. of California, and Japanese oil interests which appear to be aimed at circumventing the export on aviation gaseline.

2. Specifically, it appears that Japanese interests are now able to obtain not only Kettleman fuel oil, but a special blend of crude from Kettleman rated at 89 octane. The U.S. oil companies concerned are negotiating with the Japanese interests to supply this special 89 octane crude against outstanding large orders for 97 octane, 92 hi-octane, and 87 octane fuel. It is contemplated that by suitable leading of this special blend with ethyl, practically all Japanese requirements for high octane fuel can be met regardless of export control. Whether or not this "special blend" is a commercial grade, or a blend developed for the above outlined purpose, is not known from information at hand.

By using the special blend of <u>crude</u> oil, which was not restricted, the Japanese could meet their gasoline needs.

Records do not indicate what, if anything, Admiral Stark did or thought about the specific information on circumvention, but four days later the

Memo: Director of Naval Intelligence to CNO, 26 August 1940; NWID File: CNO JJ7 1941.

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Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Walter Stratton Anderson wrote directly to the Secretary of the Navy with a earbon copy to CNO and Naval Aids to the President. After reviewing the circumvention techniques being worked out by certain American oil companies with the Japanese, Admiral Anderson continued:

An official of an oil company, which has proved itself cooperative with government policies, has made the suggestion that the desired degree of embargo against Japan can be made air-tight and defeat such schemes as the foregoing if the following two conditions are met:

First, for the proper governmental authorities, presumably the State and Treasury Departments, to set forth exactly what degree of embargo they desire to enforce.

Second, qualified commercial oil experts could then implement this policy by writing the necessary rules with the proper technical specifications to make the policy really binding....

While the Navy is not charged with primary responsibility in connection with the enforcement of any embargo, such embargo is definitely of Navy interest, and it is believed the Departments charged with enforcing the embargo would welcome suggestions from the Navy in the premises.

The memorandum from Admiral Anderson was dually significant. First, it stated a position for the Navy, namely, that since the embarge of oil was of interest to the Navy, the Navy was ready to give suggestions on how better to enforce that embarge. The feeling expressed by the head of Naval Intelligence was not shared by the military head of the Navy, which probably accounts for the direct correspondence with the Secretary. It was quite "legal" for Admiral Anderson so to correspond, but it was not the accepted procedure. The second significance of the memorandum concerns its treatment after Secretary Knox received it. Not only was Knox in agreement with the suggestions contained in the subject memorandum, he wanted to share them with the leader

Memo: Director of Naval Intelligence to Sec. Navy, 30 August 1940;

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of the "hard-line" group, Secretary Morgenthau. Attached to the memorandum is an undated pencilled note from the Office of the Secretary of the Navy which reads:

Jim, presumably James Forrestal, Under-Secretary of the Mavy/
Take this up with Henry Morgenthau early next week.

Ask Adm Anderson for a copy of letter he has on this subject & give that to H.M. also.

/s/ F.K. 11

Obviously part of the Navy favored tight controls.

One of the first indications of the feelings of the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of embargo of oil to Japan was contained in a letter of September 24, 1940 to Admiral Richardson, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours in the State Department yesterday—something over two in the morning with Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agreement with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could....

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State Department is in concurrence. I believe Mr. Hall brought it up to get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement with me. 12

Stark was in the camp of Welles and certainly not that of Morgenthau.

If Stark did not like the look of things on September 24, he would like them less three days later. On September 27, the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy was signed, leaving little doubt that the United

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, p. 961.

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States would eventually fight Japan. A clash was possible if the United States in support of Britain against her opponent Germany encountered the Japanese in support of Germany against Britain. Fear that the new formal alliance was a prelude to a Japanese move against Singapore or the Indies prompted many discussions in Washington. Within the State Department, one faction, including Hornbeck and Norman Davis, stood for further use at once of American economic power as a deterrent, while Hamilton and his associates in the Far Eastern Division advised otherwise -- unless the United States was prepared for war. Morganthau, Stimson and Ickes wanted to lower the octane levels of exports, and in the Navy, though Knox still seemed inclined to use pressure. Stark and his admirals said that the Navy was not ready for war. Meanwhile the Dutch were asking the State Department to refrain from actions which would increase Japanese pressure against the Indies. Stimson's suggestion of sending a flying squadron of warships to the Indies to deter Japanese actions was strongly opposed by Admirals Stark and Richardson. The Navy was in no state of readiness to oppose Japanese action in the Dutch East Indies.

A naval intelligence report on November 2 showed that despite the licensing of exports since July, the aviation gasoline exports to Japan jumped to a new height two months later. Department of Commerce figures for exports to Japan in barrels read:

	Aviation Gasoline	Other Gasoline
July	40,938	119,277
August	8,540	283,550
September	115,051	h3h,28h 13

<sup>13</sup>Memo: Commander McCollum to Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 November
1940; NHD File: CNO Lll-4/EF 37.

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The intelligence report continued:

The Division of Controls (State Department) informs us that while the Commerce Department figures are accurate they are based upon the presumption that any gasoline suitable for use or actually used in aeroplanes is "aviation" gasoline; the Controls Office uses a stricter definition in terms of octans count. It is recognized in that office that a very large proportion of the gasoline now being sent to Japan is actually used in planes and can be stepped up by "boosters" to high octane count. It is also stated that the question is essentially political insefar as the Controls Office is, under instructions, following a lenient policy designed to appears Japan and relieve the Netherlands East Indies of pressure. The Comphasis mine.)

Under the circumstances the State Department had little choice. The Navy was reductant to deploy forces to the Far East and was not ready to fight Japan. Tight restriction might force Japan to take the alternate source of supply. Lenient policy might buy some time to prepare for war.

In the setting of the Fall of 1940 President Roosevelt received advice from every quarter on actions against Japan. Into the hopper of suggestions Admiral Stark dropped one of the more important analyses of the international situation and the courses of action which the United States could follow. It was his Plan Dog, which proposed American military support to Britain to defeat Cermany and if forced to fight in the Pacific against Japan, to fight a defensive war using economic restrictions to limit the Japanese. The economic measures were to be used in a war. Stark looked upon the embargo of oil to Japan as an unnecessary risk of war where he wanted no war until Cermany was defeated.

While Stark was working out his Flan Dog memorandum, the British were active again in attempting to get United States cooperation against Japan.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

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Lord Lothian on November 1 asked the American Government to join the
British Dominions and Empire "in limiting the total export to Japan of all
essential goods to what could be considered 'normal' amounts." Later in
the month the question of restricting oil exports boiled up again. On
November 20 the British sent a long memorandum entitled "Japanese Oil
Situation" which reviewed in detail their intelligence on the matter. The
key to the figures in the papers relative to the reserve of Japanese oil were
based on the United States Navy's estimate of consumption for the last three
years. The British were of the opinion, based on their war experience, that
the estimate of consumption was too high. They made a specific point

...to inform the U.S. Government that if, on reconsideration, the U.S. Navy were to lower their estimates of consumption, H.M.C. took the view that the only reliable means of dealing with the very undesirable situation inherent in further accumulation of stocks by the Japanese would be by a joint policy designed to curtail Japanese chartering of foreign flag tankers...Our policy is not to cut Japan off from supplies but to co-operate with the U.S. Government in restricting by the least provocative means, Japanese imports of oil now going forward at a rate for which there is no commercial justification.

The offer had merit but Hull insisted that any action which might provoke the Japanese was unwise unless the British and American forces in the Far East were stronger. The senior admirals of the Navy were saying the Navy was not ready. "Hull and Admiral Stark, to whom the British proposals were primarily directed, let them rest." Stark had already proposed joint discussions with the British to arrive at a better basis of possible future operations together.

Although the British Government "accepted the decision" of Hull and Stark,

<sup>15</sup> Feis, op. cit., p. 136.

<sup>16</sup> Memo: "Japanese Oil Situation," dated 20 November 1940, Enclosure (A) to letter: Rear Admiral Chormley to CNO, 11 February 1941; NHD File: CNO JJ7/EF37-JJ7-3/EF37.

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according to Herbert Feis, there was another attempt to get consideration on their memorandum on the "Japanese Oil Situation." A copy of the paper was given to Rear Admiral Chormley, the Special Naval Observer in London, who forwarded it to the Chief of Naval Operations.

- 3. Please note Paragraph 14, Enclosure (A), [the subject memorandum] that the proposals contained herein were presented to the State Department on November 20th, 1940, but no reply from the State Department has yet been received.
- 4. In view of present conditions in the Far East, it is recommended that the suggestions contained herein be given careful consideration as a possible deterrent to Japan becoming engaged in war at this time. 10

Chormley did not know that the suggestions had been carefully considered by Hull and Stark and shelved.

Discussions within the Cabinet and the State Department through the following months concentrated on freezing Japan's American assets and further restrictions on oil. In the meanwhile Japanese imports of gasoline and crude oils from which aviation gasoline could be obtained continued to increase. State Department estimates in April 1941 were that the Japanese would receive from the United States and the Butch East Indies 12 million barrels during that year or three times the normal amount.

Despite Admiral Stark's feeling on embargo of oil, Japanese practices in the procurement of oil on the west coast could not continue without comment to the State Department. For each Japanese naval ship visit to United States ports permission was obtained from the State Department by the Japanese Government. The State Department always advised the Navy Department and

<sup>17</sup> Feis, op. cit., p. 136.

<sup>18</sup> Letter: RADM Chormley to CNO, op. cit., nl6 supra.

<sup>19</sup> Feis, op. cit., p. 199 nlo.

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requested comment. In April the Secretary of the Navy informed the Secretary of State that the Navy Department had no objection to a proposed Japanese ship visit, but called attention to the recent frequency of naval visits.

...a total of twelve Japanese naval vessels will have obtained a cargo of oil from the United States within a period of six months, five of these within a period of sixty days.

Certain of the vessels now listed as naval vessels have made previous similar trips in their original status as commercial vessels. It appears more than probable that their current naval status has been devised to bestow upon them, and upon their obvious purposes, a degree of immunity which a commercial vessel could scarcely command.

It is suggested that the frequency of such visits is, to say the least, umusual; and a matter regarding which it is considered that some restrictive policy would be a timely precaution to prevent the abuse of international courtesy in a manner which appears contrary to the best interests of the United States.<sup>20</sup>

The fact that the frequency of the visits had increased to one naval tanker every ten days 21 through February and March was disturbing enough, but the abuse of designating commercial vessels as naval vessels was more than the Naval Intelligence Division cared to tolerate. The courtesies of the port allowed too much freedom to the crew for the many facets of espionage work and to accord commercial vessels the honors due to men of war was highly unpalatable. On the recommendation of the Director of Naval Intelligence the Secretary of the Navy informed the Secretary of State on Nay 23:

Although the matter was not pressed during the previous visit of the KOKUYO MARU to San Francisco April 18, to April 21, the Navy Department is unable to

Letter: Sec. Navy to Sec. State, 3 April 1941; NHD File: CNO A4-5(2)

<sup>21</sup> Letter: Sec. Navy to Sec. State, Serial 07813, 15 April 1941; NHD File: GNO A4-5(3)/EF37.

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identify the KOKUYO MARU as a bona fide vessel of the Japanese Navy and it is therefore in some doubt as to the interpretation of the courtesies and facilities which are requested. When a bona fide man-of-war visits a port it is courtesy and custom that the name of the commanding officer be furnished. However the request in this case specifically states that the senior officer on board is an inspector, and in no way indicates that the ship is under his command. In view of this unusual situation the Navy Department would appreciate some application of the exact status of the ship. If she is merely an oil cargo ship aboard which has been placed a naval inspector, the Navy Department fails to see any reason why she should be accorded the privileges, immunities and courtesies which would be accorded with pleasure to any recognized ship of the Japanese Navy.

If, under these anomalous circumstances, the KOKUYO MARU enters Los Angeles as a merchant ship subject to all applicable regulations the matter is beyond the cognizance of the Navy Department. Should the Japanese Government insist that the ship is entitled to the courtesies and privileges of a bona-fide man-of-war, the Navy Department does not consider such requests as legitimate and recommends that in this case, and all subsequent similar cases, the Japanese Government be informed that the visit

is not convenient, 22

The Navy would not have to concern itself about Japanese naval tankers for many more months. On June 20 due to an actual domestic scarcity on the east coast and as a move against the Axis Powers, oil exports from the east coast were restricted to the British Empire, the British forces in Egypt and the Western Hemisphere. Arguments within the Cabinet over restricting oil exports from both coasts resulted in Secretary Ickes resigning. Stark and Welles had delayed again cutting off oil to Japan. In July the tempo quickened. Japan was poised to acquire additional bases in Indo-China. On the direction of the President Acting Secretary of State Welles informed British Ambassador Halifax that "If Japan now took any overt step through force or through the exercise of pressure to conquer or to acquire alien

Letter: Sec. Navy to Sec. State, Serial Ol1813, 23 May 1911; NND File: Ibid.

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territories in the Far East, the Government of the United States would immediately impose various embargoes, both economic and financial..."

The showdown on the embargo question grew near.

Among those with whom the Fresident conferred on the oil embarge was Admiral Stark. Stark described his feeling to Welles in a letter afterwards.

The latter part of last week the President asked my reaction to an embargo on a number of commodities to Japan. I expressed the same thought to him which I have expressed to you and to Mr. Hull regarding oil, but as to the subject in general I would be glad to have War Plans Division make a quick study. This study was finished yesterday. I sent it to the President and told his Aide I should also like to send a copy to Mr. Hull, which I have done; and to talk it over with you. 24

The "Study of the Effect of an Embargo of Trade between the United States and Japan" was prepared by the War Plans Division (OP 16) under the direction of Rear Admiral Turner. It read in part as follows:

It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result .... Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months war operations. Export restrictions of oil by the United States should be accompanied by similar restrictions by the British and Dutch.... An embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course. Aurthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measure against the British and Dutch, she would also include military action against the Philippines. which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war.... An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan on Malaya and the Metherlands Bast Indies, and

<sup>23</sup> Feis, op. cit., p. 227.

Letter: CNO to Mr. Welles, 22 July 1941; NA 894.24/1498 1/2; (2) Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 5, p. 2382.

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possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific....Recommendation: That trade with Japan not be embarged at this time.25

On the copy of Admiral Turner's study sent to the President, Stark wrote "I concur in general. Is this the kind of picture you wanted?"

The President does not appear to have headed the evaluations of Turner or Stark. His actions in ordering a freeze of Japanese assets on 25 July after the Japanese entered southern Indo-China showed that he was less worried about immediate Japanese reaction against the United States than were his military advisers. As long as Britain stood, he thought, the Japanese would not enter the war, because they did not want to fight the British Empire and the United States together.

The Navy through the period of embargo considerations was divided. The Secretary of the Navy and certain officers below the senior admirals were for tight controls or even complete embargo. The Chief of Naval Operations, who had the advantage of personal contact with the President and who agreed with the President's trusted Mr. Welles, opposed actions which would result in war with Japan. To the very end Stark held his position, so wrapped up in the problems of the Atlantic that he veered away from any action which would commit his limited ships to the Far Mast against Japan. Stark accepted the calculated risk of allowing one very potential enemy to build up huge petroleum reserves in order to keep peace in one ocean while defeating an enemy considered more dangerous in another ocean.

Letter: Director, War Plans Division to CNO, 19 July 1941; MHD File: All-Al5.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 5, pp. 2382-2384.

Peis, op. cit., p. 24.

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## CHAPTER NINE

THE ROLE OF THE HAVY IN THE DETERRENT STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

## Introduction.

There are generally two roles for naval and military forces in a democratic nation. First, the ultimate function of any military force is to wage war, and the ability of a democratic state to muster its manpower and productive capacity to form a successful war machine when necessary is one of the prerequisites of national survival. A short step from the ultimate use of force is the second function -- the effect of military capability in foreign relations. The diplomat who negotiates without actual or potential force behind him, negotiates from a weak position. If circumstances are such that his opponent has decidedly superior actual and potential force, that opponent may with impunity ignore or reject any proposals or agreements. The democratic state, not choosing to field large military forces unnecessarily, usually seeks by a combination of existing military force, diplomacy, economic pressure and cooperation with other like-minded powers to deter any aggression or acts by other powers in violation of principles or national interests. In broadest terms, then, the strategie thinking which is a major component of international relations in a modern democracy is based on a deterrant concept.

From a vantage point bought with time, one can see in American politics in the Pacific a definite pattern of strategic thinking before Pearl Harbor.

For moral and commercial reasons the United States took on almost a paternalistic national attitude toward China in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the same period various island groups with potential bases were acquired. For reasons already discussed, decisions were made not

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to build strong bases and support a large fleet in the Orient. The substitute for naval force to back the Open Door Policy was moral influence and diplomatic agreement among the commercial powers in the area. Implicitly behind the agreements in China, but not formally committed to use, was the collective military potential of the participants.

An indication of the precarious balance of forces in the deterrent arrangement in the Orient was seen during World War I. Japan, with little hesitation, made her Twenty-one Demands after most of the European naval forces were withdrawn and attention was centered in Europe. Subsequently, the provisions for naval limitations and the non-fortification of Pacific islands in the Washington Treaty, and the agreements to recognize national rights and China's integrity, in the Four Power and Nine Power Treaties, respectively, aimed at deterring future aggression by agreements only. Japan obviously was not deterred by the existing arrangement from taking military action in Manchuria in 1931. The absence of effective Occidental military forces in the Orient and the international unwillingness to use collective economic or military action blessed the Japanese move. An opposite situation relative to the forces or collective action most probably would have deterred Japan from the Manchurian move.

As Japanese, German and Italian military might increased rapidly in the mid-1930's, the American diplomats found themselves in progressively weaker positions. The potential power of the United States was still greater than any of the militants, but that power was not being charmeled into war machinery. The existing Army was at a low ebb and the Navy was not up to treaty strength. The actual and relative military power at hand in the Axis Powers gave them a terrifying advantage. There should be no wonder that

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Cordell Hull "should be 'plugging' for a bigger Navy" in 1936.

Against Japanese naval strength, their strong Army and the propensity to use their forces to gain objectives in the Orient the Navy and State Department representatives had the weak Asiatic Fleet, the presence of the United States Fleet at Hawaii and economic pressures. Though the areas, times and degrees of use varied, the two main forces used to deter Japan from using her localized advantage against United States' interests and assumed responsibilities were naval and economic. The problem facing the American strategists was how to deter the Japanese from expanding southward into Into-China and especially the Dutch East Indies using the relatively weak forces available. The problem intensified after the decision to concentrate American effort in the Atlantic to defeat Germany first.

## Proposals to deter Japan by increasing Far Eastern naval strength.

The history of the Asiatic Fleet, its mission to protect American nationals and their property and its role in tempering Japanese actions adversely affecting American interests have already been discussed. The effectiveness of the Asiatic Fleet as a deterrent was derived not from the strength of the fleet itself but from what it represented, namely, a country capable of drastic economic reprisals and additional naval action. If the decision were made by the Japanese to risk the American use of either or both of the underlying sources of potential power, the naval forces on station in the Orient would be sadly inadequate in every respect. This fact had been recognized clearly since Mahan.

Hull, op. cit., p. 457.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Cf. Chapter Six, supra.

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In 1938 the Hepburn Board, reviewing the future needs of the Navy, specially recommended "adequate air and submarine protection securely based on Guam" to make that island "secure against anything short of a major effort on the part of any probable enemy." If the use of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor "on the flank of any Japanese move to the south" served Stimson as a deterrent against Japan in 1932, would not a secure base at Guam to which units of the United States Fleet might deploy to operate thousands of miles closer to Japan and "which would provide for the security of the Asiatic Fleet in time of sudden emergency" be even more deterring? The Japanese definitely thought so earlier. The removal of the threat of a fortified Guam was sine qua non to their acceptance of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922. For many reasons Congressmen did not approve the Apra Harbor improvement bill which was the first step in building up the base at Guam in 1939. In retrospect, a defended Guam would have strengthened considerably the Orange and Rainbow 5 War Plans, most probably would have served as a stronger deterrent than the fleet in Hawaii and quite possibly would have received the same treatment meted out at Pearl Harbor.

Coincidentially, days before the Hepburn Beard Report was published,

Admiral Yarnell in a personal letter informed Admiral Leahy, the Chief of

Naval Operations, of his views of problems in the Pacific. Admiral Leahy by

memorandum passed extracts of Yarnell's letter to President Roosevelt.

Yarnell's recommendations were:

Retter: Statutory Board on Submarine, Destroyer, Mine and Naval Air Bases, 1938; (Hepburn Board Report); 1 December 1938, p. 66; NHD File: Hepburn Board.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Latter, Statistics, Statistics, Sales and Sales and Statistics of Marie and Statistics of Marie and Statistics and Statistics

3. a. An announcement to Japan that the United States, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands East Indies, that [violations of the Nine Fower] Treaty will not be recognized.

b. No money to be loaned to Japan by any of the

signatory powers.

c. Prohibition of shipment of war material to Japan.

- d. Strengthening of Pacific and Guam specifically.
  - 1. Decided increase of Army and Navy aviation in the Pacific.
  - 2. Increase of submarine force.
  - 3. Increase of base facilities.

h. Increase of AA defense.

- 5. Base an increased number of heavy cruisers on Hawaii.
- e. The other nations to increase their forces accordingly and to take similar measures.

f. For every note written, there should be some

increase of our strength in the Far East.

h. It is only by such means that respect will be gained for our diplomatic efforts. Japan at present is in a dangerous position with respect to her...military men in China who must be supplied from overseas. Any threat against this line of communications by a competent and ample force...will have a profound effect on her attitude of mind regarding the settlement of the present controversy.

Most of Admiral Tarnell's suggestions were adopted, but generally too late in 1941 to deter the Japanese.

Another Admiral who used the Chief of Naval Operations as a pipeline to the President during this period was Admiral Richardson. He was very concerned about the inadequacy of American preparedness to act alone in the Far East against Japan. "When the China Incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as Asst. C.N.O. I used to say to Bill Leahy, Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to [be] drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the

Memo: William D. Leahy to the President, 15 December 1938; Roosevelt Papers, Secretary's Files; I Dip. Correspondence, 1933-37, 1939-41, Box 11. FDR Memorial Library.

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on September 1, 1939 the War Flans Division was concerned over Japanese moves "in the event that England and France enter war with Germany" and recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations "that the United States take such immediate steps as may be practicable to provide a deterrent effect against such aggressive measures by Japan."

Later, in December, the War Plans Division was more specific in its recommendations. The Dutch East Indies were particularly vulnerable to Japanese demands since England and France were fully occupied in Europe and the Netherlands "are so exposed to German pressure."

Consideration is therefore recommended as to whather or not we should strengthen our military position in that area before Spring in order to serve as some additional deterrent to further Japanese expansion plans, and possibly to make more forceful the efforts of the State Department in that direction. Specifically, consideration is recommended as to the advisability and practicability of increasing, without delay and certainly before Spring, our Army Air Force in the Philippines and possibly its garrison, with an increase of at least one squadron of Navy patrol planes to make more effective such an Army augmentation.

(Written at the bottom of the memorandum: "Discussed in Joint Board meeting--no action taken as Army could not comply.")?

Since the Army was incapable of reenforcing the Far East forces, the Navy studied actions which it could take alone. On learning that the Japanese Navy intended to move into the Dutch East Indies in May 1940, Captain Grenshaw of War Plans Division suggested that the Navy discuss with the State

Fearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, p. 924.

Memo: War Plans Division to CND, 1 September 1939; NHB File: Al6/Mobilia-tion.

<sup>7</sup>Memo: Captain Crenshaw to Admiral Stark, 9 December 1939; NHD File: EA-EZ.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Home Christin Dennium to stated there's 9 Incomes 1930s and Tiles

Department and the President the interesting possibility of the United States

Fleet sending a division of OMAHA class cruisers to the Indies to make

similar moves. 8 Captain Schuirmann, Liaison Officer with the State Department.

Discussed with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton, Chief of Far Eastern Division, the proposal that, if Japan sends a small occupation force for protection of Dutch East Indies we send a similiar (Sic) force, - and the variant of the same idea, i.e., that we suggest or notify Japan that if they occupy the islands that the United States share in the occupation. Hornbeck and Hamilton were in agreement that unless we were prepared to go to war, if necessary, in event such joint occupation were opposed by Japan that we should not make such a move. The proposal of suggesting to Japan some joint occupancy was not feasible as Japan has stated they wished the status quo preserved.

I explained that this was not a proposal but was more a suggestion which we were exploring, and in order to clarify our own ideas we wished the reactions of the State

Department.9

The "grasping at straws" to deny the Dutch East Indies to the Japanese gave way to more practical considerations of joint actions with the Dutch and British. Stanley Hornbeck extracted for the State Department the chief points of a letter from Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark dated 13 November 1940. Stark earlier had reported to Hart by despatch advanced information concerning his Plan Dog and proposals for American representatives to confer with British and Dutch force commanders at Singapore and Batavia. Hart's letter interpreted by Hornbeck read in part:

5. The only thing which will deter the Japanese from an attempt to seize the Netherlands East Indies will be their fear of opposing forces. By refusing to confer with the British for defense of the Indies, the Dutch are only doing themselves harm.

6. The certainty of British aid to the Dutch would probably not be sufficient of itself permanently to deter

the Japanese.

<sup>8</sup> Memo: Captain Crenshaw to CNO, 15 May 1940; NHD File: EA-EZ.

<sup>9</sup> Memo: R.E.S. [Captain R.E. Schuirmann] to CNO, 15 May 1940; Ibid.

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7. The fullest use of our joint resources calls for Staff discussions that would go immeasurably beyond the "exchange of information" basis on which we are now working. It should be possible for the United States, without making any political commitment, to proceed on certain assumptions, if there is a possibility that we will be acting jointly with the British or Dutch.

8. A Japanese attack on British or Dutch possessions, or both, is a most likely development unless the Japs are fairly certain that we will intervene. The occasion approaches which will be our last chance to maintain our right and interests in the Far East except entirely on our

own and starting from scratch. 10

Cooperation among the Far Eastern Powers was considered by Mahan and Hay;
Yarnell and Richardson had seen the need to cooperate against Japan, and
now Hart and Stark proposed agreements with a view to possible joint action,
yet history shows that the united front came only in extremis and certainly
too late to deter or to oppose effectively the Japanese.

On January 16, 1941 the President in a white House conference announced his decision to make no further reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet. The background behind the decision is most significant because two schools of thought were involved—one advanced by Admiral Stark was much more reserved vis a vis Japan than the one advanced by the former Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Yarnell. Though in this instance Stark again was able to persuade the President to accept his reasoning, most of Admiral Yarnell's recommendations ultimately were tried.

Stark must be given credit for his consistency in the application of his concept to naval and economic pressures against Japan. As indicated in his Plan Dog, Stark did not want to do anything which would bring Japan into the war until Germany was defeated. Just three days prior to the President's

<sup>10</sup> Memo: HORNBECK's Evaluation of Letter Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark, 13 November 1940; NA: 740.0011 P.W./72.

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decision not to reenforce the Asiatic Fleet, he had written Admiral Kimmel:

Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H (sic) of a job...ll

A month later Stark wrote: "There is a chance that further moves againt (sic) Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major problem."

The degrees to which he was willing to go were indicated in his full support of Welles in the State Department not to embargo oil to Japan and his unrelenting attempts to counter the more daring proposals of Admiral Yarnell. On the reenforcement question, Stark had the complete support of Admiral Reeves, who had been Commander in Chief, United States Fleet in 1935.

The record does not show definitely who initiated the proposal which triggered the discussion on the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet. It could very conceivably have been Admiral Yarnell. The proposal was to send immediately to the Asiatic Fleet the aircraft and vessels which in the Navy Basic War Flan Rainbow 3 were termed the "Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement." In the war plan the detachment to the Asiatic Fleet was to be sent from Tearl Harbor "as soon after the outbreak of war as it could be prepared for the trip." The detachment was not designed for operations in the Philippines,

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2144.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 2151.

Cf. Chapter EIGHT, supra.

<sup>14</sup> Memo: Admiral Reeves to Admiral Stark, 15 January 1941; MHD File: A16-3/EF 37 Document #26879 Central Files.

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but for operations initially from bases in the Malay Barrier "in cooperation with the British and Dutch naval, land and air forces there."

"The reenforcement...if it had ever arrived, would have about trebled the surface power of our Asiatic Fleet."

The analysis by Admiral Stark of the effects of reenforcing the Asiatic Fleet in early January 1941 continued:

It is assumed that the reason for sending a reenforcement to the U. S. Asiatic Fleet is for the purpose of deterring Japan from advancing against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. It is not known whether or not the government proposes to initiate war against Japan. If we should do so, the demands of that war will be such that we can do little to aid the British Isles or to assist the British Navy in the Atlantic Ocean. It is my opinion that the British Isles cannot long hold out against Germany unless we continue our supply of materials to those Islee and, probably, actively enter the war with our major naval forces deployed in the Atlantic. Should we make war with our major naval forces against Japan, I believe that Britain will be defeated by Germany, and that the United States will then be left with decidedly inferior naval forces in the Atlantic to protect our national position and that it will be unable to withdraw from the war with Japan without heavy losses of ships and prestige. Should the reenforcement of our Asiatic Fleet not deter Japan, but actually encourage her to strike, we may be creating a situation that will result in a national disaster. My advice is therefore, that we avoid war with Japan, 1?

Stark's analysis was consistent with his Plan Dog and his often repeated views on defeating Germany first. He was not willing to risk actions which would lead to war with Japan or to risk the loss of his naval forces needed

<sup>15</sup> Letter: CND to Sec. Navy, Serial 08212, 17 January 1941; NWD File: A16-3/EF 37, Jan. 15-Dec. 24, 1941.

Supplement to Marrative of Admiral Thomas G. Hart, US Navy; On file in Navy History Division.

<sup>17</sup> Loc. cit., nl5 supra.

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in the Atlantic.

Admiral Yarmell may be said to have had the opposite perspective. He was willing to send naval forces to the Far Fast to deter Japan and to use force if the Japanese moved into southern Indo-China. His suggestions to the Secretary of the Navy may be summarized as follows: Strengthen the Philippines with forces from Panama and Hawaii; send a division of heavy cruisers on a visit to New Tealand, Australia and Singapore; maintain a striking force of cruisers and carriers at Pearl Harbor; discuss plans of coordinate action with the British and Dutch; the British should maintain as large a maval and air force in Singapore as possible consistent with the situation in Burope; and take positive action if Japan moves south from 18 Hanoi to Kamranh Bay and Saigon.

Admiral Stark commented on the Yarnell suggestions item by item in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy on 17 January. Relative to the strengthening of the Philippines, Stark stated: "Anything we can send would probably be inadequate for a successful bluff or deterrent to Japan. It would certainly be inadequate to defend the Philippines, and it is doubtful if it could be withdrawn in time to preserve Singapore, Malay or the Dutch East Indies. It is inadequate for effective action of any serious nature from the Philippines." On the heavy cruiser visits to New Zealand, Australia and Singapore, he commented: "From a military stampoint I think a division of heavy cruisers in such an area on the outbreak of war would be unfortunate." And finally, the taking of positive action against Japan if she moved south from Hanoi, Stark interpreted as meaning war with Japan.

<sup>18</sup> Memo: Admiral Yarnell to Sec. Navy, 15 January 1941; Ibid.

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"I do not recommend war against Japan if she seizes all of Indo-China."

The Philippines were strengthened, cruisers were sent on visits to New

Zealand and Australia and "positive action" was taken by freezing assets

and invoking a complete oil embargo after the Japanese moved south in IndoChina. Yarnell's suggestions were tried with Stark fighting them every

step of the way.

The final phase of the deterrent concept took on new meaning with the fast moving events in the Fall of 1941. The previous attitude that it was impossible to defend the Philippines gave way to optimism over General MacArthur's new Army command and the arrival of B-17 bombers, submarines and additional troops. In November Marshall and Stark in an "Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation" for the President were able to report:

The present combined naval, air and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U.S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

The last attempt to deter Japan failed by months. In an intriguing game of historical supposition, it is most interesting to speculate whether Japan would have been deterred if the final Philippine buildup had been attained.

<sup>19</sup> Letter: CNO to Sec. Navy, Serial 09012, 17 January 1941; Ibid.

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2222.

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### The United States Fleet at Hawaii as a deterrent.

As the war broke in Europe, Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, asked for a division of four heavy cruisers to reenforce his fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark wanted to do what he could for Hart, to strengthen the State Department's hand and at the same time not weaken the Navy's position. On review of the Orange War Plan, and after having talked it over with the President who "okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department" Stark sent a detachment to Hawaii rather than to the Asiatic Fleet. The Asiatic Fleet received one tender, a squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines instead of the cruisers, which remained under the control of the Commander in Chief. In correspondence with Admiral Richardson over the Hawaiian Detachment, Admiral Stark said;

I still think the decision to send the Detachment to Mawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange-foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc. 21

At the end of the annual naval maneuvers the United States Fleet was in Hawaiian waters. On May 7 Stark wrote to Richardson in Hawaii: "Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a couple of weeks." On May 22 Richardson, still in Hawaii uninformed about the plans for his fleet and facing problems of scheduling and training, wrote Stark again to find "why we are here and how long we will probably stay?" Stark's answer was: "You are there because of the deterrent effect

<sup>21</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, p. 932.

<sup>22 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid., p. 933.</u> 23 <u>Ibid., p. 910.</u>

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which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies." Later he added:

...you would naturally ask-suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, (sic) I don't know and I think there is nobody in God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own argument with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thought contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U.S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely mullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so loing(sic) as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. 24

It would appear that a cycle had been completed. Roosevelt had inherited a fleet at Pearl Harbor being used as a deterrent against the Japanese when he took office in 1933.

Admiral Richardson did not accept the validity of the concept that the fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to the Japanese. He visited Washington to persuade the President to return the fleet to the west coast where it could be better supported and trained. In a memorandum covering his talks with the President, Richardson recorded that the President could be convinced "of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if he could be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward."

Roosevelt is also reported to have told Stark relative to moving the fleet; "When I don't know how to move I

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 943.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 962.

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stay put." Stark in November 1940, reiterated the problem to Richardson:
"As you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate,
and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in
Washington. It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some
good pretext."

It would appear that the Fleet was imprisoned at Pearl
Harbor by the deterrent idea which first put it there. Its withdrawal might
be considered by the Japanese as the withdrawal of a deterrent, thereby
giving encouragement to any moves which were held in abeyance because of the
deterrent.

In a letter to Stark on October 22, Richardson stated that his feelings the previous July were "that the Fleet was retained in the Mawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action and ... that there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan." After his October visit he felt that the United States planned more active steps against Japan which would lead to war. He then outlined the serious deficiencies in the Fleet's readiness for war. On February 1, 1941, Admiral Richardson was relieved by Admiral Kimmel because he insisted upon the fleet returning to the west coast, according to one revisionist. Kimmel and the deterring fleet remained in place until the deterrent was removed not to the West Coast by the United States but to the bottom of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.

William L. Langer and S. Everett Cleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 597.

<sup>27</sup> Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, p. 971.

Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1940 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 415ff.

stor get." Heart in excessed 1540, relienanted the problem to Midwesters. "As you know, we estain as without a william to the flow's form which in delicate, and and sould harely be uncompitationed without a courtness ending of proposed that it without an estainty of a stitum in the first of the contrast of the contrast of the flow of the contrast of the flow of th

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<sup>1977-1910 (</sup>Daw Yorker Maryon & Szozieres, 1952), p. 377-1910 to Includence of The Continues of The Continues

<sup>27</sup> and recom thacks are the p. 972.

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The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines marked the end of a most significant phase in Japanese-American foreign relations. The years of planning forwar with Japan were at an end. In the preceding five years the old unrealistic Orange War Plan reached its last stage of development. Fortunately for the United States it was not given the ultimate test, for although the objectives and estimated requirements were pared down from the original, the last Grange Plan was still overly ambitious. The chronic shortage of troops, the lack of a train to support a fleet movement, the weakness of the Philippine defenses and the unknown capabilities of the Japanese in the Mandated Islamds were factors which could not be ignored. Attempts to visit the strategically located islands, so inconveniently located across American lines of communications to the Orient, failed, lending more weight to suspicions of illegal fortifications. To have allowed the islands to pass from Spanish possession through German hands to the Japanese was a strategic mistake due to lack of foresightedness. Not to ensure that the islands were kept in accordance with the mandate was an accepted strategic risk, since Guza and the Philippines were undefended by the Washington Treaty of 1922.

As German successes continued in 1940 American raval leaders appreciated more the necessity of cooperation with allies in the Atlantic and Pacific.

The strategic thinking found expression in Admiral Stark's Plan Dog.

Subsequently conferences with the British in early 1941 produced an agreement on strategy in the Atlantic, but meetings with the British and Dutch in Singapore and Batavia were less fruitful. In the Pacific the strategic questions such as the defense of Singapore continued to generate disagreements, so much so that war started without a workable operations plan. The weak Asiatic Fleet and its British and Dutch counterparts paid the price

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before a superior Japanese force. In fairness to the Far East allies an operations agreement would not have solved all their problems. Too little attention was paid to a major strength factor of the Japanese which effectively took its toll of ships—air superiority: The subsequent loss of the FRINCE OF WALES and the RIPULSE are cases in point.

The question of the oil export restrictions was a thorny one. Japan received the bulk of her oil from the United States. As the possibility of war with Japan increased, the export of oil was tantamount to furnishing a probable enemy with important logistic support. On the surface such actions would appear strategically unsound, but several considerations colored the whole picture. By 1939 Japan had accumulated her huge oil reserves, and in the period of accumulation the American people were little concerned over future national security. There was no attempt to curtail the profitable oil trade while the reserves were being built. When operations in China cut into the reserves and huge orders were placed to compensate for the increased use, the international situation had changed. Oil in 1940 had become a strategic commodity due to the war in Europe, and Japan was tied to the Axis Fowers fighting in that area.

Secretaries Morgenthau, Stimson, Knox and Ickes and many naval officers thought that curtailing shipments of oil to Japan would deter that nation from further aggression, reasoning that for want of oil she could not fight elsewhere. It would appear that this faction had a low estimate of the accumulated reserve, or else chose to ignore the fact that a total embargo did not run the tap dry immediately. Conservative estimates gave Japan nine to twelve months reserve at "normal" war usage. The group lead by Stark and Welles, who wanted limited shipments continued (which amounted to near total orders through circumvention) reasoned that though the price

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Germany were assured. Again it is interesting to speculate whether continuing the oil shipments would have kept Japan out of the war long enough for the deterrents in the Philippines and in the British Far Eastern Fleet to become completely effective, or whether Japan would have reacted to the deterrents regardless of the oil policy. Fears of Japanese seizure of the oil in Dutch East Indies started even before the War in Europe and certainly contributed to the ultimate decision to build up the British and American forces in the Far East in late 1941. Those deterrents in the Philippines and the augmented British Fleet and the United States Fleet "on her eastern flank" were effective against Japan until the decision to strike Pearl Harbor was made. That which Stark feared happened. With prospects of diminishing oil reserve and ever growing deterrents encircling her, Japan decided she had to strike while she could. Those forces which posed the greatest threat to her were the first to be attacked and quickly eliminated.

The first target was the fleet at Pearl Harbor. That force represented the only military force available to the Administration until mobilization and training created a new Army. Though its presence at Hawaii served as a deterrent force, units were constantly being siphoned off for duty in the Atlantic against the German threat. Until the build up of the "two-ocean navy" voted in July 1940, there were not enough ships to fight a war in both oceans. Genuine fear that Germany might gain control of the French and British Fleets in the summer of 1940, dictated avoidance of war with Japan. History will probably uphold Stark's Plan Dog as good strategic thinking under the circumstances.

The influence of the naval leaders and the use of the Navy figures heavily in determining American positions in relations with Japan in this

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period. Stark's support of Welles on the oil matter and his fighting the State Department on the use of ships to visit the Far East or to be used to reenforce the Asiatic Fleet or Singapore might appear inconsistent. Actually there was continuity to Stark's thoughts and that was to keep Japan out of war until Germany were defeated. To this end also Stark, according to his correspondence, repeatedly and successfully pressed his points on the President. He was in an ideal position with a personal relationship with a naval-oriented President. Yet despite his favored position, his near opposite in strategic thinking, Admiral Yarnell, also influenced the President and had most of his ideas tried. The Roosevelt technique of orchestrating the divergent views of his subordinates applied to naval strategy as well as in the political fields.

The United States Navy in the period discussed was certainly the dominant American force in the Pacific and naval strategy and naval influence were deeply involved in almost all relations with Japan. Though the naval influence was pronounced and the Navy must take its share of the mistakes made, the final decisions were made by the President.

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#### APPENDIX A

#### "PLAN DOO"

Op-12-CTB

November 12, 1940

### TEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Referring to my very brief touch in a recent conference as to the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon the major decisions which the Fresident may make for guiding our future naval effort in the event of war, and in further immediate preparation for war, you may recall my remarks the evening we discussed War Plans for the Navy. I stated then that if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere: but that if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not lose everywhere, we might possibly, not win anywhere.

As I stated last winter on the Hill, in these circumstances we would be set back upon our haunches. Our war effort, instead of being widespread, would then have to be confined to the Western Hemisphere.

I now wish to expand my remarks, and to present to you my views concerning steps we might take to meet the situation that will exist should the United States enter war either alone or with allies. In this presentation, I have endeavored to keep in view the political realities in our own country.

The first thing to consider is how and where we might become involved.

- (a) War with Japan in which we have no allies. This might be precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we strongly reinforce our Asiatic Fleet or the Philippines Carrison, should we start fortifying Guam, or should we impose additional important economic sanctions; or it might be precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or by further extention of Japanese hegemony.
- (b) War with Japan in which we have the British Empire, or the British Empire and Netherlands East Indies, as allies. This might be precipitated by one of the causes mentioned in (a), by our movement of a naval reinforcement to Singapore, or by Japanese attack on British or Netherlands territory.
- (c) War with Japan in which she is aided by Germany and Italy, and in which we are or are not aided by allies. To the causes of such a war, previously listed, might be added augmented American material assistance to Great Britain, our active military intervention in Britain's favor, or our active resistance to German extention of military activities to the Western Hemisphere.
- (d) War with Germany and Italy in which Japan would not be initially involved and in which we would be allied with the British. Such a war would be initiated by American decision to intervene for the purpose of preventing the disruption of the British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles.

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(e) We should also consider the alternative of now remaining out of war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to building up our defense of the Western Hemisphere, plus the preservation by peaceful means of our Far Eastern interests, and plus also continued material assistance to Great Britain.

As I see it, our major national objectives in the immediate future might be stated as preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States, plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and political interests in the Far East. It is doubtful, however, that it would be in our interest to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and economic power. A balance of power in the Far East is to our interest as much as is a balance of power in Europe.

The questions that confront us are concerned with the preparation and distribution of the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with its military forces, for use in war in the accomplishment of all or part of these national objectives.

I can only surmise as to the military, political, and economic situation that would exist in the Atlantic should the British Empire collapse. Since Latin-America has rich natural resources, and is the only important area of the world not now under the practical control of strong military powers, we can not dismiss the possibility that, sooner or later, victorious Axis nations might move firmly in that direction. For some years they might remain too weak to attack directly across the sea; their effort more likely would first be devoted to developing Latin American economic dependence, combined with strongly reinforced internal political upheavals for the purpose of establishing friendly regimes in effective military control. The immediacy of danger to us may depend upon the security of the Axis military position in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the degree of our own military preoccupation in the Pacific, and the disturbing influence of unsatisfied economic needs of Latin-America.

The present situation of the British Empire is not encouraging. I believe it easily possible, lacking active American military assistance, for that empire to lose this war and eventually be disrupted.

It is my opinion that the British are over-optimistic as to their chances for ultimate success. It is not at all sure that the British Isles can hold out, and it may be that they do not realize the danger that will exist should they lose in other regions.

Should Britain lose the war, the military consequences to the United States would be serious.

If we are to prevent the disruption of the British Empire, we must support its vital needs.

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Should latter tone the way, his stilling emperature to the Contest Stabes would be synthese.

 Obviously, the British Isles, the "Heart of the Empire", must remain intact.

But even if the British Isles are held, this does not mean that Britain can win the war. To win, she must finally be able to effect the complete, or, at least, the partial collapse of the German Reich.

This result might, conceivably, be accomplished by bombing and by economic starvation through the agency of the blockade. It surely can be accomplished only by military successes on shore, facilitated possibly by over-extension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests.

Alone, the British Empire lacks the man power and the material means to master Germany. Assistance by powerful allies is necessary both with respect to men and with respect to munitions and supplies. If such assistance is to function effectively, Britain must not only continue to maintain the blockade, but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful land action can later be launched.

Provided England continues to sustain its present successful resistance at home, the area of next concern to the British Empire ought to be the Egyptian Theater.

Should Egypt be lost, the Eastern Mediterranean would be opened to Germany, and Italy, the effectiveness of the sea blockade would be largely nullified; Turkey's military position would be fully compromised; and all hope of favorable Russian action would vanish.

Any anti-German offensive in the Near East would then become impossible.

The spot next in importance to Egypt, in my opinion, is dibraltar, combined with West and Northwest Africa. From this area an ultimate offensive through Portugal, Spain and France, with the help of populations inimical to Germany, might give results equal to those which many years ago were produced by Wellington. The western gate to the Mediterranean would still be kept closed, provided Britain helds this region.

This brief discussion naturally brings into question the value to Britain of the Mediterranean relative to that of Hong Kong, Singapore and India. Were the Mediterranean lost, Britain's strength in the Far East could be augmented without weakening home territory.

Japan probably wants the British out of Hong Kong and Singapore; and wants economic control, and ultimately military control, of Malaysia.

It is very questionable if Japan has territorial ambitions in Australia and New Zealand.

But does she now wish the British out of India, thus exposing that region and Western China to early Russian penetration or influence? I doubt it.

It would seem more probable that Japan, devoted to the Axis alliance only so far as her own immediate interests are involved, would prefer not to move

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military forces against Britain, and possibly not against the Netherlands East Indies, because, if she can obtain a high degree of economic control over Malaysia, she will then be in a position to improve her financial structure by increased trade with Britain and America. Her economic offensive power will be increased. Her military dominance will follow rapidly or slowly, as seems best at the time.

The Netherlands East Indies has 60,000,000 people, under the rule of 80,000 Dutchmen, including women and children. This political situation can not be viewed as in permanent equilibrium. The rulers are unsupported by a home country or by an alliance. Native rebellions have occurred in the past, and may recur in the future. These Dutchmen will act in what they believe is their own selfish best interests.

Will they alone resist aggression, or will they accept an accommodation with the Japanese?

Will they resist, if supported only by the British Empire?

Will they firmly resist, if supported by the British Empire and the U. States?

Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed only against the Netherlands East Indies?

Should both firmly resist, what local military assistance will they require from the United States to ensure success?

No light on these questions has been thrown by the report of the proceedings of the recent Singapore Conference.

The basic character of a war against Japan by the British and Dutch would be the fixed defense of the Malay Peminsula, Sumatra and Java. The allied army, naval, and air forces now in position are considerable, and some future reenforcement may be expected from Australia and New Zealand. Borneo and the islands to the East are vulnerable. There is little chance for an allied offensive. Without Dutch assistance, the external effectiveness of the British bases at Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear.

The Japanese deployment in Manchukuo and China requires much of their Army, large supplies and merchant tonnage, and some naval force. It is doubtful if Japan will feel secure in withdrawing much strength from in front of Russia, regardless of non-aggression agreements. The winter lull in China will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces they need for a campaign against Malaysia. The availability of ample supplies for such a campaign is problematical.

Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with all categories of military force to capture the entire area. The campaign might even last several months. Whether Japan would concurrently be able successfully to attack Hong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful.

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During such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of effort, Japan would, unquestionably be more vulnerable to attack by the United States (or by Russia) than she would be once Malaysia is in her possession.

This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of an American war against Japan, that is, either the so-called "Grange Plan", or a modification. It must be understood that the Grange Plan was drawn up to govern our operations when the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations are involved.

You have heard enough to the Orange Flan to know that, in a nutshell, it envisages our Fleet's proceeding westward through the Marshalls and the Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of the Philippines. Once there, the Orange Flan contemplates the eventual economic starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction of her external military power. Its accomplishment would require several years, and the absorption of the full military, naval, and economic energy of the American people.

In proceeding through these Mid-Pacific islands, we have several subsidiary objectives in mind. First, we hope that our attack will induce the Japanese to expose their fleet in action against our fleet, and lead to their naval defeat. Second, we wish to destroy the ability of the Japanese to use these positions as air and submarine bases from which to project attacks on our lines of communication to the mainland and Hawaii. Third, we would use the captured positions for supporting our further advance westward.

Most of the island positions are atolls. These atolls, devoid of natural sources of water other than rainfall, and devoid of all supplies, are merely narrow coral and sand fringes around large shallow areas where vessels may anchor. Alone, they are undefendable against serious attack, either by one side or the other. They do, however, afford weak positions for basing subnarines and seaplanes. Our Fleet should have no difficulty in capturing atolls, provided we have enough troops, but we could not hold them indefinitely unless the Fleet were nearby.

We know little about the Japanese defenses in the Mid-Pacific. We believe the real islands of Truk and Ponape in the Carolines are defended with guns and troops, and we believe that some of the atolls of the Marshalls may be equipped as submarine and air bases, and be garrisoned with relatively small detachments of troops.

The Marshalls contain no sites suitable for bases in the absence of the Fleet, though there are numerous good anchorages. With the Fleet at hand, they can be developed for use as seaplane and submarine bases for the support of an attack on real islands such as Ponape and Truk. With the Fleet permanently absent, they will succumb to any serious thrust.

Our first real Marshall-Caroline objective is Truk, a magnificant harbor, relatively easily defended against raids, and capable of conversion into an admirable advanced base. When we get this far in the accomplishment of the "Orange Plan", we have the site for a base where we can begin to

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assemble our ships, stores, and troops, for further advance toward the Philippines. It would also become the center of the defense system for the lines of communications against flank attack from Japan.

Getting to Truk involves a strong effort. We would incur losses from aircraft, mines and submarines, particularly as the latter could be spared the operations in Malaysia. We would lose many troops in assaulting the islands.

Coing beyond Truk initiates the most difficult part of the Orange Plan, would take a long time, and would require the maximum effort which the United States could sustain.

Truk is not looked upon as a satisfactory final geographical objective. It is too far away to support useful operations in the China Sea. It can not be held in the absence of fairly continuous Fleet support. No matter what gains are made in the Mid-Pacific, they would undoubtedly be lost were the Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic. We would have then to choose between a lengthy evacuation process, and a major loss of men, material and prestige.

In advancing to the capture of Ponape and Truk, the Orange Plan contemplates proceeding promptly, delaying in the Marshalls only long enough to destroy Japanese shore bases, to capture the atolls necessary to support the advance and to deny future bases to Japan.

We have little knowledge as to the present defensive strength of the Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a whole. If they are well defended, to capture them we estimate initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly trained troops, with another 50,000 in immediate reserve. If they are not well defended, an early advance with fewer troops might be very profitable. Several months must elapse from the present date before 75,000 troops could be made ready, considering the defense requirements of Alaska, Hawaii, and Samoa, and our commitments with respect to the internal political stability of the Latin-American countries.

We should consider carefully the chances of failure as well as of success. An immediate success would be most important morally, while a failure would be costly from the moral viewpoint. Before invading Norway, Germany trained for three months the veterans of the Polish campaign. Remembering Norway, we have the example of two methods of overseas adventure. One is the British method; the other is the German method.

The question of jumping directly from Hawaii to the Philippines has often been debated, but, so far as I know, this plan has always been ruled out by responsible authorities as unsound from a military viewpoint. Truk is 1900 miles from Yokohama, 5300 miles from San Francisco, 3200 from Honolulu, and 2000 miles from Manila. I mention this to compare the logistic problem with that of the Norway incident. An enormous amount of shipping would be required. Its availability under present world conditions would be doubtful.

Of course the foregoing, (the Orange Plan), is a major commitment in the Pacific, and does not envisage the cooperation of allies. Once started the

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abandonment of the offensive required by the plan, to meet a threat in the Atlantic, would involve abandoning the objectives of the war, and also great loss of prestige.

A totally different situation would exist were the Philippines and Guam rendered secure against attack by adequate troops, aircraft, and fortifications. The movement of the Fleet across the Pacific for the purpose of applying direct pressure upon Japan, and its support when in position, would be less difficult than in the existing situation.

Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any modification of that plan which involves the movement of very strong naval and army contingents to the Far East, we would have to accept considerable danger in the Atlantic, and would probably be unable to augment our material assistance to Great Britain.

We should, therefore, examine other plans which involve a war having a more limited objective than the complete defeat of Japan, and in which we would undertake hostilities only in cooperation with the British and Dutch, and in which these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance in Malaysia.

Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make us also an ally of Britain in the Atlantic. The naval forces remaining in the Atlantic, for helping our ally and for defending ourselves, would, by just so much, reduce the power which the United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific.

The objective in a limited war against Japan would be the reduction of Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade. Under one concept, allied strategy would comprise holding the Malay Barrier, denying access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of communication with the Western Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the Mid-Pacific, the Philippine, China, and Indo-China. United States defensive strategy would also require army reenforcement of Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, the establishment of naval bases in the Fiji, Samoan and Gilbert Islands areas, and denial to Japan of the use of the Marshalls as light force bases. We might be able to re-enforce the Philippine garrison, particularly with aircraft. I do not believe that the British and Dutch alone could hold Malay Barrier without direct military assistance by the United States. In addition to help from our Asiatic Fleet, I am convinced that they would need further reenforcement by ships and aircraft drawn from our Fleet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops.

Besides military aid for the allied defense forces, our intervention would bring them a tremendous moral stimulus.

An alternative concept of the suggested limited war would provide additional support from the main body of the Fleet either by capturing the Marshalls, or by capturing both the Marshalls and Carolines. This, or a similar fleet activity, would be for the purpose of diverting away from Malaysia important Japanese forces to oppose it, and thus reducing the strength of their assault against the Dutch and British.

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But we should consider the prospect that the losses which we would incur in such operations might not be fruitful of compensating results. Furthermore, withdrawal of the Fleet from captured positions for transfer to the Atlantic would be more difficult.

It is out of the question to consider sending our entire Fleet at once to Singapore. Base facilities are far too limited, the supply problem would be very great, and Hawaii, Alaska, and our coasts would be greatly exposed to raids.

One point to remember, in connection with a decision to adopt a limited offensive role, as in both of the alternative plans just mentioned, is that, in case of reverses, public opinion may require a stronger effort. For example, should Japanese success in the Far East seem imminent, there would be great pressure brought to bear to support our force there, instead of leaving it hanging in the air. Thus, what we might originally plan as a limited war with Japan might well become an unlimited war; our entire strength would then be required in the Far East, and little force would remain for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support of the British Isles.

Let us now look eastward, and examine our possible action in the Atlantic.

In the first place, if we avoid serious commitment in the Pacific, the purely American Atlantic problem, envisaging defense of our coasts, the Caribbean, Canada, and South America, plus giving strong naval assistance to Britain, is not difficult so long as the British are able to maintain their present naval activity. Should the British Isles then fall we would find ourselves acting alone, and at war with the world. To repeat, we would be thrown back on our haunches.

Should we enter the war as an ally of Great Britain, and not then be at war with Japan, we envisage the British asking us for widespread naval assistance. Roughly, they would want us, in the Western Atlantic Ocean from Cape Sable to Cape Horn, to protect shipping against raiders and submarine activities. They would also need strong reenforcements for their escort and minesweeping forces in their home waters; and strong flying boat reconnaissance from Scotland, the Atlantic Islands, and Capetown. They might ask us to capture the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

To their home waters they would have us send submarines and small craft, and to the Mediterranean assistance of any character which we may be able to provide. They would expect us to take charge of allied interests in the Pacific, and to send a naval detachment to Singapore.

This purely naval assistance, would not, in my opinion, assure final victory for Great Britain. Victory would probably depend upon her ability ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers. For making a successful land offensive, British man power is insufficient. Offensive troops from other nations will be required. I believe that the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance, would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land offensive. The naval task of transporting an army abroad would be large.

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To carry out such tasks we would have to exert a major naval and military effort in the Atlantic. We would then be able to do little more in the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive.

Were we to enter the war against Germany and Italy as an ally of Great Britain, I do not necessarily anticipate immediate hostile action by Japan, whatever may be her Axis obligation. She may fear eventual consequences and do nothing. We might be faced with demands for concessions as the price of her neutrality. She might agree to defer her aggressions in the Netherlands East Indies for the time being by a guarantee of ample economic access to the Western Hemisphere and to British and Dutch possessions. But she might even demand complete cessation of British and American assistance to China.

The strong wish of the American government and people at present seems to be to remain at peace. In spite of this, we must face the possibility that we may at any moment become involved in war. With war in prospect, I believe our every effort should be directed toward the prosecution of a national policy with mutually supporting diplomatic and military aspects, and having as its guiding feature a determination that any intervention we may undertake shall be such as will ultimately best promote our own national interests. We should see the best answer to the question: "Where should we fight the war, and for what objective?" With the answer to this question to guide me, I can make a more logical plan, can more appropriately distribute the naval forces, can letter coordinate the future material preparation of the Navy, and can more usefully advise as to whether or not proposed diplomatic measures can adequately be supported by available naval strength.

That is to say, until the question concerning our final military objective is authoritatively answered, I can not determine the scale and the nature of the effort which the Navy may be called upon to exert in the Far East, the Pacific, and the Atlantic.

It is a fundamental requirement of our military position that our homeland remain secure against successful attack. Directly concerned in this security is the safety of other parts of the Western Hemisphere. A very strong pillar of the defense structure of the Americas has, for many years, been the balance of power existing in Europe. The collapse of Great Britain or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy this balance and will free European military power for possible encroachment in this hemisphere.

I believe that we should recognize as the foundation of adequate armed strength the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw materials and in finished goods. Without such a trade, our economy can scarcely support heavy armaments. The restoration of foreign trade, particularly with Europe, may depend upon the continued integrity of the British Empire.

It may be possible for us to prevent a British collapse by military intervention.

Our interests in the Far East are very important. The economic effect of a complete Japanese hegemony in that region is conjectural. But regardless of economic considerations, we have heretofore strongly opposed the further

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expansion of Japan.

We might temporarily check Japanese expansion by defeating her in a war in the Far East, but to check her permanently would require that we retain possession of, and militarily develop, an extensive and strategically located Asiatic base area having reasonably secure lines of communication with the United States. Retaining, and adequately developing, an Asiatic base area would mean the reversal of long-standing American policy.

Whether we could ensure the continued existence of a strong British Empire by soundly defeating Japan in the Far East is questionable, though continuing to hold on there for the present is a definite contribution to British strength.

Lacking possession of an Asiatic base area of our own, continued British strength in the Far East would doubtless prove advantageous to us in checking Japan permanently.

The military matters discussed in this memorandum may properly receive consideration in arriving at a decision on the course that we should adopt in the diplomatic field. An early decision in this field will facilitate a naval preparation which will best promote the adopted course. As I see affairs today; answers to the following broad questions will be most useful to the Navy:

(A) Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere defense, and include chiefly those activities within the Western Hemisphere which contribute directly to security against attack in either or both oceans? An affirmative answer would indicate that the United States, as seems now to be the hope of this country, would remain out of war unless pushed into it. If and when forced into war, the greater portion of our Fleet could remain for the time being in its threatening position in the Pacific, but no major effort would be exerted everseas either to the east or the west; the most that would be done for allies, besides providing material help, would be to send detachments to assist in their defense. It should be noted here that, were minor help to be given in one direction, public opinion might soon push us into giving it major support, as was the case in the World War.

Under this plan, our influence upon the outcome of the European War would be small.

(B) Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remain on the strict defensive in the Atlantic? If this course is selected, we would be placing full trust in the British to hold their own indefinitely in the Atlantic, or, at least, until after we should have defeated Japan decisively, and thus had fully curbed her offensive power for the time being. Plans for augmenting the scale of our present material assistance to Great Britain would be adversely affected until Japan had been decisively defeated. The length of time required to defeat Japan would be very considerable.

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probably would in any case have to reorient towards the Atlantic. There is no dissenting view on this point.

(C) Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch and Chinese in the Far East? The naval and air detachments we would send to the British Isles would possibly ensure their continued resistance, but would not increase British power to conduct a land offensive. The strength we could send to the Far East might be enough to check the southward spread of Japanese rule for the duration of the war. The strength of naval forces remaining in Hawaii for the defense of the Eastern Pacific, and the strength of the forces in the Western Atlantic for the defense of that area, would be reduced to that barely sufficient for executing their tasks. Should Great Britain finally lose, or should Malaysia fall to Japan, our naval strength might them be found to have been seriously reduced, relative to that of the Axis powers. It should be understood that, under this plan, we would be operating under the handicap of fighting major wars on two fronts.

Should we adopt Plan (C), we must face the consequences that would ensue were we to start a war with one plan, and then, after becoming heavily engaged, be forced greatly to modify it or discard it altogether, as, for example, in case of a British fold up. On neither of these distant fronts would it be possible to execute a really major offensive. Strategically, the situation might become disastrous should our effort on either front fail.

(D) Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific? Any strength that we might send to the Far East would, by just so much, reduce the force of our blows against Germany and Italy. About the least that we would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light forces and aircraft to Great Britain and the Mediterranean. Probably we could not stop with a purely naval effort. The plan might ultimately require capture of the Portuguese and Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full scale land offensive. In consideration of a course that would require landing large numbers of troops abroad, account must be taken of the possible unwillingness of the people of the United States to support land operations of this character, and to incur the risk of heavy loss should Great Britain collapse. Under Plan (D) we would be unable to exert strong pressure against Japan, and would necessarily gradually reorient our policy in the Far East. The full national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather than be extended in areas far distant from each other. At the conclusion of the war, even if Britain should finally collapse, we might still find ourselves possessed of bases in Africa suitable for assisting in the defense of South America.

Under any of these plans, we must recognize the possibility of the involvement of France as an ally of Germany.

I believe that the continued existence of the British Rapire, combined with building up a strong protection in our home areas, will do most to ensure

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national interests. As I have previously stated, I also believe that Great Britain requires from us very great help in the Atlantic, and possibly even on the continents of Europe or Africa, if she is to be enabled to survive. In my opinion Alternatives (A), (B), and (C) will most probably not provide the necessary degree of assistance, and, therefore, if we undertake war, that Alternative (D) is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States, particularly if we enter the war at an early date. Initially, the offensive measures adopted would, necessarily, be purely naval. Even should we intervene, final victory in Europe is not certain. I believe that the chances for success are in our favor, particularly if we insist upon full equality in the political and military direction of the war.

The odds seem against our being able under Plan (D) to check Japanese expansion unless we win the war in Europe. We might not long retain possession of the Philippines. Our political and military influence in the Far East might largely disappear, so long as we were fully engaged in the Atlantic. A preliminary to a war in this category would be a positive effort to avoid war with Japan, and to endeavor to prevent war between Japan and the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies. The possible cost of avoiding a war with Japan has been referred to previously.

I would add that Plan (D) does not mean the immediate movement of the Fleet into the Atlantic. I would make no further moves until war should become imminent, and then I would recommend redistribution of our naval forces as the situation then demanded. I fully recognize the value of retaining strong forces in the Pacific as long as they can profitably be kept there.

Until such time as the United States should decide to engage its full forces in war, I recommend that we pursue a course that will most rapidly increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy, that is to say, adopt alternative (A) without hostilities.

Under any decision that the President may tentatively make, we should at once prepare a complete Joint Flan for guiding Army and Navy activities. We should also prepare at least the skeletons of alternative plans to fit possible alternative situations which may eventuate. I make the specific recommendation that, should we be forced into a war with Japan, we should, because of the prospect of war in the Atlantic also, definitely plan to avoid operations in the Far East or the Mid-Pacific that will prevent the Navy from promptly moving to the Atlantic forces fully adequate to safeguard our interests and policies in the event of a British collapse. We ought not now willingly engage in any war against Japan unless we are certain of aid from Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.

No important allied military decision should be reached without clear understanding between the nations involved as to the strength and extent of the participation which may be expected in any particular theater, and as to a proposed skeleton plan of operations.

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Accordingly, I make the recommendation that, as a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with the British military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian military authorities in Washington, and with British and Dutch authorities in Singapore and Batavia. The purpose would be to reach agreements and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war under any of the alternative eventualities considered in this memorandum.

H.R. Stark

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#### APPENDIX B

#### ABBREVIATIONS

ADC American-pritish Conversations

ADB American-Outch-British

ADM Admiral

CINCAF Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet

CINCUS Commander in Chief, United States Fleet

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

COMYANGPAT Commander Yangtze River Patrol

CoS Chief of Staff

Ja Joint Board

JPC Joint Planning Committee

NA National Archives

NHD Naval History Division

RADM Rear Admiral

SecNav Secretary of the Navy

SNO Senior haval Officer

SPENAVO Special Naval Observer

WPD War Plans Division

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
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